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 i 
Understanding the Umma  
as an Islamic “Global” Society 
 
 
Ganjar Widhiyoga 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Traditionally the concept of society was in practice bound by state or tribal 
boundaries. However, the aspiration to move beyond the boundaries and establish 
a global society has been present in mankind’s history. Roland Robertson calls 
this kind of aspiration “global consciousness”. One such aspiration can be found 
in Islam. Islam encourages the believers to spread the religion and establish a 
global society, which in Islamic vocabulary is called the umma.  
 
In this thesis, I seek to explore how early Islamic society developed global 
consciousness and how the concept of the umma developed in relation to the 
concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a 
global society. I argue that the early Islamic society developed global 
consciousness through reflecting the spiritual teaching of Islam and through 
several networks. In order to trace the development of global consciousness in 
early Islamic society, I follow Clifford Geertz’s assertion that religion is a cultural 
system and discuss how basic doctrines and religious rituals in Islam cultivate the 
development of global consciousness in the minds of the believers. 
 
Subsequently, in order to understand the global characteristics of the umma, I 
observe the historical development of several instruments fundamental to the 
emergence of translocal networks in the Muslim world, namely the intellectual 
networks of Muslim scholars, the caliphates, and Sufi brotherhoods. The presence 
of networks of intellectuals, integration under the caliphates, and the spreading 
Sufi brotherhoods are invoked as indicators that the umma was a social reality and 
had the characteristics of translocal society. Yet, while the aspiration to establish a 
global society is strong within Muslim society, I argue that historical data show 
that the umma is a translocal, rather than a global, society. 
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Understanding the Umma  
as an Islamic “Global” Society 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Background 
Society has been a crucial part of our political life. It has been present 
since the ancients and persistent until today in our modern time. It is a term which 
is very familiar to us and everyone thinks he knows the meaning of it, yet whether 
this conviction is true or not, that remains to be seen (Elias, 2001b, p. 3). While 
our ancestors regarded society as part of a greater cosmic order (Outhwaite, 2006, 
p. 1), the modern conceptions of “society” range from “emphatic” to “society as 
the outcome of a process of interaction and social constitution” to a “modern form 
of association” (Outhwaite, 2006, pp. 2–9).  
Traditionally, up to the Second World War, the concept of society was in 
practice bound by state or tribal boundaries. Thus, the intensification of trade 
networks and relations between various actors starting in the late twentieth 
century is seen as challenging this traditional notion of society (Elias, 2001a, pp. 
162–163). Instead of focusing on a local, geographical part of the world, society is 
“widening” and “encompassing the whole world”. By the end of the  twentieth 
century, values, norms, ideas are moving freely without regard to their cultural 
background or even geographical position (Roy, 2004). This phenomenon shows 
that our world is moving toward “a single, integrated and interdependent world”. 
This process is labelled “globalisation” (Jaffe, 2006). As Friedman (2007) 
famously says, “our world has become flat”.  
These changes, inevitably, instigate changes in how we conceptualise and 
perceive society. Sociologists were the first to respond. Luhmann (1997) argues 
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that in our modern context, we are left with two options, whether to adopt a global 
system of regional societies, or a single world society. Others disagree and 
provide alternatives arguments about the future of society. Robertson (1992, pp. 
78–82) describes four types of world order, which range from the world as “a 
series of relatively closed societal communities” to “planned world organisation”. 
This argument is parallel with various international relations theorists, starting 
with Burton (1972) to Buzan (2004) and many others. The debate on the concept 
of “society” is fundamental because it shows that what we call as society is 
debatable and changeable by the ocurring debates. Thus, it is possible to 
“construct and deconstruct” the concept of a society, assuming a strong enough 
idea is present to do so.  
The globalisation process in the late twentieth century, which transformed 
our society from a local to a global one, is often perceived as a unique 
phenomenon of the digital age. Yet, it is not necessarily so. While the diminishing 
of national borders, as we know,  has indeed happened since the twentieth century, 
the awareness that our world is one and humans are all interconnected to one 
another is an idea as old as humanity itself (Robertson, 1992; Wilkinson, 2006). 
Robertson (1990; 1992; 2006; 2011) wrote a series of books and articles on how 
the consciousness that the world is interconnected and interdependent had been 
prevalent during various times in the history of humanity. Our contemporary 
“modern” globalisation is just one occurrence among many similar processes. 
Thus, the “modern global society” that emerged from the concept is also not a 
unique, nor even the first, phenomenon of a globalised society.  
In conjecture with Robertson’s idea, Abu-Lughod (1987; 1989; 1996) 
argues that the world has seen interactions and networks on a global scale before 
the advent of the European world economy in the sixteenth century. Examining 
trade patterns throughout history and consistently using empirical evidence such 
as navigation manuals, trade contracts and such, Abu-Lughod asserts the existence 
of trade patterns which encompassed the then-known world as early as the 
thirteenth century (Abu-Lughod, 1987). She further argues that this world system 
was supported by various regional actors whose activities maintained and 
regulated the flows of trade and interactions between various locales. Among 
these regional actors were various Muslim political entities, such as the Mamluks 
or the Ottomans (Abu-Lughod, 1989; 1996).  
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Although she goes into detail on trade relations and routes, Abu-Lughod, 
however, does not adequately explain the less materialistic aspects of the network, 
such as the presence of global consciousness proposed by Robertson or anything 
equivalent to that. Thus, this thesis seeks to investigate that particular aspect, 
enquiring into the presence of global consciousness in Muslim society. Since the 
Muslims are known to have their own, distinctive, vocabulary on society, known 
as the umma, this thesis further argues that the umma can thus be acknowledged as 
an interconnected, translocal society with global aspirations. 
Research Questions 
There are two questions that this thesis seeks to address: 
1. How did the early Islamic society develop global consciousness? 
2. How was the concept of the umma developed in relation both to the concept of 
global consciousness and to the concept and historical formation of a global 
society? 
Hypotheses 
1. This thesis proposes that the early Islamic society developed global 
consciousness through reflecting the spiritual teaching of Islam and through 
intellectual chains of knowledge transmission and diffusion, political and legal 
institutional networks and mystical networks. 
2. This global consciousness solidified into a broader, translocal society, but not 
truly global, which in the Islamic vocabulary is called the umma 
Research Significance 
This thesis will have significance in several ways.  
First, this thesis also contributes to the development of global politics by 
placing focus on the development of the early Islamic society as a global actor. In 
a small way, therefore, it may help to redress the Western-centric bias of the 
Westphalian conceptualisation of international relations, as questioned in the 
works edited by Acharya and Buzan (2009), which both question why there is no 
non-Western approach to international relations and provide several non-Western 
 4 
alternatives, and also the work of Vucetic (2011), which highlights the presence of 
an Anglosphere identity in contemporary international relations. 
Second, this thesis will expand on the historicisation of the concept of 
globalisation by tracking the transference of idea before and during the early 
Islamic society. The time span of this thesis will therefore be from the early 
Islamic society in the seventh century to the beginning of the Tanzimat movement 
in Ottoman Empire in 1839. While the temporal range is thus wide, the pre-
modern period is formative and there are well-established Muslim and non-
Muslim historical accounts that document the developing translocal consciousness 
and networks in this period. 
Third, this thesis contributes to development of Islamic studies by relating 
the concept of the umma, which is intrinsic to the religious terminology of Islam, 
with the concepts of global consciousness and global society, which are rooted in 
a social and political vocabulary.  
Research Approach 
This thesis will use social constructionism articulated by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) as the basic theoretical orientation. According to Berger and 
Luckmann, social reality is something that is constructed by humans. A person’s 
reality is constructed from how his or her consciousness puts meanings on objects 
around them. The collection of meanings then shape his or her reality’s common 
knowledge, which can then be maintained to the point that the individuals take it 
for granted as the ‘truth’. It is possible to question reality, but to do so, one has to 
be make a deliberate and extreme effort (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 33–37). 
Reality that has been shared among individuals and maintained thoroughly 
will become social reality. In essence, to produce social reality, humans have to go 
through three processes: externalisation, objectivation and internalisation. By 
externalisation, humans project their ideas to material objects or particular signs. 
Through objectivation, those artefacts then become ‘object’ of consciousness for 
people in the society, continuously accepted as part of their social reality to the 
point that they are inevitably taken for granted, they become part of the ‘natural’ 
order of the society. These ‘natural’ objects then become the tools to 
internalisation of the common knowledge to the younger generations, affirming 
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that the ‘knowledge’ of the society is embedded in their consciousness (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 68–84). 
It is in this context that this thesis examines the presence of a global 
consciousness in Islamic teaching and the formation of something which might be 
perceived as a global society in Muslim history. This thesis defines global 
consciousness as defined in the work of Roland Robertson (1990; 1992; 2006; 
2011). Subsequently, this thesis follows the approach articulated by Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998) in their norm diffusion theory to engage with the concept of 
global consciousness and its transference process to become a commonly accepted 
norm in a society, which then presumably leads to the establishment of global 
interactions and networks based on this consciousness in the society. This thesis 
then seeks to elaborate the concept of global society by reviewing the relevant 
literature in the study of international relations, namely world system theory, 
cosmopolitanism and the English school tradition. The complete elaboration of 
this process will be presented in Chapter One. 
After establishing a conceptual framework of global consciousness and its 
transference process and the definition of global society, this thesis describes how 
the teachings of Islam bring a message of global consciousness to its adherents. 
This global consciousness was then transferred by Muslims through their 
interactions and established networks, which resulted in historical phenomena that 
might be categorised as a global society. While using religion to analyse social 
and political processes is problematic, this thesis finds supporting theoretical 
framework in Geertz’s work, Religion as a cultural system (1973), which 
describes how religious activities have the capability to induce moods and provide 
motivations to the believers to act in certain ways. Therefore, Chapter Two will 
implement this theoretical framework into Muslim historical accounts and explain 
how Islam shaped Muslims’ consciousness and motivated them to try to establish 
a global society.  
This thesis’s argument that the manifestation of global consciousness 
existed in Muslim historical accounts will then be examined empirically in 
Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six of this thesis. This thesis therefore will use 
historical representation to collect the data. As Hacking (1999, pp. 19–21) argues, 
historical analysis is the most fundamental method of conducting social 
construction research. Dunn (2008, p. 79) describes the difficulties inherent in 
 6 
analysing the representation of an object over time and space. How an object is 
represented is important since it conveys a message by which people act and react 
to the object in question. Continuous use of the representation will produce a 
“regime of truth” that commands obedience and is capable of delivering rewards 
and punishment. Application of this method to Muslim history will lead this thesis 
to be able to discern various symbols used to represent global consciousness in 
Islamic teachings and the ways in which these symbols constructed a “regime of 
truth” that supported the establishment of the umma.  
There are two principal limitations inherent in this thesis. The first is the 
possibility of bias introduced by using books written by Muslim scholars. This is 
understandable since every narrative has the chance to introduce its own bias. 
Chase (2005, pp. 656–658) argues that while narratives might provide valuable 
information, narratives also express emotion, thought and, most importantly, the 
interpretation of the narrator. In order to reduce this possibility, this thesis 
balances the Muslim-written narratives with books produced by Western and non-
Muslim scholars. The second limitation lies in the fact that I do not command 
Arabic fluent enough to be able to access primary sources in that language. While 
this is unfortunate, this thesis seeks to address this limitation by using well-
established translations or secondary sources written by respectable authors. R. 
Stephen Humphreys (1991), an eminent scholar of early and medieval Islam, 
provides a good selection of secondary sources that I can access1.  This thesis also 
accesses various books translated into Bahasa Indonesia that do not have English 
translations to provide a richer set of data, especially concerning the spread of 
Islam to Indonesia and the dynamics within Muslim society there.        
This thesis will be divided into several chapters, with a general overview 
of each chapter as follows:  
 
1. Chapter One: Global Consciousness and the Formation of Global Society: 
explaining concepts of global consciousness, transference process and theories 
related to global society as the conceptual framework of this thesis, which will 
be applied to the historical material of subsequent chapters. 
                                               
1
 I have not used a precise transliteration scheme for Arabic words. I have dropped the ta marbuta, 
but otherwise follow common spellings used in English-language sources.   
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2. Chapter Two: Towards the Development of Islamic Global 
Consciousness: describing the historical context and how Islamic teachings 
and rituals presumably instilled a global consciousness in the early Islamic 
society.  
3. Chapter Three: Intellectual Networks and the Integration of the Umma: 
explaining how teacher-student relations between Muslim intellectuals had 
formed various intellectual chains which played an important part in diffusing 
the idea of a global consciousness to various locals in the Muslim world.  
4. Chapter Four: The Conceptual Development of the Caliphate: describing 
how the idea of the umma instigated the necessity for Muslims to develop an 
institution of authority. This led to the development of the “caliphate”. This 
chapter seeks to show that the caliphate was an evolving concept, in 
accordance to the interpretation of the holy texts and the actual condition of 
Muslim society.  
5. Chapter Five: The Integration of the Umma under the Caliphates: 
describing the structural development of the caliphate, how it grew and 
became more complicated with differentiation of roles among various 
apparatuses. This chapter also seeks to argue that the institutional development 
of the caliphate, while perhaps driven by political motives, inevitably provided 
a functional framework in which the idea of the umma thrived.  
6. Chapter Six: Integration through the Sufi Orders: explaining Sufi 
networks which as non-political institutions contributed to the promotion of 
global consciousness throughout Muslim lands. While the main goal of the 
Sufi networks was mystical, they unwittingly integrated Muslims by 
promoting shared values and rituals, which paved the way to greater 
integration among Muslim locals.  
7. Chapter Seven: The Umma as a Symbolic Universe: analysing the 
development of the umma using a global society framework and how each 
facet of society promotes the global consciousness by embedding the umma as 
a symbolic universe in the minds of Muslims. This chapter then evaluates 
whether the corresponding society, the umma, can truly be categorised as a 
global society.  
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Chapter One: 
Global Consciousness and the Formation of Global 
Society 
 
 
Global consciousness 
The term global consciousness can be explained as the “consciousness of 
the world as a whole,” interconnected and interdependent (Robertson and Inglish, 
2006, p. 30). Someone adopting this global consciousness tends to feel attached to 
the world as a whole, instead of a particular tribe, state, or part of the world. He or 
she identifies himself or herself as global citizen. He understands that his actions 
will have a profound effect on others, and at the same time, he will be affected by 
others’ actions too. This new identification will change his behaviour towards the 
local unit which he previously identified himself with. The shift of attachment will 
decrease his or her loyalty to the local unit, and give a broader, global perspective 
on day to day activities (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 281–283). 
This consciousness can be seen in practice when facing problems such as 
endemic disease and ecological degradation. When facing global threats that 
trespass local borders and that no contemporary local units (states, tribes, etc) can 
handle, people discovered the need to band together to solve the problem, 
regardless of citizenship, race or ethnicity. Lee, Buse, and Fustukian (2002) for 
example, explain how interconnectedness in our world led to the spread of 
endemic diseases. Kay and William (2009) then argue that these health problems 
required global, coordinated, policies to be dealt with. With regard to 
environmental issues, Vertovec and Posey (2003) believe that actions from all 
elements of the global society are necessary to reduce environmental degradation. 
Interestingly, Vertovec and Posey base their call on a “global consciousness of 
connections’, the awareness that the world is integrated as one, and the action in 
one part might influence another part (Vertovec and Posey, 2003, pp. 2–3). 
Acknowledging global consciousness and the globalisation process leads 
us to questioning parochial consciousness, which has a different view of the world. 
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Parochial consciousness grows when people that live within a certain geographical 
area develop commonalities. This can result in various political concepts, such as 
tribalism (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 148–149), ethnicity (Said and Simmons, 1975) or 
nationalism (Anderson, 2006, pp. 37–46). This consciousness then transformed 
into a political entity and guided the people inside the area with a common 
mission and promoted uniformity inside its territory (Bauman, 1990, p. 153). 
Since parochial consciousness is inherently related to a certain 
geographical area, it is inevitable that the world is consisted of many parochial 
societies, each cautious toward another. While parochial consciousness promotes 
uniformity inward to the members of its societies, it also imposes discrimination 
to those deemed as “outsiders”. This discrimination. for example, can be observed 
in tribal laws. In our modern world, the expression of parochial consciousness can 
be seen in the concept of “nation-state”. The process of uniformity and 
discrimination within a nation-state continues and the world has become a place 
where people in one nation-state often look to others as outsiders. Anyone who is 
not the member of a nation-state is considered as outsider. The outsiders then 
receive different treatment, and sometime even are denied access to certain 
services and goods (Riesenberg, 1992, p. 24; Kim, 2001, pp. 31–35). This practice 
has been ongoing since ancient times and legitimated by the concept of 
“citizenship” (Riesenberg, 1992, p. xvii).  
Global consciousness is crucial for the development of human interactions 
that encourage humans to transcend their parochial boundaries, to the point of 
eliminating the said boundaries. Social phenomena bearing the characteristic of 
global consciousness can be observed in our contemporary history. Starting from 
the early fifteenth century to mid eighteenth century, the modern idea of society 
slowly replaced the medieval one. From the nineteenth to mid twentieth century, 
the idea of modern society and how the national societies interact with each other 
in an international society was established, and completely eliminated the 
medieval system. During these stages, the idea that the world is a whole place 
with interconnected relations emerged in our modern society and gained 
momentum to become a popular idea such as it is today (Robertson, 1992, pp. 58–
59). 
The world wars, the establishment of the League of Nations and then the 
United Nations, and the presence of conflicting ideologies were developments that 
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occurred within the framework of modern global consciousness. The end of the 
Cold War marked the end of a chapter in the modern globalisation process and 
also heralded the beginning of a new one. Modern global consciousness keeps on 
growing and changing, to the point that Friedman (2007) declares that we are 
entering the age of “Globalisation 3.0”, during which the free flow of information 
and people gives individuals the opportunity to collaborate globally, something 
that was unimaginable decades before. This globalisation, Berger (2003, pp. 4–6) 
argues, brings within itself a global culture originated from the West, more 
precisely from America, which penetrates the larger populations. One of the 
significant evidence of this cultural penetration is the near-absolute hegemony of 
American English as the popular language in contemporary globalised world. 
The phenomenon of globalisation is an acknowledged feature of our 
modern world and has attracted many studies. But unlike global connectivity 
which becomes the centre of attention from globalisation theorists, global 
consciousness has not attracted a sufficient amount of study (Robertson, 2009, p. 
121). This is underwhelming since, according to Robertson (2011), the issue of 
consciousness is at least as important as connectivity. He puts emphasis on the 
importance of consciousness by arguing that a global vision is necessary before 
we could start a discussion on the world as a “whole”. It is the presence of a 
global consciousness that enables socioeconomic interactions to transform into a 
global network of connections and culture (Robertson, 2011, pp. 1336–1338). 
While current, modern, globalisation is the product of a specific 
development in our history, the presence of global consciousness and the 
development of connections through the whole world is not uniquely a modern 
phenomenon. Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 30) argue that global consciousness 
had existed before the current modern era. They used Greek and Roman culture 
and philosophical thinking to illustrate this argument. For example, during the 
ancient Greece period, Stoic thinkers such as Zeno and Diogenes had voiced 
concepts such as kosmopolites (a citizen of the universe) or brotherhood for all 
humanity. These concepts can be seen as the Greek version of global 
consciousness (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, pp. 31–32). 
The expansion of Greek influence under Alexander the Great further 
promoted this global consciousness. During the Hellenistic period, the Greeks felt 
more comfortable to be considered as citizens of a general Hellenistic world 
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instead of citizens of a particular polis (Heater, 1999, pp. 44–46). This expansion 
also promoted a lingua franca for the known world, and established a “universal 
historiography” (katholou ton praxeon istoria). The Greeks sought to narrate 
history in a global perspective. Not only did this allow Greek historians to record 
the history of the world, it also showed the interconnectedness of the world. 
Geographically diverse locales were connected in an intricate web of relations, 
constituting one whole world. This departed from the previous tradition that 
narrated history from a local and disjointed perspective (Robertson and Inglish, 
2006, p. 32). 
The Romans adopted this and started their own “universal historiography.” 
Polybius, a Greek historian who resided in Rome between 167 and 150 BC, 
recorded the history of the world under the Roman Empire as somatoeides 
(organic whole). The history was considered as a whole body, consisting of 
smaller parts that worked together and inter-related in very complex ways. 
Polybius deliberately wrote that he is “weaving together the various strands of 
history into a single tapestry” (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 33). As Roman 
dominion grew rapidly, and encompassed most of the inhabited world at that time, 
Polybius’ works helped in building global consciousness among the Romans. His 
works were circulated among the Roman elite and were internalised as the self-
understanding that the Roman Empire was a global power.  
By the first century AD, the Roman Emperor and the city of Rome were 
viewed in global terms; the Emperor as “guiding spirit of the whole world” and 
Rome as “the centre of the earth” (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, pp. 33–34). In the 
practical sense of common people, the pax Romana indeed brought geographically 
distant areas into one union, with the Roman Empire at its centre. Roads the 
Romans had built and the Romans’ protection of the Mediterranean had made 
people able to travel across the known world (Aristides, 1953, p. 906, in 
Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 34). This condition had created waves of 
migration and social mobility. In this sense, the Roman Empire was an essential 
mechanism that allowed the flow of goods and people, thus creating 
unprecedented configurations of persons and places (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, 
p. 35).  
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Transference of Idea 
The idea of a whole, interconnected and interdependent world, termed 
aptly by Robertson and Inglish (2006) as global consciousness, recurs throughout 
our history and inspires people to develop forms of society which aspire to 
transcend parochial boundaries. This process, in which a global consciousness 
tries to manifest itself in a society, is in line with the theoretical framework 
articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966). Society, according to Berger and 
Luckmann (1966, pp. 33–42), is the product of humans’ consciousness. In order 
for an idea to be able to affect society, it has to go through the three stages of 
externalisation, objectivation and internalisation.  
The first stage, externalisation, is done when humans are expressing their 
subjective ideas to other humans. The second stage, objectivation, happens 
whenever humans put their ideas into signs or material objects available to them, 
allowing other humans to perceive their idea and agreeing to it. This forms the 
intersubjectivity which then affects their perception of the society. When this 
particular idea has gained enough followers to be the dominant idea, the society 
transforms itself, adjusting itself to the new dominant idea. What had been a 
subjective idea now becomes “objective” and the third process, internalisation, 
begins when the society teaches the idea as the objective reality to the next 
generation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 68–84). 
Berger and Luckmann’s description of the translation of an idea into 
societal reality mirrors contemporary research on norms and their life cycle. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 895–896), there are stages that a 
particular norm needs to go through in order to establish its dominance and be 
adopted by the general populace. At its first stage, norm emergence, a new norm 
requires support and campaigns so that the masses notice and adopt it. Adopting 
foreign norms is not a trivial matter. Norms are an essential part of constructivist 
analysis. A norm (or, norms) is the foundation in which actors derive their identity, 
which in turn will define their interests. Norms influence the international context 
by providing intersubjectivity among actors, and determine what behaviour is 
appropriate (Zehfuss, 2002, pp. 3–4).  
Since actors are often reluctant to adopt a new norm, the devout initiators 
and advocates of such a norm, called norm entrepreneurs, have to mount a 
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campaign for the norm and try to diffuse it as broadly as they can. In this early 
stage, norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors to embrace the new norm. It is 
possible that, at this stage, norm entrepreneurs have to make a bargain with the 
other parties, providing necessary incentives for them to embrace the norm. Since 
humans have the tendency to maximise their gains, then it is possible that the 
other parties will adjust their behaviour in accordance with the norm but without 
believing in it (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, p. 12). 
If enough masses adopt this new norm, it will pass a tipping point and 
enter phase two of its circle of life. It is essential for a norm to pass this tipping 
point because if it fails to pass, it will be neglected and, eventually, forgotten. 
However, if norm entrepreneurs manage to gather enough support, the norm will 
enter its second stage, norm cascade. At this stage, norm entrepreneurs seek to 
recruit more supporters for their championed norm through socialisation of the 
norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Norm entrepreneurs then engage 
with other parties using argumentative discourse in order to challenge the 
established narrative, seeking to usurp it with the championed norm and to change 
the identity of the other parties to conform with the new norm (Risse-Kappen and 
Sikkink, 1999, p. 13). During this process, it is possible that the other parties will 
still maintain their pragmatic interests but at the same time, will become more 
deeply entangled with the moral discourse brought by the norm entrepreneurs 
(Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, pp. 15–16). 
The diffusion process continues, until the norm starts its final phase, 
internalisation. By becoming internalised, the norm acquires a taken-for-granted 
status and no longer becomes the topic of debate (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 
pp. 895–896). At this mature stage, actors act in conformity with the norm 
because “it is the normal thing to do” (Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999, p. 17). 
This mature stage is mirroring the habitualisation process in Berger and 
Luckmann’s work. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 70–72), an idea 
becomes habitualised when it becomes an accepted pattern in the society. The 
conforming pattern then frees the individuals from “the burden of ‘all those 
decisions’” and provides them with psychological relief. A further step will 
institutionalise the idea within a society and lead to it being perceived as  
“objective” reality. 
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Other than deliberate diffusion by norm entrepreneurs described above, 
there is also an unintended process of normative diffusion known as transference. 
Transference can be understood as the act, or process, of redirecting something to 
others. Transference of ideas is one defining characteristic of modern 
globalisation (Friedman, 2007). Bartelson (2000, p. 184) uses the term 
transference to describe one facet of globalisation. He argues that, as transference, 
globalisation allows the process of exchange between certain units in many 
sectors. This exchange happens as an unintended consequence of the interaction 
between various parties. Although unintended, this exchange operates at the 
conscious level of both agents and recipients. This process transcends boundaries 
but does not change the units or the boundaries. Bartelson (2000, p. 184) draws an 
example of transference from the writings of Keohane and Nye who argue that 
complex interdependence might change a state’s concern for military security, but 
it does not change the states or the system itself.  
Manners (2002, pp. 244–246) describes how both deliberate and 
unintended diffusion methods have been at work in promoting EU norms. The 
first method is contagion, in which EU norms spread as the result of diffusion of 
ideas during discussion with other political actors, which lead the other actors to 
adopt EU norms. Manners uses the example of how the integration process in 
Mercosur mimics the process of EU integration. The second method is the 
informational process, whereby EU norms spread as the result of strategic 
communications done by the EU, such as when the EU publishes its policy 
initiatives, makes declaration on certain issues, etc. This is an intentional process 
by the EU to disseminate its norms and persuade other interested parties.  
The third method described by Manners (2002, pp. 244–246) is procedural 
diffusion, when the EU spreads its norms by institutionalising its rules and binding 
its partners to them. The most prominent example of this method is when the EU 
sets specific norms, rules and criteria to be acquired and met by aspiring states 
before they can be members of the EU. The fourth method, transference, occurs 
whenever the EU provides aid and assistance programmes to third parties. 
Through these interactions, EU norms will spread indirectly and, maybe, 
unintentionally. By interacting with the EU, the third parties would be exposed to 
the norms and standards of the EU and again, maybe unintentionally, would adopt 
these norms in conformity with the EU. The fifth method, overt diffusion, is the 
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result of the EU’s physical presence in either third states or in various 
international organisations. Manners cites the EU monitoring missions in the 
former Yugoslavia as one of the examples of this method. 
It is important to note that despite an idea’s dominance in a society, the 
idea will always require certain forms of legitimation in order to maintain its 
position. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 112–115) describe levels of 
legitimation that help legitimate an idea. The most fundamental is the transmission 
of language whose vocabulary defines and supports the idea, providing tools for 
conversation on the idea. The next levels are the  development of theoretical 
propositions and the articulations of theories to further explain and justify the idea. 
The highest form of legitimation is the establishment of a symbolic universe. A 
symbolic universe is the amalgamation of bodies of theoretical traditions which 
support the idea. It encompasses all socially objectivated meanings. History of the 
society and biographies of its members are seen as events taking place within the 
symbolic universe. It creates a whole world and by accessing this knowledge, 
humans are affirmed of their position in the world.  
During the internalisation process of a symbolic universe, variance of 
interpretation might occur and this might give rise to the establishment of a 
“deviant” version of the symbolic universe. If sufficient people within the society 
support this “deviant” narrative, they might challenge the established narrative 
and begin what Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 124–125) define as the “problem 
of heresy”. To protect itself from such a problem, a symbolic universe develops 
conceptual machineries which maintain the systematisation of cognitive and 
normative legitimation processes within the society, making it in accordance with 
the “official” narration of the symbolic universe. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 
127–134) identify four conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance: 
mythology, theology, philosophy and science. Each provides ways to enforce the 
narrative of the symbolic universe into societal life. 
According to the theoretical framework described above, this chapter 
argues that in order to establish a global society, the proponents of a global 
consciousness have to initiate a campaign to promote this idea. These norm 
entrepreneurs externalise their idea of a global society to the masses. They can use 
persuasion and bargain at first, recruiting supporters by exchanging favours or 
other material necessity requested by the other actors. After the global 
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consciousness reaches its tipping point, then the norm entrepreneurs start to 
undermine the status quo by using argumentation over their cause. At this time, 
new supporters are recruited through dialogues and debates that challenge the 
validity of the established discourse and transform their identity. After reaching its 
final stage, the idea of a global consciousness becomes the “natural” condition of 
the society, adopted and articulated by actors of various interests. 
At the same time as with this deliberate process, there is also another 
transference process that helps the diffusion of global consciousness. Every 
person who has adopted a global consciousness might inadvertently transfer the 
message of an interconnected world to other parties. Even those who are not a 
keen supporter still could be an agent of transference. There are several 
characteristic of the transference process, as follows: (i) relations between two or 
more units; (ii) the creation of networks and connections; (iii) the crossing of 
boundaries; (iv) the often lack of deliberateness of the transfer. Collins’ work 
(1998) on how teacher-student relations formed intellectual chains across various 
geographical areas and periods of time, which will be elaborated further in 
Chapter Three, is an excellent example of such transference. This transference 
process will build upon and reinforce each other, to the point where the idea 
expands beyond the tipping point and is accepted as the norm of the society.  
This chapter further proposes that to further legitimate the idea of a global 
consciousness and to fulfil the aspiration of a global society, the society will 
produce various tools to help maintain the idea’s dominance. In the case of the 
umma, these developments are reflected in the development of the institution of 
caliphate, which will be elaborated further in Chapters Four and Five, and the 
development of Sufi networks, which will be elaborated in Chapter Six. These 
institutions support and advocate global consciousness to the general populace by 
performing what Manners (2002, pp. 244–246) describes as “transference of 
norms”. Transference enables the actors to deliver a message without their 
knowing the transfer process and/or the message itself. The message becomes 
deeply overtly imbedded in the behaviour of the norm entrepreneurs, in everything 
that he or she does; it transfers a message to other people. The process also 
becomes genuine, without both the norm entrepreneurs and the other person aware 
of a deliberate process of communication, thus removing psychological barriers 
that might arise in the process. 
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Global Society in International Relations 
While the manifestation of the global society is obvious and study of it 
thrives in the field of international relations, the debate surrounding the concept of 
global society is more problematic. In contemporary discourse there are many 
terms which might or might not intersect and overlap with global society. There 
are terms such as international system, international society, world society and 
world civilisation, to name a few. This section will discuss various concepts in the 
study of international relations and assess their relevance to the discussion of 
global society undertaken in this thesis. While the concepts discussed in this 
section might not be explicitly about global society per se, there might be some 
relevance of their definitions to the concept of global society that this thesis seeks 
to develop.  
Study of World System Theory 
The argument that a global society has existed before our modern 
globalised society is to some extent parallel with the argument proposed by the 
proponents of world system theory. Within world system theory, the main 
argument is that there exists a worldwide economic system that connects and 
integrates various regional and local systems. While Wallerstein (1974) argues 
that the world system starts at 1500 AD, his opinion is contested by various others. 
Abu-Lughod (1989) argues that a world system had existed at 1250 AD before 
being replaced by the current modern world system. Frank and Gills (1996) draw 
the starting line of a world system even further back to 5000 BC. 
In addition to the debate on when the world system existed for the first 
time, there is also a debate on the nature of the world system. Abu-Lughod (1996, 
p. 279) describes the complete debate as follow: 
“1) Has there been only one world-system, the one that began with 
the sixteenth century? 
2) Have there been several successive world-systems, each with a 
changing structure and its own set of hegemons? 
3) Or has there been only a single world-system that has continued 
to evolve over the past 5,000 years?”  
 
According to Abu-Lughod (1996, p. 279), Wallerstein supports the first 
position in the debate: that there is only one world-system and that the world 
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system is our contemporary modern globalised world-system, whose development 
was started in 1500 AD. Abu-Lughod herself supports the second position: that 
there were several world-systems and that when a world-system collapsed, 
another rose in its stead. According to Abu-Lughod, the contemporary modern 
globalised world-system emerges after the fall of the previous world-system, in 
which China and the Middle East played prominent parts. Frank and Gills support 
the third position: there is only one world-system which started 5,000 years ago 
and is continuously changing. In their view, our modern globalised world is the 
newest mutation of this world-system. 
Participating in the aforementioned debate, this thesis stands in line with 
Abu-Lughod’s argument that there have been several world-systems that replaced 
each other. Our contemporary globalised world is the most recent world-system. 
This position is also in line with Robertson’s, who argues that while global 
consciousness is a recurring feature throughout human history, contemporary 
globalisation is the product of unique interactions among various components 
(Robertson, 1992, p. 27). A different source of global consciousness might require 
a different model, such as Islam, which Robertson explicitly states possesses a 
“globalising thrust” (Robertson, 1992, p. 28).  
Drawing further upon Robertson’s (2011) argument about the importance 
of global consciousness, this thesis also argues that a global consciousness is 
necessary for the formation of a world-system, which in turn lays the foundation 
for the formation of a global society. While according to Frank and Gills (2000, p. 
4), world-system’s emphasis is on economic activities, this thesis suggests that a 
global society constitutes all aspects of human life. Therefore, while the economic 
connections that characterise a world-system will play an important part in a 
global society, a global society is more than worldwide economic interactions. 
Following this line of argument, this thesis proposes that it is possible that 
the collapse of a world-system would lead to the disruption of the global society 
that relies upon it. The collapse of a world-system might be the result of rivalries 
among various actors promoting their version of global consciousness, or the 
result of contestation between actors promoting global consciousness and those 
working against it. When the global consciousness ceases to permeate or a strong 
form of a parochial consciousness undermines it, the world system would collapse 
and the global society would cease to exist. It would eventually be replaced by a 
 19 
new world system based on a renewed global consciousness, which would provide 
the foundation for a new global society and begin the cycle anew.  
Cosmopolitanism 
Another research tradition that provides a detailed discussion seemingly in 
parallel with the development of a global society is cosmopolitanism. The idea of 
cosmopolitanism stems from ancient Greek philosophy, especially the Stoic 
tradition. It has the literal meaning of “citizen of the world.” It seeks to promote 
universal rights and establishes a universal bond among humankind as a world 
citizen, beyond nationality or citizenship (Nussbaum, 2010). Held (2005, p. 10) 
describes cosmopolitanism’s objective as “to disclose the ethical, cultural and 
legal basis of political order where political communities and state matter, but not 
only and exclusively.” While there are many strands in this movement, Fine (2007, 
p. 2) argues that all cosmopolitans share three basic values: (1) breaking national 
presuppositions and prejudices; (2) recognising the necessity of global 
interdependence for the benefits of humanity; (3) developing normative and 
prescriptive theories of world citizenship, global justice and cosmopolitan 
democracy. 
Miller (2010, pp. 377–380) distinguishes between moral cosmopolitanism 
and political cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism seeks to promote the idea 
that all humans are equal and subject to the same set of moral laws. Thus, people 
should respect and treat each other equally, regardless of nationality, citizenship 
or place of residence. Political cosmopolitanism believes that the idea can only be 
achieved when there is one authoritative figure that enforces the law to all. In the 
moral sphere, cosmopolitanism is concerned with identity and belonging. There 
exists the tension between the local and cosmopolitan, constantly questioning 
whether a person should have greater loyalty to his local environment or should 
supplant national ties with world citizenship. This tension is made more 
complicated by different interpretations of weak cosmopolitan and strong 
cosmopolitan. Miller (2010, pp. 383–388) provides an excellent illustration on this 
recurring dilemma: do we prioritise social justice over global justice, thus willing 
to inflict harm to other people in order to fulfil our local duty? Or do we prioritise 
global justice over social justice, thus willing to sacrifice limited local resources 
for the betterment of foreigners? 
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In the political sphere, cosmopolitanism rejects “methodological 
nationalism” which rationalises the presence of nation-states as the nature of 
human condition. According to cosmopolitan theorists, the formation of nation-
states is not natural; instead, they are the product of human history (Fine, 2007, pp. 
3–10). At one time, the concept of nation-state might be important for humankind. 
However, according to Held (2005, p. 10) this concept should not be considered as 
“privileged” entities. Cosmopolitanism also rejects the logic of anarchy which 
puts the state as the ultimate actor and sole source of power in the field of 
international relations. Cosmopolitanism then seeks to strengthen international 
law and expand its authority beyond state sovereignty, since states or its apparatus 
might threaten and violate human rights (Fine, 2007, pp. 3–4). While criticising 
the emphasis on nation-state in modern political life, cosmopolitanism does not 
radically negate the presence of the nation-state and its possible role in fulfilling 
the cosmopolitan vision. Instead, it seeks to establish a multi-layered global order 
that consists of nation-state, transnational political community and global 
consolidation of international institutions, movements and laws to regulate 
relations between states and to protect global citizens’ rights (Fine, 2007, p. 39).  
The concept of cosmopolitanism is relevant to this thesis. Both global 
society and cosmopolitanism seek to disclose the presence of a global 
consciousness among humans transcending their local environments. Both 
concepts acknowledge that the consciousness might motivate various actors to 
interact and to establish connections, which might lead to the manifestation of a 
society with global characteristics. However, cosmopolitanism puts too strong an 
emphasis on a common world value, norm or morality, which dominates in the 
name of “universalism” and shapes actors’ behaviour into a uniformed standard. 
The case of cosmopolitan democracy is one of the examples of such universalism. 
This is different from the depiction of global society used in this thesis that does 
not require members to adopt uniform behaviour. One way to connect these two 
concepts, however, is to draw a continuum of a human group, whereby the left 
end stands for a human group without a uniform, universal culture and with 
myriads of local cultures and the right end stands for a human group with an 
ultimate, uniform, universal culture. The concept of global society used in this 
thesis is in the middle of the continuum, signifying a balance between global 
cultures and the persistence of various local ones. The concept of 
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cosmopolitanism, by way of contrast, is in the central-right portion, or even at 
near the right end.     
English School 
John Burton’s World Society 
The first influential work on this tradition is John Burton’s World Society. 
Burton (1972) starts his discussion on this matter by posing the question: why 
study world society at all? He proposes five reasons for studying world society: to 
recognise our social responsibilities as citizens of a particular state and the world; 
to keep our interest secure by adjusting to changes in the larger environment; to 
understand the pattern of behaviour and draw lessons from the pattern; to better 
understand parts of the world, and the relations between the parts; to study norms 
of behaviour on a universal basis (Burton, 1972, pp. 1–10).What exactly does 
Burton mean by world society? In a later chapter, he starts his definition of world 
society by differentiating it from international relations. Burton argues that while 
international relations focuses its study on the state, the study of world society is 
not restricted to the dynamics of states or state authorities (Burton, 1972, p. 19). 
While it is possible to study the dynamics of states and inter-governmental 
institutions, the study of world society is wider than that. 
Burton’s choice in employing the term world society results in logical 
consequences. According to him, the scope of the study needs to be broadened. It 
can include any level of social organisation, from the individual to the state to the 
world. It is the choice of the researcher to determine which levels of behaviour are 
relevant, by moving up or down. Burton urges researchers to take levels of 
behaviour only as one consideration in their analysis, not ignoring other aspects of 
behaviour that can be observed and analysed (Burton, 1972, pp. 20–21). While the 
field of international relations tends to be descriptive, the study of world society 
tends to be analytical and conceptual (Burton, 1972, p. 22).  
The broad scope of world society makes studying it a never ending 
exploration, not unlike collecting a jigsaw (Burton, 1972, p. 23). This presents a 
challenge as to how to conduct the study. It is impossible to conduct simultaneous 
analysis of the whole world,  in both physical and social aspects. Scientific 
progress tackles this impossibility by establishing a division of labour, specialised 
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fields, experts and methodology that engage with specific parts of the world. The 
study of world society requires, then, a multi-disciplinary approach (Burton, 1972, 
pp. 24–25).Burton also realises that his conception of world society faces 
challenges on a practical level. The presence of states might be contradictory to 
the establishment of one, unified world. Burton acknowledges that states might be 
suspicious of external forces meddling in their authority and be defensive in terms 
of their own external behaviour. Also, even taking the assumption that all states 
are willing to cooperate to the extent of integrating into one unified world, an 
assumption which Burton calls “an absurd one’, conflicts and aggression are still 
possible (Burton, 1972, p. 118).  
But this is not the means to the end for the world society. Burton (1972, pp. 
119–120) notes that in the contemporary and conflict-oriented real world, there 
are services that are provided by international institutions. Thus the integration 
process might come about slowly, step-by-step. It might come in the form of both 
decentralisation of a state’s power to local government and centralisation of power 
from states to international institutions. It also might come from the introduction 
of multiple, simultaneous identities and loyalties between those political 
institutions. These can be done by determining what values and goals of people 
are best satisfied by local authorities, and what values and goals of people are best 
satisfied by international institutions because of their universal nature.  
Martin Wight’s System of States 
The second important work to be addressed for this discussion is Martin 
Wight’s System of States. In contrast with Burton, Wight focuses his book on the 
relations between states. His work is nevertheless important in this discussion 
since Wight’s idea has inspired the development of the English school of 
international relations, whose theorists focus on the dynamics of international 
society.Wight categorises the worldview of the contemporary world into three 
traditions: Kantian, Machiavellian and Grotian. The Kantian tradition has a 
messianic and missionary worldview. It emphasises the necessity of world unity, 
to the point of rejecting the necessity of the state system. The Machiavellian 
tradition has a pessimistic worldview. Proponents regard the state-system as 
natural and see all interactions as survival of the fittest. The Groatian perspective 
is a middle way between the two which accepts the state-system as a 
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contemporary condition, but does not discourage cooperation between states 
(Wight, 1977, pp. 38–39).  
Wight’s work in the System of States derives from this Groatian tradition. 
He credits the contemporary Western states-system to the Westphalian system 
(Wight, 1977, p. 110). It was Grotius who had brought the word “system” into 
international politics, a legacy that Wight continued to use (Wight, 1977, p. 113). 
Wight wrote a detailed account on the systems of states. He distinguishes systems 
of states into two categories: an international states-system, and a suzerain state-
system. In an international states-system, the system is composed of sovereign 
states. In a suzerain state-system, the system is composed of one supreme state 
that maintains control over the rest. This domination is permanent and 
unchallengeable. While the fundamental principle of the international states-
system is maintaining the balance of power, for the suzerain state-system it is 
divide et impera (Wight, 1977, p. 24). 
Wight also differentiates systems of states into: a primary states system, 
and a secondary states system. The primary states system is a system composed of 
states. The secondary states system is a system composed of systems of states, 
such as the relations between Western Christendom, Eastern Christendom and the 
Abbasid Caliphate in the Middle Ages (Wight, 1977, pp. 24–26). According to 
Wight (1977, p. 34), a states-system cannot be established without a certain 
cultural resemblance between the member states. Thus, it is necessary to make 
further inquiries to the cultural community of the states. There are several 
characteristics of this community. First, it has a cultural unity among its member 
states. The degree of the cultural unity also determines the degree of its sense of 
distinctness from the other. Higher internal unity leads to more pronounced 
differences with the others, even a higher discrimination against others, which, 
according to Wight, might culminate in the concept of Holy War (Wight, 1977, pp. 
34–35).  
The second cultural characteristic of this community of states is the 
presence of internal factionalism. The stronger the factionalism is inside a 
community, the bigger the strain is being put upon the states-system. A strong 
sense of factionalism can lead to the denial of other factions’ right to exist within 
the states-system. Wight draws on historical evidence, starting from the 
factionalism inside the ancient Greek states-system, the Religious Wars in the 
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European state-system, to contending schools of thought in the Chinese states-
system (Wight, 1977, pp. 35–39). 
Hedley Bull’s Anarchical Society 
Bull draws heavily upon Wight’s ideas and developed some more on his 
own. Bull affirms the necessity of the state-system but put more emphasis on the 
non-state aspect of the world. Bull also makes a distinction between system and 
society, something that was lacking in Wight’s writing. Bull opens his explanation 
on world society by explaining order in society. Bull defines order in a society as 
“a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals” 
(Bull, 2002, p. 4). These particular goals can be, but are not limited to: (1) the 
desire to preserve life; (2) to ensure compliance on promises and agreements; and 
(3) to maintain a certain degree of stability in property and possession (Bull, 2002, 
p. 4). These three goals, simplified by Bull (2002, p. 5) as goals of life, truth and 
prosperity, are elementary in the sense that the expectation of these goals is the 
foundation of a society. Without these expectations, a group of people is not a 
society at all. They are also primary, since the fulfilment of these goals becomes 
the precondition for the fulfilment of other goals in a society. They are also 
universal, because they are prevalent in all actual societies, without regard to the 
conventional boundaries of time and place (Bull, 2002, p. 5). 
Putting this concept into international relations, Bull (2002, p. 8) defines 
international order as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary 
goals of the society of states, or international society’. Bull then further identifies 
necessary elements in international order: state, international system and 
international society. State, according to Bull (2002, p. 8) is an independent 
political community, the government of which has both the right of sovereignty 
over a particular territory and particular people, and the capability to actually 
exercise it. Sovereignty possessed by a state comes in two forms, internal 
sovereignty, which means “supremacy over all other authorities within that 
territory and population,” and external sovereignty, which means “independence 
of outside authorities’.  
A system of states, or international system, will form whenever two or 
more states have intensive enough contacts with one another, thus creating 
relations that influence one another and making them behave as parts of a whole. 
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Without the intensive contacts and influences affecting one another, these 
independent states do not form a system of states even though they exist in the 
same time frame (Bull, 2002, p. 9). The formation of a system of states might be 
the result of direct relations between states. Or, it might be the result of indirect 
chains of relations between states (Bull, 2002, p. 10). A society of states, or 
international society, is a collection of states which have common interests and 
common values, bound together by a common set of rules in their relations with 
one another, and that adhere to a common institution, such as the international law 
and customs of war (Bull, 2002, p. 13).  
In addition to the goals of social order, international order has its own 
specific goals. The goals of international order are: (1) the preservation of the 
system and society of states itself; (2) maintaining the independence or external 
sovereignty of individual states; and (3) maintaining peace among member states 
of international society, resorting to war only in special circumstances according 
to generally accepted principles (Bull, 2002, pp. 16–17). Peace, in this sense, is 
subordinate to the first and second goals. While states are the dominant type of 
social groups, there are possibilities that people may be grouped in another form. 
Also, while people are grouped into states, it is possible that at the same time, they 
are grouped in other ways too. Thus, it is important to think on a deeper scale and 
contemplate the social life of mankind as a whole, not limited to the social 
interactions of the states. The presence of order in human activity that advocates 
the elementary and primary goals of mankind as a whole is dubbed by Bull as 
world order (Bull, 2002, p. 19). 
Bull (2002, p. 21) notes that are three distinctions between world order and 
international order. First, world order is wider than international order because it 
encompasses not only order among states but also order inside a state (municipal 
or provincial) and order within the wider world. Second, world order is more 
fundamental than international order because it is concerned with individual 
human beings, who are permanent, while states (or any other human groups) are 
not permanent. Third, world order is morally prior to international order. Values 
embedded in world order are related to humankind, thus must be treated as a 
primary value.  
The world order can be inhabited by many political systems. Bull (2002, 
pp. 19–20) describes the evolution of political systems, some of which carried the 
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potential for world order. These range from no political systems at all, to the 
eighteenth century when world order was a concept without fulfilment, to the 
current system of states. Bull also explores several alternatives to the system of 
states, including one he dubs as a world political system. Bull further 
differentiates between world political system and world society. The first is 
characterised with global interdependence and global awareness between political 
actors. The latter is characterised by common interests and common values of all 
mankind (Bull, 2002, p. 279). Thus, actors might promote global integration of a 
political system, but at the same time they do not promote world society. 
Promoting integration of the political system means these actors integrate the 
world under their dominant culture rather than integrating the world into common 
interests and values.  
Barry Buzan’s idea of Global Society 
Barry Buzan both continues and criticises the legacies of Wight and Bull. 
According to Buzan, the concepts of “international society” and “world society” 
are the flagship ideas of the English school, which he is part of (Buzan, 2004, p. 1). 
But Buzan also criticises English school theorists for the lack of clarity with 
regard to the concept of world society. He sets out  to build a coherent 
conceptualisation of this concept (Buzan, 2004, p. 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. The English School’s “The Three Traditions” 
Source: Buzan (2004, p. 9) 
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Buzan starts his critique by reconstructing the English school’s basic 
approach to international relations. World society is one of the English school’s 
triad; the other two are international system and international society. These 
concepts are often perceived in terms of the three traditions adopted by Wight and 
Bull: realism, rationalism and revolutionism (or, Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian). 
While the conjunction between international system and realism, and between 
international society and rationalism, poses no serious difficulties, the conjunction 
between world society and revolutionism “rings several alarm bells” (Buzan, 2004, 
p. 27). 
Indeed, the incompatibility between world society and revolutionism is the 
first problem with the concept according to Buzan. The second is, world society 
lacks a world system counter-part. According to Buzan, Bull offered the concept 
of world political system as the physical counterpoint of world society, but he 
never developed it because of the dominance of the states-system (Buzan, 2004, p. 
28).  
The third problem is the different views about the relationship between 
world society and international society. One position declares that world society 
exists as a prerequisite for the establishment of international society. This view, 
mainly adopted by those concerned with development of world society, draws 
especially from Wight. A second position, adopted by those concerned with the 
maintenance of international society, is more problematic. On the one hand, it 
suggests that the development of world society undermines the states and the 
international system. This antagonistic relation can be seen in the dynamics 
between individual rights and state sovereignty. On the other hand, there are 
several universal concepts which strengthen the states and international system, 
such as the right of self determination (Buzan, 2004, pp. 28–29). 
Buzan’s theoretical construct of world society begins by making clear the 
distinction between state and international society on one side, and non-state and 
world society on the other. In doing this, Buzan acknowledges the special place of 
states in international relations, while, at the same time, recognising the 
importance of non-states (Buzan, 2004, pp. 91–92). Elaborating his theoretical 
construct, Buzan (2004, p. 92) presents his definition of state as “any form of 
post-kinship, territorially-based, politically centralised, self-governing entity 
capable of generating an inside-outside structure”. He leaves out “sovereignty” 
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and “hard boundaries” deliberately from the characteristics of “state” so that it 
would encompass broader political entities. 
The separation between state and non-state produces consequences for the 
conceptual construct of the English school. First, it removes Kantianism from 
world society and places it into solidarist international society. Second, it also 
removes coercive elements from the world society and moves them to the realist 
spectrum. Third, it also rejects the notion of world society as the sum of states and 
non-states. Fourth, it creates a distance between world society and the solidarist 
tradition, which often uses concepts as “the protective nature of the state” as 
justification for non-intervention (Buzan, 2004, pp. 93–94). 
Buzan’s second revision is by abandoning the physical-social distinction. 
The argument was based on the premise that there is a high degree of overlap 
between the physical and social. Eliminating the distinction between the two does 
not mean taking the physical out of the analysis, but it does reduce the importance 
of the physical aspect; it no longer differentiates one international system from 
another. Thus, by doing this, Buzan merges the international system and 
international society, and eliminates the necessity of world system (as the physical 
counterpart of world society). At this stage of the argument, the English school’s 
triad has become a dyad between state and international (Buzan, 2004, pp. 98–
102). 
Buzan then tackles the distinction between society and community. Society 
is defined as a rational, contractual bond between members of the group. 
Community is defined as a sense of membership, identity and responsibility 
towards other members of the group. Society is about certain expected behaviour 
between members. Community is about shared identity between members (Buzan, 
2004, pp. 110–111). International society is the more developed concept in 
international relations, particularly in the English school’s writings. International 
society is about all norms, rules and institutions created by states to bring order in 
their relationships with each other. On the other hand, international community is 
under-developed in comparison. It is formulated around shared identities among 
states but how it really works is yet unexplored. At the minimum, Buzan states, 
international community could share the mutual recognition of sovereignty of the 
states. Stronger shared identity will give rise to a problematic question: is it 
possible to create a universal community with (or without) an “Other”? (Buzan, 
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2004, pp. 121–122). He is here flagging the thorny problem of self-definition by 
way of implicit or explicit opposition to an ‘outsider’.   
Buzan (2004, p. 123) argues that the formation of individual and trans-
national society and community independent of the states-system is “taking one 
away from much of history and onto unfamiliar ground.” It is practically 
impossible for contemporary individual humans to develop “world society” 
consisting only of individuals, without the help of any other actors. It is more 
possible for individuals to develop world community by adopting a shared identity. 
The practice of adopting shared identity has been in the nature of humans without 
any agential intermediary. The community will enlarge itself whenever it is able 
to temper the parochial effect of its identity, often by adopting another shared 
identity and merging with other small groups. Thus, in the end, a world 
community rests on multiple shared identities, all overlapping between smaller 
groups, integrating them and moderating the need to identify the “Other” (Buzan, 
2004, p. 124). 
Addressing transnational actors, Buzan argues that it is possible for them 
to develop world society among themselves since they are similar to collective 
units formed by states. But in order to build an “autonomous” transnational 
society, one has to destroy states, which is difficult to do. Buzan cites the network 
of guilds in the medieval period as the example of a functioning transnational 
society without interference from states (Buzan, 2004, p. 125). Yet, it is harder for 
transnational actors to develop community since there are vastly different types of 
association, whereby one association might be in a zero-sum competition with 
another, or one association could claim indifference to another that is distinctly 
different. There is still a possibility for similar types of transnational actors to 
form a community, but this would be very segmented and thus unfit to be called 
“world community” (Buzan, 2004, pp. 126–127). 
The different emphasis between individual and transnational actors 
discussed above leads Buzan to argue that it is proper to divide non-state actors 
into two groups: individuals and transnational actors. This restores the triadic 
structure of the English school defined by a distinct type of unit: states, 
individuals and transnational actors (Buzan, 2004, p. 127). The resulting diagram 
of the revised concept is as follow: 
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Figure 2. “The Three Traditions” revised by Barry Buzan  
Source: Buzan (2004, p. 133) 
 
 
In this revised version of English school traditions, there are three distinct 
pillars. These are not a spectrum as in the previous version; instead these represent 
different actors: states, individuals and transnational actors. Thus, these pillars can 
never overlap one another. While the differentiation between states and non-states 
is important (since states have privilege as in the study of international relations), 
the commonalities between individuals and transnational actors are limited. Thus, 
the two “non-states” are put into different groups, unlike the previous version in 
which they were put together in “world society” (Buzan, 2004, p. 134). 
The individual (or, interhuman) pillar is divided based on how strong its 
identity integration is. The lowest integration is “fragmented’, where interhuman 
relations form the most basic society: family/clan. The next is “imagined 
communities’, such as nations, religions and other kinds of networks. The highest 
integration is “universal identities’, ranging from the recognition of each other to 
interhuman relations capable of adopting various shared identities and creating a 
world civilisation. With humans’ complexity and their ability to adopt multiple 
identities simultaneously, this spectrum does not portray staged, mutually 
exclusive positions. Thus, it is possible for these forms to exist simultaneously. 
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Even the formation of world civilisation would not erase the other forms in this 
spectrum (Buzan, 2004, p. 135). 
The second pillar is transnational actors. This pillar is divided into a 
spectrum based on how strong the transnational society is. The weakest of all is 
“no transnational actors’. This condition will happen if there is no single non-state 
actor, or if any non-state actor’s activities are constrained inside a state’s territory. 
At the other end of the spectrum is “pure medievalism’, where the transnational 
actors managed to secure recognition from one another, managed to achieve 
understanding of the rights and responsibilities of one another and to maintain 
independence, to a certain degree, from the influence of the states (Buzan, 2004, p. 
136). 
The third pillar is states, which collaborate into interstate societies. Since 
the “social” in international relations encompasses broad activities, from enemies 
to rivals to friends and allies, it also encompasses the Hobbesian model of 
international relations at one extreme and Kantian at the other. In the middle of 
these is where the continuum of pluralism-solidarism takes place. Buzan (2004, p. 
140) states simply that “pluralism is what happens when 
pessimists/realists/conservatives think about international relations, and solidarism 
is what happens when optimists/idealists/liberals do so.” The example of pluralist 
interstate society would be the Westphalian model of the states-system, while the 
example of solidarist society would be one union of states or a global federation 
among states (Buzan, 2004, p. 140). 
Conceptualising “Global Society” 
The challenge in developing a theoretical framework for this thesis is that 
there is no clear definition of “global society” to use. Each theorist provides his or 
her own explanation. They even use different terms, with permutations of the 
usage of various concepts: “international” or “world” or “global’; “society” or 
“community” or “civilisation”. This condition requires me to determine my own 
definition of global society to use in this thesis. Before doing so, I will describe 
the definition of several key concepts, the first being “global.” While there are 
many definitions of this term, this thesis will draw upon the definition of Martin 
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Shaw in Theory of the Global State. According to Shaw (2000, p. 10), global is 
“the quality involved in the worldwide stretching of social relations.”  
The second concept is “society.” Based on a translation from Weber’s 
Gesellschaft done by Waters and Waters (2010, pp. 154–155), society is then 
defined as a group that is held together by rational and utilitarian interactions, 
connectivities and shared interests. This is in contrast with “community” 
(Gemeinschaft), which refers to a group held together by shared identity and 
emotional ties. Buzan (2004, pp. 110–111) also follows this distinction. 
Contrasting society and community like this, however, is taking matters to the 
extreme. It is probably impossible to find a human group with purely pragmatic 
motives and utilitarian interactions among them, without the presence of even a 
trickle of emotion and shared identity to bind them. It is also probably impossible 
to find a human group that relies solely on shared emotion, common identity and 
culture to bind their group, without the presence of a single pragmatic motive or 
self-interested interactions between them.  
Consequently, rather than adopting such a stark definition which denies 
the importance of culture and identities to a society, I propose that there is a 
continuum between (conceptual) society at one end and (conceptual) community 
at the other. A human society’s position is between these two idealised concepts, 
thus signifying a mixture of pragmatic interactions and shared identities inside the 
group. I choose to use “society” in this thesis to put highlight on the establishment 
of pragmatic interactions and its nuances among humans, which then create a 
global network and channels in a particular human group, rather than investigating 
the shared culture or identities among them. Combining the definitions of society 
and global described above, this thesis then adopts a final definition of “global 
society” as: “a manifestation of the consciousness that the world is an 
interconnected and interdependent whole, which binds a group of people in a 
network of interactions, both in physical and non-physical aspects of human 
relations”.  
Building from social constructionism articulated by Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) and the theory of norm life cycle articulated in various works such as 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999) and Manners 
(2002), I focus this thesis on the translocal interactions which might aspire to the 
formation of a global society. The interactions described in this thesis might be 
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considered as pragmatic and utilitarian in nature and are not necessarily designed 
specifically to promote global consciousness and its manifestations. However, as 
shown in the extensive works by Abu-Lughod (1989), Held (2005) and Buzan 
(2004), to name a few, even interactions with mundane interests or self-interested 
motives can bring a hidden message of global consciousness within, which then 
may unintentionally be transmitted to the other parties in a transference process. 
These interactions eventually strengthen the translocal connections and become 
the fabric that constitutes the formed society. How this theoretical framework is 
applied to the concept of the umma and its implementation in Muslim societies is 
explained in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter Two: 
Towards the Development of Islamic Global 
Consciousness 
 
 
The previous chapter has provided a theoretical framework for the 
concepts of global consciousness and global society. As articulated by Robertson 
and Inglish (2006, p. 30), global consciousness is the idea and understanding of 
the world as an interconnected and interdependent whole, unseparated by any 
boundaries. This idea has emerged throughout history and is fundamental to the 
aspiration of certain groups of people to form a society transcending local borders. 
In order for actors to have the notion of global society, not to mention to try to 
establish one, a global vision is necessary (Robertson, 2009, p. 121; 2011, pp. 
1336–1338). The idea that a vision has the power to shape social reality is in line 
with Berger's and Luckmann’s work (1966) on social constructionism. A global 
consciousness, therefore, will inspire people to establish global connections, 
which eventually might establish the foundation of a global society.  
Unlike global consciousness, the concept of global society is not as easily 
defined because while global society is a popular term and regularly used in the 
field of international relations and by various other literatures, there is no single, 
global definition on this term. As Chapter One has illustrated, scholars use this 
term in a broad way and often differ in their definitions. The debate becomes 
increasingly complex if it takes for consideration the many permutations of global 
society such as “international” or “world” or “global”; “society” or “community” 
or “civilisation.” Do these terms refer to one definition? It is most certainly not the 
case. Are these terms interchangeable? Some would say yes, but terminological 
differentiation is also possible. Thus, to provide a comprehensive framework, in 
Chapter One, this thesis proposes its own definition of global society as “a 
manifestation of the consciousness that the world is an interconnected and 
interdependent whole, which binds a group of people in a network of interactions, 
in both physical and non physical aspects of human relations”. 
With those definitions as the framework, this thesis seeks to address two 
questions in relation to the Islamic concept of the umma: “how did the early 
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Islamic society develop global consciousness?” and “how is the concept of the 
umma related to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and 
historical formation of a global society?”. Answering these questions will require 
extensive discussion, which will be broken down in several chapters of this thesis. 
This chapter in particular will discuss the development of global consciousness in 
early Islamic society through the reflection of Islamic teaching and participation 
in Islamic religious rituals. Subsequent chapters will describe the manifestation of 
the Islamic global consciousness in Muslim society. 
Near East in Late Antiquity 
The universal empires 
In order to understand how Islam instils global consciousness to its 
adherents, it is important to understand the pre-existing context surrounding the 
advent of Islam from the perspective of global consciousness, or the lack thereof. 
Islam emerged from Arabia in the sixth century CE, in a period defined as “Late 
Antiquity” by scholars (Donner, 2010, p. 1). Arabia at that time was surrounded 
by two great empires: the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Empire. By the late 
sixth century, the Byzantines were the rulers of the Mediterranean basin while the 
Sasanids were the ruler of thriving valleys between the Euphrates and the Tigris, 
and the land beyond (Durant, 1950). The expansion of both the Byzantine Empire 
and Sasanid Empire is crucial to the discussion of global consciousness since both 
the Byzantines and the Sasanids were seeking to establish a universal empire as 
the manifestation of global consciousness in their societies.  
The concept of “universal empire” had deep roots in Roman culture. Long 
before the Byzantine Empire was established, this concept was proposed by Stoic 
thinkers such as Zeno and Diogenes who had voiced concepts such as 
kosmopolites (a citizen of the universe) or brotherhood for all humanity. These 
concepts can be seen as the Greeks’ version of global consciousness (Robertson 
and Inglish, 2006, pp. 31–32). The expansion of Greek influence under Alexander 
the Great further promoted this global consciousness. Whether Alexander himself 
was harbouring an intention to unite mankind is open to debate. Tarn (1948, p. 
435) claims that Alexander had developed the idea that because God is the 
common Father of mankind, mankind should be united in a brotherhood of man. 
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Alexander’s expansions brought people from various cultural backgrounds under 
his banner ostensibly so that they could become one and live in unity, which 
might be called “the unity of mankind”. 
Badian (1958) disagrees with this and meticulously constructs arguments 
which disprove Tarn’s assessment. According to Badian, despite reports on 
Alexander’s view of the common fatherhood of God validating Tarn’s claim, 
Badian argues that Alexander also displayed a claim of superiority over the rest of 
mankind by stressing his heritage as the son of Zeus-Ammon (Badian, 1958, pp. 
426–427). He also questions Tarn’s treatment of source materials, accusing Tarn 
of pro-Alexander bias and either mistranslating or misdirecting the readers (or 
both) (Badian, 1958, p. 432). Thomas (1968), while agreeing with Badian’s 
methodological criticisms, considers that Alexander did play an important role in 
changing the world’s outlook. According to Thomas (1968, p. 258), although 
Alexander might never have envisioned the unity of mankind as Tarn has claimed, 
his actions can be understood in that sense.  
There are several actions of Alexander which can be perceived as 
promoting the unity of mankind. Alexander had imagined the fusion of races, 
especially Greek and Persian, and did so by marrying his soldiers and Persian 
women. By establishing cities, which served as trade networks and cultural 
diffusion centres, Alexander also promoted the diffusion of cultures. These 
developments spurred a shift in philosophical debates on the concept of Homonoia, 
or unity of mankind. While this concept had existed in Greek philosophical 
thought before Alexander’s reign, after his death the concept of Homonoia 
evolved. Instead of being confined to relations between Greek and Greek, it 
expanded to include non-Greeks. This inclusion of non-Greeks in the concept of 
Homonoia was a step further towards the unity of mankind, which might have 
never been envisioned by Alexander but gained some traction  from Alexander’s 
actions (Thomas, 1968, pp. 258–260). 
That Alexander had an important role in expanding the concept of unity of 
mankind, whether he intended or not, is also supported by other scholars. Heather 
(1999, pp. 44–46) notes that during the Hellenistic period, Greeks were feeling 
more comfortable to be considered as citizens of a general Hellenistic world 
instead of as citizens of a particular polis. Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 32) 
further argue that Alexander’s expansion also promoted a lingua franca for the 
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known world and spurred the establishment of a “universal historiography” which 
sought to narrate the history of the “whole world” through a cosmopolitan 
perspective. Not only did this induce Greek historians to record the history of the 
known world, it also showed the interconnectedness of the world. Geographically 
diverse locales were connected in an intricate web of relations, constituting one 
whole world. This departed from previous traditions that narrated history from 
local and disjointed perspectives. Thus, whatever intention was driving Alexander 
to expand his empire, his act gave precedence to the establishment of a global 
consciousness among people under the Hellenistic empire and kingdoms.  
Alexander’s legacy did not end with the Hellenistic kingdoms. The 
Romans adopted this philosophy and practice, and started their own “universal 
historiography.” Polybius, a Greek historian who resided in Rome between 167 
and 150 BCE, recorded the history of the world under the Roman Empire as 
somatoeides (organic whole). The history was considered as a whole body, 
consisting of smaller parts that worked together and were inter-related in very 
complex ways. Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 33) note that Polybius deliberately 
wrote that he was “weaving together the various strands of history into a single 
tapestry”. Polybius’ works helped in building global consciousness among the 
Roman elite. His works were circulated among the Romans’ elite and internalised 
as the proper self-understanding of Romans as a global power. By the first century 
AD, the position of the Roman Emperor and the city of Rome were viewed in 
global terms: the Emperor as “guiding spirit of the whole world” and Rome as 
“the centre of the earth” (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, p. 34).  
In the practical sense of common people, the pax Romana manifested itself 
in more mundane, yet no less powerful, ways. Roads the Romans had built and the 
Romans’ protection of the Mediterranean had made people able to travel across 
the known world. This condition had created waves of migration and social 
mobility. Pax Romana indeed brought geographically distant areas into one fold, 
with the Roman Empire at its centre. In this sense, the Roman Empire was an 
essential mechanism that allowed the flow of goods and people, thus creating 
unprecedented configurations of persons and places (Robertson and Inglish, 2006, 
p. 35). Provinces such as Britain, Greece and Syria experienced economic 
development thanks to the infrastructure provided by the Roman Empire. The 
agricultural surplus from North African provinces were exported to various places 
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around the Mediterranean, which stimulated the flourishing of the provinces 
(Bang, 2007, pp. 14–17). 
The flowering of Christianity further developed the global consciousness 
in the Roman Empire. Early Christianity had been Jewish in composition and in 
conception, but it was then transformed into a universal movement by St. Paul, 
embracing both Jewish and Gentile populations in the Roman Empire (Burns, 
1991, p. 11). Christianity also brought a strong message of universality and 
egalitarianism. In pagan Roman society, women had a lower position than men 
and slaves were below freemen but Christianity ensured that all Christians are 
equal before the Father (Burns, 1991, p. 15). While there were tensions with 
imperial institutions, Christianity ultimately tolerated the continuous practices of 
the pagan Roman Empire and refashioned some to fit its tenets. Only practices 
that gave associations to paganism were eliminated (Angelov and Herrin, 2012, p. 
154). In this light, the doctrine of universal empire from the ancient Roman 
Empire was both continued and modified to fit the Christian faith. 
Like the Hellenistic and then pagan Roman philosophy, Christianity also 
espoused a type of global consciousness and delivered the message of universal 
brotherhood using the metaphor of Christians as the body of Christ. By promoting 
virtues such as hospitality, Christianity helped in establishing broader travel for 
pilgrims, which in turn provided a sense of unity among Christians (Meeks, 2006, 
p. 171). Christianity also transformed the symbols and narratives of the pagan 
empire concerned with global consciousness and universal empire. One important 
example is the narrative of one ruler for the whole world. In pagan Rome, Caesar 
was associated with a deity, or even deified, thus entitled to rule the whole world. 
In Christian Rome, Caesar was seen as the regent of One God on earth, and was 
therefore granted the divine right to rule the whole world. Constantine’s 
conversion to Christianity had strengthened the universal claim of the Roman 
Empire (Burns, 1991, p. 32). To support this, Eusebius in his oration argued that 
the empire of Constantine was the reflection of God’s kingdom in Heaven. Since 
there is one God, there must be only one emperor who derived his power from 
God (Burns, 1991, p. 52). 
This idea of a universal Christian empire lasted even after the split of the 
Roman Empire. Emperors of Byzantium, acknowledging themselves as the true 
successor of the Roman Empire, dreamed of a universal state in which all subjects 
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were loyal politically to the emperor and religiously to the church, headed by the 
Patriarch of Constantinople (Donner, 2010, p. 5). Byzantine Christian authors 
enforced this idea by declaring the Byzantine Empire as the fourth great empire in 
the Book of Daniel, the great empire that would last until the end of time and 
facilitate the Second Coming of Christ (Angelov and Herrin, 2012, p. 171). 
Byzantium’s efforts to subjugate the known world under its banner was the main 
cause of tensions between the Byzantine Empire with another rival universal 
empire, the Sasanid Empire. 
While the Byzantine Empire built their claim of universal empire on the 
foundation of Greek philosophy, Roman legacy and Christian eschatology, the 
Sasanid Empire based their claim of supremacy on the teaching of Zoroastrianism. 
Zoroastrianism had been the religion of the Persians long before the Sasanid 
dynasty, but the Sasanid kings possessed a special relationship with 
Zoroastrianism. Ardashir I, the founder of the Sasanid dynasty, was not of noble 
descent. While he had managed to defeat Ardaban of the Arsacid dynasty and this 
victory had made him the ruler of Persia, he did not have the legitimacy to rule. 
Thus, he turned to Zoroastrianism, using religious propaganda to establish his 
legitimacy as the king of kings (Boyce, 1979, pp. 101–102).  
In order to build Ardashir I’s legitimacy, a priest named Tansar portrayed 
Ardashir I as a religious reformer; he did his conquest to restore Zoroastrianism 
into its “pure” form.  Tansar then helped Ardashir I to create a single Zoroastrian 
church and establish a single canonical text. The church and sacred text provided 
control over Zoroastrians, both inside and outside the empire’s borders (Boyce, 
1979, pp. 102–103). Zoroastrianism teaches that God willed mankind to achieve 
the good life in the mundane world through social order, and this order was 
manifested in the form of the Sasanid dynasty (Zaehner, 1961, p. 284). Thus, the 
Sasanids were considered to have divine right to rule Persia. Not only did they 
claim legitimacy from divine rights bestowed by Ahura Mazda, the God of Light 
in the Zoroastrian faith, the kings also claimed themselves as divine persona. The 
Sasanian kings were considered as the manifestation of the divine in the mundane 
realm (Kennedy, 2004, p. 7).  
In addition to establishing a legitimate claim to rule Persia for Ardashir I 
and his descendants, Zoroastrianism also provided the Sasanid emperors the 
necessary reason to establish a universal empire. Since there was only one God, 
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and the God acted through the Sasanid royalty, then it was the duty of the Sasanid 
emperors to lead mankind to the ultimate salvation of the world through the 
adoption of Zoroastrianism (Zaehner, 1961, p. 300). Since they were the 
representation of Ahura Mazda over the world, Sasanid kings felt that they were 
the true master of the world, above petty kings and other earthly powers, including 
the Byzantines (Donner, 2010, p. 20).  
Arabia and the Arabs’ identity 
Before Islam, Arabia was caught between the two great empires. Arabia 
itself was named after its people; it means “the land of the Arabs’ (Donner, 1981, 
p. 11; Hoyland, 2001, p. 5). Hoyland (2001, pp. 2–3) notes a classical description 
of Arabia from various sources. Herodotus (d. c430 BCE) designated Arabia as 
parts of eastern Egypt, Sinai and the Negev. In Persian administrative records 
from the reign of Darius (521-486 BCE), a district called Arabaya was located 
between Assyiria and Egypt. According to Hoyland (2001, p. 3), it might be 
possible that the Persians’ designation of Arabia included Herodotus’ Arabia with 
the addition of parts of the Syrian Desert. 
The Muslim historian al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 8–9) explains that, 
linguistically, “Arab” means deserts and barren land without water and vegetation. 
The way of life in Arabia was shaped by these physical conditions such as climate, 
the availability of water and the landscape formation. In the southern part of 
Arabia, in the mountainous area of Yemen, Hadramawt and ‘Asir, the winds from 
the Indian Ocean brought enough moisture to trigger rains. The inhabitants there 
developed agriculture techniques such as irrigation to better their life. Southern 
Arabia developed fairly dense population which then opened the possibility of 
artisans and craftsmen. In other parts of Arabia, where rainfall was too erratic for 
farming, the inhabitants depended on the presence of oases or reliable 
subterranean water to provide water for their plants.  
Settlements in the Hijaz region, which would be the heartland of Islam, 
were built around these oases, where people could plant palm groves or other kind 
of crops (Donner, 1981, pp. 11–14). There were also nomads, Arabian people who 
roamed the vast steppe and desert environment with their herds. According to 
Donner (1981, p. 16), there was only a small fraction of Arabs who adopted a 
purely nomadic life. Most of them were semi-nomads, who practised both 
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nomadic pastoralism and settled local agriculture in varying degrees. Despite 
these various differences, there was unquestioningly a shared identity of “being 
Arabs’ in Arabia. Hoyland (2001) argues that there was an Arabisation process 
that occurred, thus turning the various kingdoms and tribes into one identity: Arab. 
According to Hoyland (2001, p. 230), the Arabs’ homeland was north and central 
Arabia, from the Fertile Crescent southward to the borders of Yemen, from the 
west Arabian mountains eastward to Dahna and the Rub al-Khali desert. The 
Arabs shared a language, the same tribal structure and various religious practices 
and institutions, and through these Arabisation occurred (Hoyland, 2001, pp. 230–
231). 
Arabisation itself occurred gradually. During the first millennium BCE, 
the Arabs existed in their homeland area, sharing the Arabic language as their 
main identifier (Hoyland, 2001, p. 230) At the first and second centuries CE, 
several Arab groups from south of Arabia migrated. There was no clear reason as 
to why these tribes migrated, but several sources such as al-Tabari (1989a, p. 745) 
propose that the migration was caused by population growth and war. Others such 
as Mas'udi (2007) suggests that the migration was caused by the breaching of the 
Marib dam. During the fourth century CE, there were various accounts of settled 
and nomadic Arabs in various regions of Arabia. There were also treaties between 
various Arab tribes and also between Arab tribes and both the Romans and 
Persians (Hoyland, 2001, pp. 238–240). The interactions between Arab tribes and 
the empires of Byzantine and Sasania also introduced the concept of dynastic rule 
to the Arabs (Hoyland, 2001, p. 241). As the power and prestige of these dynasties 
grew, they started to employ poets and artists, mimicking the Byzantines and 
Sasanians by establishing their own courts in Arabia. This in turn encouraged the 
development of Arabic poetry, which reached its peak in the early sixth century 
CE (Hoyland, 2001, pp. 241–242). 
There were several instruments that were imperative in constructing Arab 
identity. First was poetry. Hoyland (2001, pp. 242–243) explains the importance 
of poetry in building the Arab identity. Using poetry, poets established an 
idealised version of Arab virtue (muruwwa) such as courage, generosity, fidelity 
and loyalty. These values were promoted in each and every poem, and a great act 
on these values would be exulted in poems. To be immortalised in a poem was 
considered as a great honour among the Arab people. The ideals promoted by 
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these poems became a shared identity and bonds among the Arabs. Poetry was 
also imperative in the construction of Arab identity by introducing the “high” 
language of poetry. Arabic poetry used distinctive dictions which transcended 
local dialects. This language of poetry was not only the language of arts; it also a 
symbol of intelligence and class. It unified the elites and learned ones from 
various tribes into one intellectual community. Poetry also served as storage for 
collective memory. The poems sought to immortalise virtuous deeds done in a 
tribe and, subsequently, commemorate these stories into the common history of 
the Arab people. 
The second instrument for the development of Arab identity was kinship. 
Kinship played a very crucial part in constructing Arab identity (Kennedy, 2004, p. 
16). Since resources were very scarce in Arabia, families banded together and 
helped each other in basic survival. Larger families grouped together for general 
economic purposes. Yet, even larger, kinship based families sharing common 
ancestors grouped together for political strength (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 148–149). 
These kinship based groups often called themselves, and were called by others, 
after the name of a late ancestor (Kennedy, 2007). Outsiders were addressed 
cordially, but were never part of the tribe unless they pledged their loyalty to the 
tribe (and thus, leaving their old tribe). This condition made the rights of outsiders 
limited. Tensions also existed in the daily relations between a member of a tribe 
and a member of another. Injuries caused by outsiders to a member of the tribes 
were regarded as injuries to the whole tribe, caused by the whole group where the 
perpetrator belonged (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 149). 
The third instrument was religion. While the Arabs were polytheists and 
each tribe or society venerated a particular god, all Arab religions shared certain 
characteristics, which made it possible for these religions to coexist and provide 
common ground for interaction. The most important element that bound the Arabs 
together and made cooperation among them possible, even when water and food 
were scarce and conflicts were common, was the concept of haram. Haram was a 
sanctuary where Arabs worshipped their gods (Serjeant, 1999, p. 169). It was 
forbidden to shed blood or to engage in violence inside the haram boundaries and 
its surrounding area (Kennedy, 2004, p. 25). This made the haram a place where 
people could meet safely for both religious and mundane reasons such as visiting 
a market, settling quarrels and arranging marriages and alliances between various 
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tribes (Donner, 2010, p. 30). The guardian of the haram and his descendants were 
considered a holy family which had certain privileges and authority (Serjeant, 
1999, pp. 171–173). 
These unique characteristics unwittingly impacted on the political structure 
of the Arabs. The variation in way of life determined the form of political 
institution that the tribe adopted. The Yemen, which had relatively plenty of water 
and had been able to settle more comfortably in their territory, developed more 
complex political institutions than the rest of Arabia (Donner, 2010, p. 28). There 
had been kingdoms in this area, and several were well-known even to non-Arabs 
such as Saba’ or Hadramawt. These kingdoms eventually gave way to even more 
complex political institutions, such as the kingdom of Himyar. In other parts of 
Arabia, where life was harsh and vital resources were scarce, tribalism was the 
prominent form of political institution. Unlike kingdoms, tribes have no 
specialised institution as a mean to maintain law and order. Therefore, a person’s 
life, honour and goods were protected by his relatives. If something bad befell the 
person, then his whole family was obliged to assist him during the troubles 
(Hoyland, 2001, p. 113). Such a society knitted its members together in tight 
relations. Each member had to pledge to help other members of his tribe in good 
or bad conditions. Because the support of the tribe was vital to survive in a desert 
environment, one placed his or her utmost loyalty on to the tribe (Kennedy, 2007, 
pp. 37–39). 
The Arabs were further divided into two large groups: those who dwelled 
in cities (ahl al-qura) and those who roamed the desert as nomads (ahl al-
badiya/al bawadi). At times, the city dwellers and the nomads were of the same 
tribe. For example, Lecker (2009, p. 158) noted an historical account describing 
that there were farmers from the Sulami tribe who tended their tribe’s plantation at 
Suwariqiyya, and there were also nomads from the Sulami tribe who tended the 
cattle, especially camels. Both of these elements were part of the same tribe and 
had a share in the plantation worked by the farmers. Between these two elements, 
they shared strong bonds which made alliances and cooperation between city 
dwellers and nomads possible. 
During the sixth century, there were several strong political entities in 
Arabia. In south Arabia, there was the Arabian kingdom of Himyar. The last of 
the Arabian southern kingdoms, Himyar, forged alliances with several 
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neighbouring warrior tribes of Kinda, Madhhij and Murad to ensure its safety and 
influence. In central and northern Arabia, there was no kingdom present. The 
tribes were independent and engaged in complicated oaths of alliances and 
vendettas against each other. In general, there were two types of tribal 
confederation in central and northern Arab. The first type were confederations 
dominated by warrior nomads. This type of confederation was characterised by 
the lack of haram as its spiritual centre and with a high value on the military 
prowess of the leader. The strongest warrior tribe then became the leader of this 
confederation, the one who established and enforced order, and the one who 
protected other members, using arms and military prowess if necessary (Donner, 
1981, p. 42). The second type of confederation was dominated by dynastic 
nobility. This confederation was led by a family of “nobles”, who were not a 
warrior tribe but capable of controlling nomadic groups in their area using 
diplomacy and religious legitimacy (Donner, 1981, p. 45).  
Global and parochial consciousness in Arabia 
Despite located far from the centres of larger civilisation, Arabia was not 
isolated from the dynamics of the region. Arabian people was connected to both 
the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires through economic, cultural and religious 
interactions. Both Christianity and Zoroastrianism were present in pre-Islam 
Arabia, along with various Jewish tribes, providing Arabs with spiritual guidance 
alongside their traditional pagan religions (Donner, 1999, pp. 4–5). Arabia was 
located in a strategic position for both empires but its vast desert and arid climate 
provided difficulties for foreigners and invaders. Even though it was important for 
the Byzantines and Sasanids to establish their presence in Arabia in order to fulfil 
their vision of a universal empire, it was difficult for both empires to subjugate 
and directly control all of Arabia. Thus, the empires chose an indirect route to 
control the peninsula (Lecker, 2009, pp. 163–166).  
The Byzantines’ strategy was to build alliances with the warrior tribes. The 
Byzantines chose a warrior tribe called Banu Ghassan to be the leader of their 
allies and to provide military auxiliaries to the empire. The Ghassanids were a 
tribe that had immigrated into Syria around 400 CE and built up a strong network 
of alliances a century later (Donner, 1981, p. 43). The chiefs of Ghassan were 
recognised by the Byzantine Emperor as phylarch, a tribal affiliate of the empire. 
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They received money and weapons from the Byzantines and, in return, were 
expected to fight for the empire’s cause (Donner, 2010, p. 32). The Sasanids, on 
the other hand, chose to ally themselves with several noble families of Arabia. 
The best known of Sasanids’ allies was the Lakhmid dynasty of al-Hira. Their seat 
was located in the lower part of contemporary Iraq. The leaders of the Lakhmids 
were crowned as kings, strengthening their status and prestige in the eyes of local 
tribes (Donner, 1981, p. 45). These Lakhmid kings appointed governors to the 
territories from Iraq to Bahrayn. Each of these governors then worked together 
with a Bedouin chief to manage the territory and provide security for their 
patrons’ interests (Lecker, 2009, p. 164). 
Both the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids were bound to give military 
assistance to their respective patrons. They were involved in various Roman-
Persian wars. The Ghassanids even attacked the Lakhmids’ capital of al-Hira at 
570 CE. Other than direct military assistance, the Ghassanids and Lakhmids also 
supported their patrons’ interest by extending Byzantine and Sasanid influences in 
Arabia. Both tribes competed in gaining the loyalty and obedience of various Arab 
tribes. They also provided security to any Byzantine or Sasanid interests in Arabia. 
The Ghassanids were especially tasked with preventing other nomad groups from 
raiding and plundering Byzantine settlements in Syria (Donner, 2010, p. 32). This 
is also recorded in Muslim historical accounts. Muslim historian Mubarakpuri 
(1996, p. 21) highlights how at that time, Arabs of Iraq could face Arabs of Syria 
in battle despite their shared ancestry because they served different empires. 
By becoming Byzantine and Sasanid vassals, the Ghassanids, the 
Lakhmids and other Arab tribes unwittingly embraced the consciousness of a 
universal empire, with their respective patron as the leader of this universal 
empire. That these Arab tribes were having pragmatic motives in their relations 
with the empires was without question. After all, the study of norms by Risse-
Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16) describes that it is possible for parties to 
maintain their pragmatic agendas while adopting a certain normative discourse. In 
the case of the Arab tribes, these pragmatic motives did not preclude the Arab 
vassals’ adoption of a broader consciousness. On the contrary, the pragmatic 
motives further strengthened or provided incentives for these vassals to embrace 
the global consciousness introduced by the empires.  
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A tribe entering an agreement with the Byzantine Empire or the Sasanid 
Empire acknowledged the legitimacy of the empire’s claim of universal rule and 
willingly put themselves inside that frame of thought as a subservient party. By 
entering in agreement with the empire, the tribe became an integral part of the 
empire’s vision of a universal empire, perhaps unwittingly acting as a promoter of 
global consciousness in the form of universal empire. The tribe would strive for 
the benefits of its patron, and would receive benefits in return. Without the 
existence of their patrons, and without their patrons’ ambition to establish the 
universal empire, these vassals would lose their privileged status and also would 
lose the source of their income and other material benefits.  
This behaviour was in contrast with the behaviour of the Quraysh, the 
Arab tribe that inhabited Mecca. The Quraysh of Mecca were not strangers to the 
outside world. The city of Mecca was one of the great trading centres in Arabia 
(Lecker, 2009, p. 166). From Mecca there were two major trade routes. One 
connected Yemen and the Indian Ocean in the south to the Mediterranean lands 
and Syria in the north. The other connected Persian territories in the west to 
Abyssinia and Africa in the east (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 154). During the sixth 
century, the Quraysh were merchants and often journeyed far to trade. The 
Quraysh arranged trade caravans and established trade routes from Yemen to 
Syria and back again to Yemen, with Mecca as the hub (Kennedy, 2007). They 
interacted with Byzantines and Persians and their vassals during their voyages.  
There was another reason that established Quraysh’s reputation as one of 
the important tribes in Arabia. Mecca was the home of the Ka’ba, an ancient 
shrine deemed holy by the Arabs. The presence of the Ka’ba ensured Mecca’s 
status as a haram land, where various people routinely made their pilgrimage. The 
Quraysh as the guardians of the shrine were thus considered religious aristocrats 
among the Arabs (Serjeant, 1999, p. 179). Combined with its strategic location 
and security provided by the haram, Mecca developed into a well-established 
centre of trade fairs and religious pilgrimages and the Quraysh enjoyed an 
elevated status among the Arabs (Kennedy, 2007).  
Yet, while they were well known by the great empires and their vassals, 
the Quraysh were very careful in maintaining a neutral stance in conflicts between 
Byzantines and Sasanids. Hodgson (1974a, p. 147) explains that during the 
heightened rivalry between Byzantines and Sasanids, the people of Mecca and the 
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surrounding area of Hijaz managed to remain neutral. This was not an easy feat. 
Maintaining a stance of neutrality between two great empires required a great deal 
of information, networking and political shrewdness from the Quraysh leaders. 
During this period, the Quraysh and the Arab tribes in Hijaz saw Byzantines, 
Persians and their vassals as the “Other.” Hodgson (1974a, pp. 153–156) states 
that relations between the Quraysh and the “Other” were purely financial. The 
Quraysh were very careful to stay neutral from the contestation between the 
empires.  
Peters (1999, p. xlvii) describes that the only intense interaction between 
the Quraysh and the outsiders was Abraha’s assault on Mecca. The assault, 
according to Peters, was part of a series of efforts by the Byzantine Empire and its 
vassals intended to secure their interests in the area and to hamper the Sasanids’ 
influence. The attack against Mecca was preceded by the persecutions of 
Christians by Dhu Nuwas, the king of Yemen. With the support of the Emperor 
Justin I, Abraha dispatched a contingent of soldiers to attack Dhu Nuwas. After 
succeeding in conquering Yemen, Abraha was proclaimed the king of Yemen and 
then attacked Mecca (Huxley, 1980). This action, according to Peters (1999, p. 
xlvii), was intended to hamper the perceived Sasanids’ influence over the territory. 
This expedition was an important turning point in the manifestation of Byzantine 
global consciousness and the Quraysh’s rejection of it.  
Islamic sources confirm this event and remember it as the War of the 
Elephant (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 20). This event was described in detail by the 
classical Muslim historian, Ibn Ishaq, in his Sirah. According to Ibn Ishaq (1967, 
p. 20), Abraha was a soldier in the army sent by Christian Abyssinia, which was a 
Byzantine vassal, to attack Dhu Nuwas, a Jewish king of Yemen who had 
massacred thousands of Yemeni Christians. After conquering Yemen, Abraha 
overthrew his leader and became the governor of Yemen. He ruled Yemen as a 
vassal of Abyssinia, which in turn was a subject of the  Byzantine Empire. Ibn 
Ishaq (1967, pp. 21–22) described that Abraha built a great cathedral in Sana’a 
and intended to make the cathedral the centre of religious activities in the region. 
Jealous of the status of the Ka’ba, he then decided to attack Mecca. The Quraysh, 
who at that time were under the leadership of Abdul Muthallib, the Prophet 
Muhammad’s grandfather, were trying to prevent the attack by diplomacy, to no 
avail (Ibn Ishaq, 1967, p. 24). At the end of the day, it was not political 
 48 
shrewdness that saved the Quraysh. Abraha’s attempt failed because, according to 
Islamic tradition, of divine intervention. God sent armies in the form of flocks of 
birds which threw stones at the soldiers and the war elephants, injuring and killing 
them (Ibn Ishaq, 1967, p. 26). This event was mentioned in the Qur’an, in sura 
number 105, al-Fiil (the Elephants). 
This expedition was the result of global consciousness projected by the 
Byzantine Empire and inevitably bound the Abyssinians to comply. Abyssinians 
then manifested the global consciousness into an action: sending soldiers to 
revenge the Christians of Yemen. While this also gave practical and political 
benefits to the Abyssinian king, who extended his sphere of influence to Yemen 
by proxy, this action also enforced the universality and globality of Christianity 
under the patronage of the Byzantine Emperor. After Abraha had secured the 
throne of Yemen, he became another actor whose actions inevitably enforced the 
idea of a universal empire under the Byzantine Empire. His decision to attack 
Mecca, whether to increase his status in the region, to comply with Byzantine 
pressure to counter the Sasanids’ movements or both, was the manifestation of a 
Byzantine-centred global consciousness. If he was to succeed in conquering 
Mecca, then without a doubt, Mecca would be assimilated into the Byzantine 
Empire’s sphere of influence. But since he failed, Mecca maintained its 
independence from both empires. Whether there was divine intervention or not, 
Abraha’s failure reinvigorated the religious faith of Arab tribes in Hijaz. The gods 
of Mecca were victorious against Christ. This elevated the Quraysh’s authority as 
guardian of a haram, bolstered their pride and strengthened the parochial 
consciousness of the Quraysh. 
Message and Rituals 
The previous sections of this chapter show that during Late Antiquity, 
there were two competing ideas of universal empire in the Near East, supported by 
the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Empire. These ideas can be categorised as a 
global consciousness, since both ideas acknowledged the existence of the world 
outside their boundaries and sought to incorporate the foreign local into the union 
and establish the aspired world union. While neither the Byzantine Empire nor the 
Sasanid Empire was able to create a complete global society, they managed to 
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create a sense of globality inside their respective domains. Any institutional 
establishment within their domain further promoted global consciousness by 
enforcing the idea of universal rule and facilitating the promotion of  pragmatic 
interests within the boundaries of the empires. 
The Byzantine Empire’s and Sasanid Empire’s efforts to manifest their 
universal empire also affected various Arab tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Unable to control Arabia directly, the empires chose vassalage as the viable 
strategy. While it did not assimilate the Arab tribes into a Byzantine or Persian 
society, this strategy unwittingly bound the vassal tribes into the universal empire 
frame of thought promoted by the two empires . The vassals became active actors 
who diffused the global consciousness and, for several reasons, worked hard to 
achieve the goal of universal empire. At least, the vassals sought to maintain the 
status quo, since without their patrons these tribes would have lost their privileged 
positions. The Ghassanids, the Lakhmids and various other Arab tribes were 
unwittingly adopting global consciousness and by ensuring their own interests, 
inadvertently contributed to the manifestation of a global society. 
The Quraysh of Mecca adopted a distinct attitude from that of the other 
Arab tribes. Instead of adhering to the great empires’ schemes, the Quraysh 
maintained a standoffish neutrality to the empires. They managed to establish 
trade routes to various territories under the influence of both empires but avoided 
any commitments or hostilities to both. When Abraha, an agent of Byzantium’s 
global consciousness, sought to subsume Mecca into Byzantium’s sphere of 
influence, his plan failed. This incident justified the status of the Quraysh as the 
guardian of the sacred site, the Ka’ba, and reinforced their policy of neutrality. 
This decision to stay away from “outside” affairs while acknowledging their 
presence can be addressed as the manifestation of parochial consciousness 
embedded in the Quraysh. 
The position of the Quraysh in the sixth century with their parochial 
consciousness is in contrast with their position in the seventh century. Instead of 
maintaining their parochial consciousness through a policy of neutrality, the 
Quraysh became the motor of an Arabian expansionary force. More than 
engulfing all Arabia, this force challenged the great empires and managed to 
destroy the Sasanids. By the eighth century, they were establishing an empire of 
their own, one that continued to grow for centuries. The Quraysh’s parochial 
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consciousness no longer existed. Instead, there was a global consciousness that 
drove the people to continue expanding through various means. 
This thesis thus argues that this development within Quraysh society was 
caused by the advent of Islam. Islam instilled global consciousness among the 
Quraysh, transforming them from a standoffish society into an active society 
aspiring to establish their version of a global society. There are several doctrines 
and rituals in Islam that when taught by Muhammad, inspired a global 
consciousness in the Quraysh of Mecca and other people who decided to embrace 
Islam during the early years. To bring evidence to this argument, the subsequent 
section of this thesis will explain the message and rituals of Islam that instilled 
global consciousness. The first is the concept of tawhid, or the Oneness of God 
and taqwa, the appraisal of someone’s worth in front of God. The second is the 
concept of rahmatan lil ‘alamin. The third is the moment of hijra. The fourth is 
the ritual of hajj. By learning these doctrines and performing the rituals, Muslims 
in the early years of Islamic history were taught to think beyond their parochial 
consciousness. The result was the expansion of Muslims outside their traditional 
domain. 
The role of Qur’an and hadith as references 
The teaching of Islam is codified in two main sources: the Qur’an, as the 
words of God conveyed through Muhammad, and the hadith, the sayings and 
habits of Muhammad narrated by chains of reputable scholars. The majority of 
Muslims will accept these as the authoritative texts in Islamic tradition. Therefore, 
in order to understand the Islamic message and rituals that introduced global 
consciousness, this section will use the Qur’an and hadith as references. This 
section will also use the works of Muslim scholars which provide context and 
explanation for the texts of the Qur’an and hadith. Using religious texts to explain 
social and political behaviour might be considered problematic, at the very least, 
because of the temptation to turn the analytical work into a deus ex machina type 
of explanation. However, abandoning religion as a driving force in social and 
political activities would be equally unwise, since most of human societies possess 
religious patterns and expressions which play fundamental roles in the 
development of society. This thesis therefore will use religious texts and rituals to 
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explain social and political phenomena, cautiously using Geertz’s work (1973), 
“Religion as a cultural system”, as a guiding framework. 
According to Geertz (1973, p. 96), religious activities have the ability to 
induce motivations and moods in the believers. Motivation is a persisting 
tendency to perform certain sorts of acts and experience certain sorts of feelings in 
a certain sort of condition. Motivations are “made meaningful” with reference to 
the end. Moods occur when a person is properly stimulated by religious activities. 
Moods are “made meaningful” with references to the conditions that produce 
them. Geertz then concludes that religion can play an important part in social 
activity, with the activity in turn gaining the attribute of ‘religious’. A charity, for 
example, can be called a “Christian charity” when it is enclosed in the Christian 
concept of God’s purpose. Optimism can be called a “Christian optimism” when it 
is based in a particular Christian conception of God’s nature (Geertz, 1973, pp. 
96–98).  
Geertz notes that when a person embraces religious belief, he or she 
accepts the authority of the religion or the institutionalisation of the symbols of 
the religion. The believer complies with the conception of order that the symbols 
of the religion have formulated (Geertz, 1973, p. 109). During religious rituals, 
which fuse motivations and moods with conception of order, a person experiences 
the merging of the world as lived and the world as imagined. This will leave the 
person with a profound effect which will transform his worldview even after 
completing the rituals (Geertz, 1973, p. 112). But since religious ritual is spatially 
and temporarily limited, no person will live in religious rituals for all of the time. 
According to Geertz, the most important function of a religious ritual, outside the 
boundaries of the ritual itself, is that the ritual provides the believer a tool to 
reflect back on the conceptual world order as determined by the religion so that 
the individual could take it as a bare fact and internalise it (Geertz, 1973, p. 119).  
Geertz’s observation on the power of religious symbols and rituals can be 
further elaborated using Kertzer’s (1988) work on the importance of rituals in 
politics. While not limiting the use of the terminology to religious rituals, Kertzer 
does include religious rituals in his work. Kertzer argues that religious rituals and 
worship of god are the symbolic way of a people to worship their society. Thus, 
religious rituals are important in political activities (Kertzer, 1988, p. 9). 
Participating in rites establish links for the people to abstract concepts such as 
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citizenship and the greater world outside. According to Kertzer, people have 
tendencies to assign sacred, cosmological meanings to their society. It is through 
rituals that people justify their society as a “proper” order and relations between 
individuals and groups (Kertzer, 1988, p. 37). More so, rituals also introduce a 
particular worldview to the people and make it possible for the people to build 
emotional attachment to the worldview (Kertzer, 1988, p. 40). By participating in, 
and maybe manipulating, a ritual, political actors can ascertain their position as 
the ruling class in a certain society (Kertzer, 1988, pp. 40–41). 
Using religion in explaining social and political behaviour, as this thesis 
will do, therefore is not an effort to conjure a deus ex machina explanation, but to 
seek the ways in which religion and religious rituals inspire and transform social 
and political behaviour. After all, religion is sociologically interesting not because 
it describes the social order, but because it shapes it (Geertz, 1973, p. 119). This 
position is also supported by the theoretical framework previously discussed in 
Chapter One. As Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–134) describe, mythology 
and theology can become legitimation instruments for a symbolic universe. In the 
case of this thesis, the symbolic universe is the concept of the umma and the 
teaching and rituals of Islam are part of the instruments which legitimate it.  
Still, using the holy texts, in this case using the Qur’an and hadith, as the 
basis of a scientific inquiry is a matter of contention. Crone and Cook (1977, p. 3) 
argue that there is no hard evidence that the Qur’an had existed before the last 
decade of the seventh century. Crone (2003, pp. 5–7) claims that the situation in 
Arabia during the first century after Muhammad’s death was so turbulent with 
internal tensions and external polemics that their narration of history was 
irrevocably damaged. According to Crone (2003, p. 7), the religious tradition of 
Islam was built during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, disconnected from the 
real history of Muhammad. Therefore, Crone (2003, p. 8) criticises the usage of 
hadith as the basis for reconstructing the first century of Islamic history.  
Peters (1991), however, argues to the contrary. Regarding the authenticity 
of the Qur’an, he stated that there are no variants of great significance in the 
Qur’anic texts. This is due to the careful preservation of the text, after 
Muhammad’s dictations to the Companions, through the scribes’ and secretaries’ 
efforts to codify them (Peters, 1991, pp. 293–295).  Qur’anic texts were preserved 
with a great care as to exclude redactional bias (Peters, 1991, pp. 298–299). On 
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the authenticity of hadith, Peters’s opinion is more cautious. While he 
acknowledges critics of the authenticity of hadith, including Crone, he also 
acknowledges the usefulness of using hadith as a historical source through the 
process of arranging the hadith in a coherent order or to deduce the evolutionary 
thinking in Mecca from a comparison with other religious cultures (Peters, 1991, p. 
307).  
In line with Peters’ argument, this thesis, instead of completely 
disregarding the Qur’an and the hadith, will draw upon these holy texts to better 
understand the process of thought and the development of the global 
consciousness of Muslim society. However, far from using the Qur’an and hadith 
as a divine power that provides unchallenged explanation, it will see the Qur’an as 
the source of inspiration of global consciousness which was then articulated by 
Muhammad, or using Berger's and Luckmann’s (1966) terminology, externalised 
by him. This thesis will see the hadith as the instrument of objectivation of the 
idea of a global umma, in which Muhammad put his idea into languages and 
material instruments available to him. Further, this thesis will observe how the 
Qur’an and the hadith create moods and motivations which affect the believers, 
consistent with Geertz’s (1973) concept of religion as a cultural system. In other 
words, this thesis will position the Qur’an and hadith as the texts that inspire 
global consciousness in early Muslims, but the manifestation of global 
consciousness and the development of a global society were social and political 
processes and phenomena, not divine ones. 
Tawhid 
The first and foremost doctrine of Islam is tawhid, or the Oneness of God. 
The Islamic conception of God is clearly stated in sura 112, al-Ikhlas (The 
Fidelity) verse 1-4: 
Say: He is Allah, the One and Only 
Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; 
He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; 
And there is none like unto Him. 
According to al-Suyuti (2008, p. 649), this sura was revealed when a 
group of unbelievers asked Muhammad for a description of Allah. According to 
Ibn Kathir (2000b), this sura has another name, which is al-Tawhid (Oneness of 
God). The sura declares the name of God as Allah. It puts emphasis on the 
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characteristics of God: that He is One and Absolute. He has no contemporaries, no 
parent, spouse or child. This complete rejection of other gods or supernatural 
beings is also reflected in the Islamic statement of belief, laa illaha illa Allah, 
there is no god but Allah. Al-Qaradawi2 (1995, pp. 39–41) elaborates the doctrine 
of tawhid further by stating that as God is One and Absolute without 
contemporaries, then mankind must only direct their fear and hope at God. There 
is no one who can put others at harm or give benefits, without His consent. 
Accordingly, mankind should strive for their ultimate goal: to gain His approval. 
There are several Qur’anic verses that provide details on the proper behaviour 
approved by God.  
Since there is only one God, Islam as the religion blessed by Him calls on 
the whole humanity. This concept of universalism of Islam is called fitra. 
According to Rubin (2003, p. 74), Islam’s self-image as the religion of fitra 
became the justification for spreading of Islam. Embracing Islam means coming 
back to the very fundamental nature of mankind, regardless of one’s racial, social 
or cultural background. On the societal level, this self-image is reflected in Islamic 
historiography, which identifies Islam as the message brought by prophets since 
the first human, as described in the Old Testament. This kind of attitude is 
supported by Islamic religious accounts that call previous prophets and their 
followers as “Muslims”3. Thus, to be a Muslim means following the footpath of 
not only Muhammad but also those of Jesus and Moses and the patriarchs of Israel. 
More than that, it also means following Abraham, Noah and other figures to 
Adam, which Rubin considers as “pre-national” (Rubin, 2003, pp. 78–87).  
Yet, despite this universalism of Islam, racial discriminations were 
observed in early Muslim society, quite in contrast with the message of tawhid 
                                               
2
 Al-Qaradawi is a renowned modern scholar of Islam. He is best described as a modernist-
traditional Muslim scholar. He seeks new interpretations of various Islamic teachings, which 
would fit with modern situations, but he still is rooted deeply in traditional sources. While there 
might be controversies about him and his opinions on certain issue, al-Qaradawi’s influence on 
constructive dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims is notable. See Mandaville (2005) 
“Toward a Virtual Caliphate” for a discussion on why al-Qardhawi is a prominent figure in 
contemporary Muslim world. 
3
 An example of such religious accounts is Qur’an sura 2 al Baqara verse 136. Translation of the 
verse by Sahih International is as follows: 
Say, [O believers], "We have believed in Allah and what has been revealed to us and what has 
been revealed to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the Descendants and what was 
given to Moses and Jesus and what was given to the prophets from their Lord. We make no 
distinction between any of them, and we are Muslims [in submission] to Him.” 
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and fitra. In regard to racial discriminations, there is one important verse to be 
taken into consideration:  
O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and 
made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. 
Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most 
righteous of you (taqwa). Indeed, Allah is Knowing and 
Acquainted. 
Sura 49 al-Hujurat (Inner Apartments), verse 13.  
 Al-Suyuti (2008, p. 530) provides context and explanation to the above 
verse. The verse was revealed to admonish a racial act conducted after the victory 
of Muslims over the pagan Quraysh of Mecca. At that time, Muhammad had 
asked Bilal, one of his trusted companions, to perform the call to prayer (adhan) 
as a symbol of Islam’s triumph over paganism. Bilal then climbed the Ka’ba and 
started the call for prayer. Seeing a black man and former slave had been 
bestowed with this privilege, some people complained that surely there were 
better candidates to perform this sacred duty than a former slave. Others snickered 
and mocked Bilal because of his skin colour and status. The verse was then 
revealed to reproach this racist behaviour. 
This verse conveys a strong message about universal brotherhood of 
mankind in Islam. Theologically, tawhid teaches Muslims to reject the existence 
of another being as god or pseudo god, whether it has human or supernatural 
characteristics. Islam was eliminating the power of god kings, tyrants and despots. 
A Muslim should never consider himself as a god, nor consider other humans as a 
god or a god-like figure. A human should never bow, prostrate or kiss the ground 
before any other human. The Muslims understood this point abstractly. But the 
incident of racism against Bilal proved that, in practice, it was hard to eliminate a 
deep-rooted prejudice. Slavery had been considered normal and slaves with 
different skin colour were considered as sub-human. Even after “being liberated” 
by Islam, for some people, a black, former slave, was still considered as sub-
human regardless of his status as a beloved Companion of the Prophet. Therefore, 
this verse was very important to the Muslims at that time since it directly 
admonished racism and symbolically enforced the message that Islam seeks to 
eliminate racist behaviour among the believers, bringing them back to the fitra, 
the basic nature of humanity, of universal brotherhood. 
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Surat al-Hujurat verse 13 also provides an alternative to measure one’s 
standing in the society. Instead of using racial background, social status or 
material possession, this verse introduces taqwa as the best indicator to evaluate a 
person. As a religious concept, taqwa can be defined as “observing the Divine 
ordinances in every walk of life.” Other Qur’anic verses provide a description of 
the behaviour of people with taqwa: 
And hasten to forgiveness from your Lord and a garden as wide as 
the heavens and earth, prepared for the righteous [people with 
taqwa] 
Who spend [in the cause of Allah] during ease and hardship and 
who restrain anger and who pardon the people - and Allah loves the 
doers of good; 
And those who, when they commit an immorality or wrong 
themselves [by transgression], remember Allah and seek 
forgiveness for their sins - and who can forgive sins except Allah? - 
and [who] do not persist in what they have done while they know. 
Those - their reward is forgiveness from their Lord and gardens 
beneath which rivers flow [in Paradise], wherein they will abide 
eternally; and excellent is the reward of the [righteous] workers. 
Sura 3 Ali Imran (The Family of Imran), verse 133-136. 
Since God condemns racism and measures people by their good behaviour, 
the early Muslim society also adopted taqwa as a social measurement. People 
were admonished no longer to look at racial attributes, social standings and 
material possessions to determine one’s position in the society. Instead, the early 
Muslim society used the quantity and quality of one’s good behaviour as the 
social measurement. This was reflected in daily activities among the Prophet’s 
companions. Al-Suyuti (1881, p. 39) narrates a story from Abu Daud and al-
Tirmizi where Umar ibn al-Khattab gave half of his property for alms and felt 
satisfied about his good deeds. Umar thought that, this time, he had given more 
than Abu Bakr. But to his disappointment, Abu Bakr came and donated more than 
what Umar had. This event had kindled genuine admiration from Umar ibn al-
Khattab for Abu Bakr for the latter’s good deeds were greater than other 
Companions in that time. 
The narrative’s goal of looking at other’s good behaviour, and maintaining 
one self’s good behaviour, became ingrained and formed the idealised basis of an 
Islamic society where material achievements and social status were relatively 
unimportant. In this society, various conditions that would usually conjure barriers 
to human mobility were to be considered insignificant. People would perform 
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horizontal mobility without being worried about racial background. People could 
also move up vertically in society without being overly concerned about wealth or 
lineage. But in this society, piety became an important factor to improve one’s 
standing in the society. Therefore, one century after the Prophet’s migration from 
Mecca to Medina, piety became a valued instrument of social and political 
mobilisation. People would out-piety others to improve their social and political 
standing. This is especially true in the political sphere, where political actors used 
piety to gain legitimacy for their political actions. The instrumentalisation of piety 
will become an important aspect of discussion in the later part of this thesis. 
Rahmatan lil ‘alamin 
The second doctrine of Islam that introduced global consciousness to the 
early Muslims is the doctrine of rahmatan lil ‘alamin. Qur’an sura 21 al-Anbiya’ 
(The Prophets) verse 107 states that: 
And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to 
the worlds.  
 
The Islamic terminology rahmatan lil ‘alamin is translated as “mercy to 
the worlds.” Ibn Kathir (2000a) explains that this verse was directed to 
Muhammad, to indicate that his teaching is for mankind in the whole world, not 
only to certain tribes or people. Anyone, regardless of his or her ethnicity, social 
status and other conditions, will receive mercy if he or she is willing to accept his 
message. Even someone who is not a Muslim might benefit from the mercy of 
Muhammad’s teaching. Muslim in his Sahih (vol. 32/6284) reported a narration 
from Abu Hurayra that someone asked Muhammad to curse the polytheists but he 
replied, “I was not sent as the invoker of curse, rather I was sent as a mercy.” This 
hadith shows that, to Muhammad, even the polytheists had rights to receive the 
mercy of Islam. 
The doctrine of rahmatan lil ‘alamin is the underlying force which 
motivates Muslims to spread the teachings of Islam to all corners of the world. 
The doctrine appeals not only to cognitive reasoning of the people of Arabia 
familiar with the existing rivalries among the empires: since the Byzantines and 
the Sasanids sought to establish a universal empire, then connectivity is a must? It 
also appeals to a normative dimension of the believers, that their active 
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participation is part of a greater good. Who does not want to be part of a 
movement which spreads mercy to all? This is in line with the legitimation 
process according to Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 111). Further, this doctrine 
encourages the development of a sense of social justice among the believers. 
According al-Qaradawi (1998, pp. 277–279), there are five basic rights in Islamic 
teaching, known as al-dharuriyyat al-khams that need to be protected and 
preserved. These five basic rights are: the right to live, the freedom of religion, the 
freedom of thought, the protection of family and bloodlines and protection of 
property and wealth. Only after every man and woman in the world has their basic 
rights fulfilled will the world reach the condition of rahmatan lil ‘alamin 
prescribed by the verse above. As mercy can only ensue if all five basic rights are 
prevalent in the whole world, it highlights the nature of Islam as a universal 
religion (al-Qaradawi, 1995, p. 93). 
Muhammad took this mission of mercy seriously. In order to spread the 
mercy of Islam, Muhammad appealed to tribes and nations beyond the Quraysh 
through personal visits, sending envoys or diplomatic correspondence. Al-
Mubarakpuri (1996, p. 147) notes the first attempt to establish external contact 
was done by Muhammad by visiting the city of al-Ta’if, approximately 60 
kilometres from Mecca. In the summer of 619 CE, accompanied by his freed slave 
Zaid ibn Harithah, Muhammad spent ten days in al-Ta’if to meet the elite and 
general populace, inviting them to Islam. Unfortunately, this first attempt was met 
with failure. Instead of embracing his message, the people of al-Ta’if gave him a 
hostile reception, forcing Muhammad and Zaid to leave with wounds on their 
bodies.  
Islamic tradition provides a hadith on this incident which further highlights 
the message of mercy brought by Muhammad. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, p. 150) 
narrates from al-Bukhari who recorded from ‘Urwah ibn al-Zubair, that when 
Aisha, the Prophet’s wife, asked Muhammad whether he had a day worse than the 
day of Uhud, he recounted his experience in al-Ta’if. Going back from al-Ta’if 
with wounded body and broken heart, Muhammad saw the angel Gabriel in the 
sky, calling him and saying that God had sent the angel of the mountains to him. 
Muhammad was free to order the angels anything he wished, including toppling 
the mountains and burying al-Ta’if under the mountains. Muhammad instead 
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forgave the people of al-Ta’if and prayed that God would spare them so that their 
children could embrace Islam in future. 
After the incident in al-Ta’if, Muhammad continued to contact tribes 
outside the Quraysh. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 153–161) notes Muhammad’s 
efforts to contact various tribes and introduce Islam. Classical scholars such as Ibn 
Ishaq (1967, pp. 194–197) and al-Tabari (1988a, pp. 88–92) also documented 
Muhammad’s attempts. These efforts were futile, since most of these tribes were 
not interested in a religion that they perceived as a cult of the Quraysh. After some 
time preaching without success, Muhammad finally gained support from six men 
from the city of Yathrib. At the next year, the delegation from Yathrib came again, 
this time numbering twelve men. After twelve years of prophethood, finally there 
was some good news for Muhammad. He then sent Mus’ab ibn ‘Umair as the first 
ambassador to Yathrib (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 172). This mission succeeded 
and, in the next year, Yathrib was ready to accept Muhammad. The city then 
changed its name into al-Madina al-Munawarra, or the Radiant City, commonly 
known as Medina. 
Muhammad’s mission to spread Islam intensified after he performed hijra 
to Medina. He dispatched ambassadors to the kings of Abyssinia, Bahrain, 
Alexandria, Yamama, Oman, and Ghassan. He also sent a letter to Heraclius of 
Byzantium through Jerusalem and another letter to Khusrau II of Persia through 
al-Madain (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 391). These letters were invitations to Islam 
and bearing Muhammad’s personal seal which consisted of three words: Allah 
(God), Rasul (Prophet) and Muhammad. For letters to Christian kings, 
Muhammad included a verse of the Qur’an that addressed the Christians (al-
Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 392). These diplomatic missions were met with various 
results, ranging from a friendly reception from the Negus of Abyssinia and Cyrus 
the Patriarch of Alexandria, well-known with his Arabic name as al-Muqawqis, to 
the hostile reception by  Khusrau II of Persia (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, pp. 390–
405).  
Hamidullah (1945) describes how Muhammad also received foreign 
envoys. He usually received them in the Great Mosque, where they then 
exchanged gifts and greetings. The whole procession during Muhammad’s time 
was simple, in contrast with the more complex and grand reception in later 
caliphates (Hamidullah, 1945, pp. 137–139). During their stay in Medina, the 
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envoys were entertained in special guest houses and enjoyed privileges. For 
example, the Christian envoys from Najran were allowed to perform their 
religious prayer inside the Grand Mosque of the Prophet (Hamidullah, 1945, p. 
140).  
The other efforts of spreading mercy were paradoxically done through 
wars. Since mercy in the world can only be achieved through the fulfilment of 
rights, Islam takes oppression as a heavy offence against humanity. Islam teaches 
Muslims to stand up against oppression and to liberate oppressed people. As 
strange as it seems, Islam also teaches that mercy can be spread by waging war. 
Mercy can also be found during war and in the battlefield, as well as in peace 
missions and diplomatic correspondences. There are verses of the Qur’an that 
justify the war against oppressors:  
So let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this 
world for the Hereafter. And he who fights in the cause of Allah 
and is killed or achieves victory - We will bestow upon him a great 
reward. 
And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of 
Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children 
who say, "Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people 
and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us 
from Yourself a helper?" 
Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who 
disbelieve fight in the cause of Taghut. So fight against the allies of 
Satan. Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak. 
Sura 4 al-Nisa’ (The Women) verse 74-76. 
 
Ibn Kathir (2000a) explains that the city with oppressed people referred to 
in the verses is Mecca that was still under the Quraysh’s rule at the time of 
revelation of this verse. But the verses also speak of a more general condition, 
about cities where people are being oppressed and justice is non-existent. Thus, it 
is taught to Muslims to stand up and fight against oppression whenever it exists. 
To achieve this objective, al-Qaradawi (2004, pp. 17–21) argues that Muslims 
require a state which accommodates the Islamic orientation of global justice. State 
in Islam is not an egoistical entity concerned with its national interests. It is not 
merely the “security device” to protect the umma and its interests. But state in 
Islam is a tool of education, both educating its people and the global world on the 
virtues of Islam, an actor that actively creates a positive environment for global 
justice and serves as the vanguard against oppression.  
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The doctrine of Islamic just war found precedents in Muhammad’s sayings 
to his Companions. Ibn Kathir (2006) narrates several hadith in which 
Muhammad encouraged the Companions to explore beyond Arabia. In one hadith, 
Muhammad foretold several of his Companions that they would conquer Egypt. 
When they did so, he expected them to treat the Egyptians with good manners and 
provide them with security (Ibn Kathir, 2006, p. 22). In another hadith, 
Muhammad promised Paradise for the first Muslim army who crossed the sea. 
Umm Haraam, a female Companion of the Prophet, asked him whether she would 
be in the army, and he answered that she would (Ibn Kathir, 2006, p. 26). Islamic 
tradition believes that what Muhammad said was a foretelling of the future. The 
fulfilments of those events are part of his miracles. While the divine nature of 
these messages is debatable, Muhammad did send a strong message to his 
Companions to think beyond the land of Arabia in their mission to spread mercy 
to the world. In this sense, the expeditions that were launched after his death 
brought his foretelling into reality. This can be seen as the evidence of 
Muhammad’s divine guidance but it also can be interpreted as the self-fulfilling 
manifestation stimulated by a strong vision from a charismatic leader. Whichever 
it was, Muhammad’s message, through the use of religious symbols and promise 
of salvation, had managed to motivate the believers, as Geertz (1973) has 
described.  
The effect of Islamic teaching on the implementation of global justice can 
be seen in the Muslim historical account which reports dialogue between Rib’i ibn 
Amir, the envoy from the Muslim army, and Rustum, the leader of the Persian 
army, before the Battle of Qadisiyya. When Rustum sent a message to Sa’ad ibn 
Abi Waqqash and asked an envoy from the Muslims, Rib’i was sent to meet the 
Persian general. During this meeting, Rustum asked Rib’i, what the Muslims truly 
wanted and what their true mission was. Rib’i answered with, “Allah, the 
Almighty, sent us to free people from worshipping subjects and make them 
worship Him alone, and to get them out of difficulties of this life to its easiness 
and spaciousness, and from injustice of dogmas to the justice of Islam” (al-
Qaradawi, 2004, p. 21)4. 
                                               
4
 It is ironic to note that while the Battle of Qadisiyya, in which this dialogue took 
place, was perceived in the classical literature as one of the defining moments of 
the unification between Arabia and Persia under the rule of the Muslim empire, it 
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The results of diplomatic missions and wars during the time of 
Muhammad were varied. Some were successful and some were not, but the 
message from these practices was clear: Islam is a universal religion for all people 
regardless of ethnicity, social status and race. Muhammad had broken the barrier 
of seeing people as the “Other” that characterised the parochial consciousness of 
the people of Quraysh. Instead of maintaining aloofness and indifferent attitudes 
to people outside their tribes, Muslims now actively reached out to the people 
from other tribes and kingdoms.  
It is important to note that the obligation to wage war was not placed on 
individuals; thus the obligation was not mentioned in the five Pillars of Islam, 
which constitute the primary obligations for all Muslims. Instead, the obligation to 
war was placed upon the community. Khadduri (1955, pp. 60–61) describes two 
important implications of this. First, it means that not all Muslims must perform 
the duty. Some Muslims might be exempted from this duty, such as those old, 
weak or with disability. Second, placing the obligation on the community made 
the conduct of war a state instrument. While any state has the power to declare 
war and conscript the populace to support war, the Islamic state is authorised in 
particular by religious texts and motivations to do so. This provided the state with 
an additional mechanism to control the population, which is beneficial to the 
universe-maintenance process as described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 
127–134).  
The concept rahmatan lil ‘alamin has provided both rational justification 
of the existence of the umma and moral legitimation to take part in the expansion 
efforts of the Muslim umma. It further ingrained the global consciousness in 
Muslims’ mind by providing a vision of global mercy and global justice that 
Muslims should strive to accomplish. Since the doctrine of rahmatan lil ‘alamin is 
inherent in Islamic teaching, Islamic rituals or educational efforts inevitably will 
play as instruments for internalising the idea of the umma, further strengthening 
the concept as a symbolic universe. A good Muslim is not only caring for his or 
                                                                                                                                 
was interpreted by Saddam Hussein as a moment of perpetual conflict between the 
Arabs and Persians. He even erected a monument to the Battle of Qadisiyya to 
commemorate the conflict, which he argued was alighted anew in the war between 
Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988. See: Kanan Makiya, The Monument: Art and 
Vulgarity in Saddam Hussein's Iraq (London and New York:  I.B. Tauris, 2004).   
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her personal happiness. A good Muslims should also actively promote the idea of 
mercy and justice to the whole world, as part of his or her holy duty from the God. 
The ultimate reward for Muslims who advocate these values are, according to 
Islamic traditions, the perfect harmony in earth and the joy of Paradise – a 
powerful normative encouragement.  
Hijra 
The third important concept in Islam that plays a fundamental role in 
breaking parochial consciousness among Muslims and instils Islamic global 
consciousness in their minds is hijra. In itself, hijra was a general Arabic term for 
migration thus having a social connotation in it. Later developments in Islamic 
history made it gain a significant religious meaning. After Muhammad asked his 
Companions to migrate from Mecca to Yathrib, hijra became a sacred duty of all 
Muslims. This migration was done in series, and culminated with Muhammad’s 
own migration. Later, Muslims considered hijra as a defining moment in the 
development of the early umma, thus attributing the first year of Islamic calendar 
to the year where Muhammad did his migration, not to his birth or the time he 
received his first revelation.  
As described earlier in this chapter, there were three instruments that 
defined the Arabs: Arabic poetry and poetic language, kinship and religion with 
its haram sites. Before the hijra to Yathrib, Muslims were affected by these same 
social instruments as their fellow Meccans. During its earlier phase, Islam had 
been considered as just another cult that would become part of Meccan polytheism 
since its prophet was from the religious family of Quraysh and its rituals revolved 
around the Ka’ba. Al-Tabari (1998, pp. 92–97) describes how, at first, the 
Quraysh had tolerated Muhammad’s preaching but then became increasingly wary 
and outright hostile after Muhammad had firmly rejected their polytheism and 
idolatry. Al-Suyuti (2008, pp. 644–645) explains that surat al-Kafirun (The 
Unbelievers) was revealed to counter the pagans’ request for a compromise: the 
pagan would pray to God during one year and the Muslims would pray to pagan 
gods the next year.  
Yet despite this religious difference, Muslims were still considered as a 
part of Meccan society even though some of them met unsavoury treatment from 
the Quraysh elite. Al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 92–94) describes how the laws and 
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customs of Meccan society still protected Muslims and gave them certain rights 
within the society. Muslims from noble families or wealthy ones could live 
relatively free from harassment. They still became victims of discrimination and 
harassment from within their own family, but, generally, they were protected by 
the customs. The ones who suffered the most were Muslims from poor and weak 
families, or slaves. Muhammad himself was subject to harassment, mostly verbal 
but sometimes also physical (Ibn Ishaq, 1967, pp. 130–131), but none directly 
threatened his life because he was from a noble family and had esteemed status in 
the society (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, p. 94). 
Frail as it was, kinship and tribal customs provided some forms of security 
to Muslims in Mecca. While their lives were at a disadvantage, they were 
comforted by the fact that they were still part of the society. Even during the years 
of boycott during the seventh to tenth prophetic years (c. 617-619 CE), the kinship 
system protected the majority of Muslims. During this period, the pagans from 
various clans boycotted the clans of Hashim and al-Mutallib until they agreed to 
lift their protection from Muhammad. Abu Talib, Muhammad’s uncle and the 
patriarch of the clans, instead of relenting to the demand, chose to withdraw to a 
valley on the eastern outskirts of Mecca and faced the boycott valiantly. The 
Muslims and members of the two clans followed him. The boycott lasted for three 
years before a group of kinsmen protested against it, invoking the sentiments of 
kinship and tribal customs to end the boycott (al-Mubarakpuri, 1996, pp. 127–
130). 
Their ties to Mecca ran so deep to the point that despite continually 
received harassment and torture, Muslims did not think of permanently leaving 
Mecca. Before the hijra, there were occasions of Muslims leaving Mecca for trade 
or other affairs but they always came back despite knowing the unsavoury 
treatments that they would receive in the city. During the fifth year of 
Prophethood (c. 615 CE), there were scores of Muslims who were sent to 
Abyssina and lived there under the protection of the Negus (al-Tabari, 1988a, pp. 
98–101). But this migration was temporary, because as soon as they heard that the 
pressure against Muhammad had lessened, they tried to move back to Mecca (al-
Tabari, 1988a, p. 109). There was little attraction to spend their life in other land 
beside their homeland, away from their kinsmen and tribe.  
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The command to do hijra and make permanent migration to Medina was a 
revolutionary call. The word hijrah came from the root of HJR. It literally means 
“to abandon”, “to break ties with someone” or “to migrate” (Masud, 1990, p. 30; 
Abu-Shahlieh, 1996, p. 37). This can be translated further as “he cut himself off 
from friendly or loving communication or intercourse…he ceased…to associate 
with them” (Armstrong, 2006, p. 109). In a culture where family ties and tribal 
customs are instrumental in defining a person, asking the person to cut all ties to 
his or her kin and defy the customs is the same with deconstructing his or her 
whole world. Instead of continuing their life in a world defined by their blood 
relations and tribal laws, Muslims from Mecca were required to migrate to a 
foreign city, to place their fate in the hands of strangers (Masud, 1990, p. 31). This 
was an act of both defiance to the old world of tribalism and acceptance of the 
new world of the Islamic umma.  
Hijra was an event that shook the core of the parochial nature of Arab 
tribes, thus enabling Muslims to build a community based on broader 
consciousness. Hodgson (1974a, p. 172) states that by hijra, Muslims could 
finally escape from old confinements and were able to build a new societal order 
based on Islamic values. By severing the ties to their tribe, Muslims could create 
new bonds based on religious brotherhood. By leaving their birthplace, Muslims 
were encouraged to see foreign territories as their home. By this act, a Muslim 
was not only cutting all ties to the primordial connections but he was also forming 
a new connection. This was a drastic move which served to deconstruct a 
Muslim’s worldview and his or her imaginary of ‘society’. Since those who 
migrate, Muhajirin in Islamic terminology, were without society and would never 
survive without one, Muhammad created a new society by bonding each Emigrant 
from Mecca with one resident of Medina into a brotherhood. This brotherhood 
was the embryo of the new society based on Islamic teaching and values: the 
umma.  
In Islamic tradition, there is a popular story of how Muhammad 
established the bond of brotherhood between the Emigrants and the Ansar, or the 
Helpers, people from Medina who helped the Emigrants (Watt, 1960, p. 84). In 
Islamic tradition, Bukhari narrated in his Sahih (vol. 5/book 058/no. 124) that 
when Abdur Rahman ibn ‘Auf arrived at Medina, Muhammad established a bond 
between Abdur Rahman and Sa’ad ibn ar-Rabi. In accordance with this bond, 
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Sa’ad offered to divide his property with Abdur Rahman, but the latter declined 
this offer. Instead, he asked Sa’ad to show him the way to the market. While the 
accuracy of this story remains debatable, changes in the society of Medina to 
accommodate the arrivals of the Emigrants were observed. This narration is an 
example of how Muhammad built the fabric of the new umma. In Berger's and 
Luckmann’s (1966) work on social constructionism, what Muhammad did is a 
process of objectivation. At first, he expressed the idea of universal brotherhood in 
a series of signs and symbols, such as defining and calling for hijra. Then, he put 
the idea into social practice, by bonding two strangers in “the brotherhood of 
Islam”. Other than the immediate societal effect, this narrative also serves as an 
instrument for internalising the idea of the umma to younger generations, with 
teachers routinely citing this hadith as an example of the universal brotherhood 
among Muslims5. 
The stories of hijra for the first generation of Muslims provide strong 
encouragement for Muslims to travel, leaving their homeland. While later 
generations of Muslims might not share similar predicament with the Muhajirin, 
the moment of hijra has provided a general sense of detachment toward particular 
locales among Muslims. Since every part of the Earth belongs to Allah and 
Muhammad himself had inspired his Companions to travel outside their traditional 
area, Muslims performed travelling as part of their social and religious life. 
Commenting on the concept of migration in Islamic society, Abu-Shahlieh (1996, 
pp. 39–45) describes that the spirit of hijra increased social mobility in Muslim 
society, to the extent of a fluid mobility in future years. Later jurists put some 
restrictions on the migration of Muslims for safety and political reasons. These 
jurists, such as Ibn Hazm (d. 1064 CE) or Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE), both of them 
from Cordoba, especially discouraged travelling to the territory of infidels, which 
was termed as dar al-harb. These could be seen as reactions toward hostilities 
between Muslims and Christian kingdoms in Europe. Contrary to these 
                                               
5
 The power of this narrative is strong among Muslims, even to this day. This can be seen in how 
the Muslim activists in Indonesia reacted to Rohingyan refugees. While the governments of 
Indonesia and Malaysia were hesitant to accept the refugees, local fishermen from Aceh and, later, 
Muslim organisations in Indonesia embraced them as fellow brothers and sisters of Islam. They 
saw the waves of Rohingyan refugees as the “new Muhajirin” and themselves as the “new Ansar” 
providing the refugees with help and care, as can be seen in an article entitled “All Muslims are 
Brothers”: http://aceh.tribunnews.com/2015/05/22/muslim-itu-bersaudara  
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restrictions, Muslims were travelling as far as China and Southeast Asia, bringing 
Islam and their concept of a universal umma to these distant areas. 
The journey of Ibn Batutta (d. 1369 CE) provides such strong evidence of 
the global nature of Islamic medieval society. During his thirty years of journey, 
Ibn Batutta explored various parts of the known world at that time, and his journal 
provides an insights into the global nature of the community he visited (Waines, 
2010). There were also detailed documentaries on the journey and career of Ibn 
Khaldun (d. 1406 CE). Menocal (2002), in describing part of the journey taken by 
the young Ibn Khaldun, indicates how he visited the court of Peter of Castile in 
1364 CE as the ambassador of Granada and charmed the Christian king to the 
point of being offered the position of wazir of Castile. While Ibn Khaldun 
declined the offer, this short fragment of his personal life fits properly with the 
argument of this thesis, that Muslim individuals have established a translocal 
network, driven by their aspiration for a global umma. The journeys of these men 
were different from the journeys of the pre-Islamic Quraysh because, during their 
journeys, both Ibn Batutta and Ibn Khaldun showed detachment towards a certain 
geographical place, unlike the Quraysh which had held Mecca dearly. At the same 
time, Ibn Batutta and Ibn Khaldun also showed willingness to adopt and be 
adopted by alien lands, to a certain degree. This can be seen by the travellers’ 
attitudes, spending more on their journey than residence in their home town, and 
the attitudes of their hosts, who disregarded the cultural background of these men 
and provided them with strategic opportunities.  
Ibn Batutta and Ibn Khaldun were not the only ones who took such 
journeys. Eickelman and Piscatori (1990) detail the activities of Muslim travellers, 
travelling various routes in search of knowledge and in the quest for spirituality. 
Collins (1998) has written an extensive work on the master-pupil connections in 
various world cultures, starting from China to India, to Arabs and Europe. Using 
Collins’ work, we can understand how Muslims had established extensive chains 
of intellectuals throughout the Muslim world and how global consciousness 
spread across distant areas, and even across time frames. These journeys were not 
only beneficial for the development of science and religiosity, but also serve as the 
instruments in their aspiration to establish a global umma. Nasr (2002, p. 173) 
notes that this fluidity, or what he called the nomadic element, is one 
distinguishing element of Islamic medieval society, as this thesis will explain 
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further in later chapters. All of these provide evidence of the development of a 
larger consciousness among Muslims and how this consciousness instilled an 
aspiration to Muslims to form a global society called the umma. 
Hajj 
Hajj is one important ritual in Islam. For Muslims who are able, hajj is 
compulsory to perform at least once in their life. The majority of Muslim scholars 
agreed that hajj was prescribed at the sixth year after hijra (Sabiq, 1992, p. 1). 
There was a narration of hadith that commends hajj as one of the best deeds, after 
belief in God and His Prophet and striving in the cause of God. Sabiq (1992, p. 2) 
also narrates another hadith in which the Prophet declared that whoever performs 
hajj for Allah and frees themselves from lewdness and sins during the procession, 
will be freed from all sins, as if he was just born from his mother’s womb. This 
puts hajj as a strong and valued religious ritual which, calling on Geertz (1973), 
could invoke strong moods and provide a powerful motivation to Muslims 
performing it. 
Muhammad did his hajj during the tenth year after hijra, or 632 CE. He 
was accompanied by ninety thousand to one hundred and forty thousand Muslims 
(al-Tabari, 1988b, p. 125). This event was known as the Farewell Pilgrimage or 
hajj al-wada’, since, in the next year, Muhammad passed away. During his 
sermon, Muhammad gave an important speech that further promoted the message 
of a universal brotherhood of Muslims. According to Ibn Ishaq (1967, p. 651), the 
part of Muhammad’s speech related to the universal brotherhood of Muslims is as 
follows: 
Know that every Muslim is a Muslim’s brother, and that the 
Muslims are brethren. It is only lawful to take from a brother what 
he gives you willingly, so wrong not yourselves. 
 
This message was simple yet powerful, more so when one considers the 
context around the message. Muhammad delivered this message after the victory 
over Mecca, at a time when the power of Muslims was thought unstoppable, or in 
the vocabulary of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 902), Islam had reached its 
“tipping point” in Arabia. This victory lent credence to the messages of Islam and 
Muhammad; as noted by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 138), an idea is 
considered to be superior to other rivalling ideas not by its virtue or intrinsic 
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qualities but by its applicability to serve the social interests of the carrier group. 
With the victory of Muslims over Mecca, the people of Arabia saw that Islam had 
managed to “make” the Muslims victorious, thus enforcing the soundness of 
Islamic messages.  
That the sermon was done during the hajj is also important. According to 
al-Qaradawi (1995, p. 81), the hajj teaches Muslims to purify themselves from 
material luxuries. During the hajj, Muslims are demanded to live in simplicity, 
humility and abstinence from material possessions. The peak of the hajj is the 
gathering in Arafat, which is considered an obligation for all pilgrims, even those 
of old age or on their sick beds. This event determines the validity of someone’s 
hajj. It is also reported by Muslim and other narrators that Aisha heard 
Muhammad say that during the gathering in Arafat, God grants his mercy to all 
attending Muslims (Sabiq, 1992, pp. 94–96). Thus, when Muhammad made his 
speech during the wuquf or gathering in Arafat, his speech became part of a 
powerful ritual that symbolised God’s mercy upon mankind. At the same time, the 
gathering of thousands of Muslims from various tribes and races was not a 
common happenstance and, consequently, this might further instil a sense of awe 
among the attendants. As Geertz (1973, p. 113) has noted, a religious ritual can be 
considered as a “cultural performance” whose elaborate symbols shape the 
worldview of the adherents. This sermon was one of the grand rituals, if not the 
grandest, in Muslim history and it imprinted a compelling imagery of a global 
umma in Muslims’ minds, not only on those who were present during the sermon 
but also on later generations. 
 The Hajj Ritual  
While Muhammad’s sermon and his message of universal brotherhood 
was unique, a one of a kind grand ceremony unparalleled by other hajj rituals, 
Peters (1994) describes each hajj as an extraordinary event. The hajj is not like 
other types of pilgrimages known later in Muslim rituals. Its time is fixed. The 
hajj can only be performed in the eighth, ninth and tenth days of the last month in 
the Muslim lunar calendar. It is not just a few days in Mecca or doing a single act 
in sacred places, but involves a series of rituals to be performed and travelling for 
miles for the completion of the process. Each ritual of the hajj is attributed to the 
experiences of Abraham and his son, Ishmael. Muslims performing hajj re-enact 
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the struggle of the family, and this journey culminates in wuquf, performing a 
contemplative and reflective break in the field of Arafat. Quoting Peters (1994, p. 
xxii), “hajj is not so much an act as an experience.” This observation is in 
accordance with Geertz’s (1973, pp. 119–123) observation on the transformative 
powers of a religious ritual, which can shape the world of a believer. 
Peters’ (1994) collection on various accounts of the hajj is valuable as one 
of sources of how transformative their hajj experience is for the pilgrims, so that 
by the end of their pilgrimage, the pilgrims not only gain the title of Hajji but also 
gain a profound change in their worldview. The experience of hajj begins when 
the pilgrim departs from their homeland. A nineteenth century hajj account from 
John Lewis Burckhardt describes how the Muslim pilgrims from a region called 
Taka, now part of Sudan, embarked on their journey to the holy city of Mecca. 
Quoting Burckhardt, Peters (1994, pp. 96–97) describes the pilgrims’ preparation 
for the hard journey ahead. They were also prepared for the possibility of facing 
various perils during the journey: death by fatigue, being robbed, lost in the desert 
etc. Despite the dangers, the number of pilgrims did not lessen over time. A 
particular pilgrim, a blind man who was continually led by a stick during his hajj, 
recounted his experience using these passionate words, “I am blind, but the light 
of the word of God and the love of His Prophet illumine my soul and have been 
my guide from the Sudan to this tomb.” 
Approaching the haram of Mecca, the pilgrims are required to perform a 
ritual of purification and don plain, white clothes. This ritual, called as ihram, 
produces profound effects on the pilgrims. Peters (1994, pp. 114–115) narrates Al-
Ghazali’s (d. 1111 CE) musing that ihram is a symbol with multiple meanings and 
interpretations. Ihram could be interpreted as the purification of the pilgrim from 
anything else besides God. By donning the ihram, the pilgrims confirm their 
intention of doing hajj solely because of God; they cast away any lingering 
worldly motives that might lurk inside their hearts. By donning the ihram and 
uttering the talbiya, a ritual chant during the entrance to Mecca, pilgrims are 
answering the call from God. The pilgrims are now guests in God’s house, and 
should rely on God’s grace and generosity, nothing else. Ihram also symbolises 
the shroud that each Muslim will be wrapped in after their death; thus buying and 
donning the ihram is a reminder of the pilgrims’ mortality and their afterlife.  
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As we have seen, the wuquf in Arafat is the peak ritual of the hajj. A 
narration from Muhammad said that “hajj is wuquf in Arafat,” thus making this 
ritual obligatory for all pilgrims. This is a spectacular moment, where all pilgrims 
gather in one location. Ibn Jubayr described his awe when performing this ritual. 
How the chant “God is great!” arose from the whole plain, the pilgrims were deep 
in their meditative prayers with such humility and in tears. Social stratification 
was neglected in this time. In the assembly were Arabian, Maghribi, Persian, and 
Khurasani pilgrims. With both men and women, the mass was beyond counting 
(Peters, 1994, pp. 123–125).  
It is this elaborate set of experiences that instil and enforce global 
consciousness among Muslims during the hajj. Since it can only be done during a 
specific time and place, all Muslims who are going to perform hajj in a certain 
year will meet and mingle. It also requires Muslims to wear a specific garb, 
modest in style and white in colour during the ritual. Since during the hajj the 
values of universality, simplicity and abstinence from material possession are 
enforced, and differences in ethnicity, social status or wealth are muted, the hajj is 
where the idea of universal brotherhood meets reality. This engrains the sense of 
uniformity and globality in Muslims and generates necessary moods and 
motivations to continue the global consciousness. If Muhammad’s sermon during 
the wuquf ingrained the message of universal brotherhood of Muslims for the 
early generation, the annual experiencing of how a multitude of Muslims from 
various racial, social and cultural backgrounds gather together in a common ritual 
might drive the message home for later generations. The gathering has become a 
powerful tool for objectivating the message, that there is a universal brotherhood 
of Muslims6.  
On “Islamic” global consciousness 
Universalism is a fundamental part of Islam. There is one God, one 
religion calling for one humanity. One people forming one society, the umma. 
Verses of the Qur’an speak about this in subtle ways, instilling a global 
                                               
6
 Modern pilgrims undergo the same transforming experience. One notable example of modern 
Muslims who underwent a life-changing experience during the hajj was Malcolm X. His 
experience during the hajj was so profound that he concluded that Islam was a means by which 
racial problems could be overcome. For a detailed account of Malcolm X’s hajj experience, see 
Malcolm X’s autobiography (1968). 
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consciousness to Muslims, calling them to expand and connect, to establish the 
global umma. Muhammad, as the religious and social leader of the early Muslims, 
enforced this message through various events and rituals. Hijra and establishing a 
bond of brotherhood between the Emigrants and the Helpers were part of 
Muhammad’s strategy to deconstruct and reconstruct the concept of society 
among Muslims. The spreading of Islam outside Arabia and expansion of Muslim 
society afterwards could be seen as the efforts to achieve this idea of a global 
umma. 
However, there are sceptics who argue that the movement of Muslims out 
from Arabia was not motivated by the teachings of Islam. One classic scholar who 
expressed this view is Ernest Renan. Unlike other nineteenth century scholars on 
Islam, Renan was quite sympathetic to the figure of Muhammad and his teachings. 
In his essay “Mahomet and the origins of Islam”, Renan (1864) repeatedly 
stressed the virtues of Muhammad, stating that he was a gentle, benevolent man 
(Renan, 1864, p. 236), not an ambitious or heartless Machiavellian (Renan, 1864, 
pp. 247–248), a master of his own thought (Renan, 1864, pp. 251–252). Without a 
doubt, Muhammad was a man who had believed in his sacred mission and had 
faith in everything that he did (Renan, 1864, p. 252). 
Yet, when contemplating how much the early Muslims believed in the 
prophetic mission of their master, Renan was a sceptic. He stated that in the circle 
of Muhajirin and Ansar, faith was absolute (Renan, 1864, p. 253). Yet, leaving 
these groups, faith was replaced with pragmatism. Renan describes that the first 
century of Muslim history was but a struggle between the forces of true believers, 
those of the Muhajirin and Ansar, and the sham ones. In the second group, there 
were Quraysh elite families, led by Abu Sufyan of the Umayyads, who, according 
to Renan (1864, p. 257), had never been a genuine believer. After the death of 
Umar, the Muhajirin and Ansar lost their main defender, and wilted under the 
pressure of the Umayyads and their allies, which culminated in the assassination 
of Ali, the murder of Muhammad’s grandson, Husain, and the siege of Medina by 
the Umayyad’s troops (Renan, 1864, pp. 258–259). With the defeat of the 
Medinans, Umayyad rule was uncontested in the Muslim world and brought to an 
end the generation of true believers (Renan, 1864, p. 260). 
Using what he perceives as rivalry between the true and sham believers 
during the first century of Muslim history, Renan concludes that after the 
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ascension of the Umayyads, the Muslims had lost their true faith. He states that 
the Muslim movement after the first century in Muslim history was “started 
almost without religious faith” (Renan, 1864, p. 259). What developed later in the 
Muslim world was no longer inspired by Islam, but was instead driven by the 
power of tribal politics and elite families who competed with each other to expand 
their domains. The ascension of the Abbasids marked the triumph of Persian 
philosophy over the true teaching of Islam. While Muslims were expanding fast 
and the Arabic language was adopted in large areas of the world, the true spirit of 
Islam was forgotten (Renan, 1864, p. 265).  
Lewis (2002a) provides another sceptical view on the expansion of 
Muslim society. He describes the expansion of Muslims after the death of 
Muhammad as driven by pragmatic motives (Lewis, 2002a, p. 50). It was a means 
to establish a political supremacy over Arab tribes in Arabia. The death of 
Muhammad was perceived as the end of the bonds between various Arab tribes 
and Medina. These tribes, which had formerly associated themselves with Islam, 
severed their bonds with Medina and ceased their tribute. Abu Bakr as the 
successor was compelled to launch military expeditions against these tribes to 
maintain Medina’s hegemony over the region. The conquests also provided a 
solution to the economic problem of the peninsula. Expansion into the rich 
kingdoms in northern Arabia generated income which was necessary to 
consolidate Medina’s hegemony in the area. Without the economic benefits 
gained from the expedition to the north, Medina might have not succeeded in 
forcing the various Arab tribes into submission. Lewis subsequently provides 
details on how Medina gained various benefits by conducting expansions and 
conquests. Most of these benefits were economic in nature, some were political. 
None was religious (Lewis, 2002a, pp. 50–57). 
Taking into account these critical assessments, there are two arguments 
delivered by the critics of “Islamic” expansion that disagree with the notion of an 
“Islamic” global consciousness. First, there was no Islamic global consciousness 
because the true believers of Islam were decimated during the first century of 
Muslim history. This rendered Islam as a body of ideas and norms irrelevant in the 
later expansions of Muslim society. Second, there was no Islamic global 
consciousness because there were other motives guiding the expansions of 
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Muslim society; thus the society and its motives could not be called “Islamic” but 
were pragmatic instead.  
This section will provide counter-arguments to these two propositions. 
First, in order to answer the proposition that there were no true believers after the 
fall of Medina, this section will raise an argument based on the prevalence of the 
spirit of Islam in the society; that the Muslim society developed at the end of first 
century was still using Islam as the foundation of their society. Second, to answer 
the concerns that pragmatic motives were observed in later generations, thus 
diminishing the “Islamic” characteristics of the society, this section will describe 
the instrumentalisation of piety: in other words, that the presence of pragmatic 
motives did not automatically bar the presence of religious motive in the Islamic 
community. Rather, pragmatic motives required the presence of piety and 
religious symbols to gain legitimation.  
Prevalence of the spirit of Islam in the society 
This section seeks to counter the claim that one century after the death of 
Muhammad, there were no true believers of Islam and that Islam had ceased to be 
the foundation of the emerging society. This sceptical view is based on what was 
perceived as rivalry between true and sham believers in the first century of 
Muslim history (Renan, 1864, pp. 257–260). This sceptical view further argues 
that the ascension of Mu’awiya as the Caliph and the subsequent creation of the 
dynasty of Umayyads as rulers of the Muslim world indicated that the later 
Muslim movement was motivated by dynastic politics, not by Islam.  
These concerns can be addressed in several ways. The first is to engage the 
concern with the theoretical framework discussed previously in this thesis. 
Drawing on Berger and Luckmann (1966), the umma was built upon the 
foundation of Islamic values and rituals. Tawhid and rahmatan lil ‘alamin as 
fundamental principles of Islam motivated the believers to act in certain manners. 
Islamic religious rituals further ingrained the values in the believers’ minds, in 
accordance with the process described by Geertz (1973). The moment of hijra 
marked a clean break from a parochial, tribal idea of society and signified the 
emergence of a global idea of society based on Islamic values. Watt (1956, pp. 
251–252) observed that the resulting society expressed an interesting 
characteristic unlike any other societies at that time: it lacked attachment to a 
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particular territorial basis. This observation further strengthens the argument that a 
broader consciousness was present in the early Muslim society. 
 Although there were conflicts between true and insincere believers after 
the death of the Prophet, there was a constant acceptance among them that  Islam 
was the ideal foundation of the society. In other contexts, the changing of the ideal 
foundation is observable in various societal conflicts;  the conflicts between the 
Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Empire were characterised by constant rivalry 
over their respective values. Later conflicts between these empires with the 
emerging caliphate also showed the rivalry between the empires’ values against 
Islamic ones. One could even cite the Wars of Ridda, which involved the fledging 
caliphate and secessionist groups. During this period of conflict, there were 
constant attempts to uproot Islam from parts of the umma, changing it with new 
religious forms that were brought by new prophets or prophetesses, or changing it 
back to old, pre-Islamic ways of tribalism. Yet, there were no recorded attempts to 
uproot Islam from the society during the conflict between various Muslim groups. 
On the contrary, each faction founded their political aspiration on an Islamic basis, 
arguing that other parties were not Islamic enough in their behaviour. 
Thus, from the perspective of the theoretical framework established in 
Chapter One, the internal conflict during the first century of Muslim society 
cannot be understood as an attempt to remove Islam from the society. Instead, it 
can be seen as the maturing process of the society. If we consider Islam as a norm 
in Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle theory, Muhammad was its 
most prominent norm entrepreneur. His words and actions were practical guides in 
efforts to establish an umma. With his death, this guide was lost and some groups 
had differing opinions on how to continue their societal activities within the 
framework of the umma, which led to violent conflict. While the violence was 
unfortunate, the presence of different interpretations within a symbolic universe is 
common, as described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 124). They (1966, p. 
125) further argue that the presence of such conflict usually leads to efforts to 
systematise the theoretical conceptualisation of the symbolic universe. This did 
happen in Muslim history, as can be seen in the development of various 
theological traditions, both to satisfy the intellectual and spiritual needs of Muslim 
and to provide legitimation to the political establishment governing the umma. 
Further discussion of this will be detailed in Chapter Four. 
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The second is to examine Mu’awiya’s status among the believers using 
historical accounts, both from inside Muslim intellectual tradition and from 
outside sources. While the Khajirites and Shiites vilified Mu’awiya, Sunni sources 
agree that, regardless of the controversies over his political activities, Mu’awiya 
was a true believer of Islam. He was one of the scribes of the Qur’an, and the 
brother-in-law of Muhammad. These two statuses were not easily granted by 
Muhammad to a random person. Supporting this argument, there were narrations 
from the Prophet, describing Mu’awiya’s virtues. Al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 47–48) 
reports one of such narrations, recorded by Ahmad and at Tirmizi, from Anas ibn 
Malik, that Muhammad had praised Mu’awiya: 
The most compassionate of my people unto my people is Abu Bakr, 
and the most zealous of them-in upholding the commands of God, 
Omar, and the most truly modest among them, Othman, and the 
most learned of them in things lawful and unlawful Mu'ad-b-Jabal, 
and the most skilled in the law of inheritance, Zayd-b-Thabit, and 
the most learned of them in the Kuran, Ubayy-b-Kaa'b, and in 
every people, there is one that is confided in, and the trusted one of 
this people is Abu U'baydahb-u'l Jarrah.” Abu Ya'la has taken this 
from the tradition of Ibn Omar and added to it: “and the best of 
them in adjudication, A'li.” Ad Daylami quotes this in his Musnad 
u'l Firdaus from the tradition of Shaddad-b-Aus and added: “and 
Abu Darr, the most devout of my people and the most sincere, and 
Abu'd Darda, the most pious of my people, and the most 
Godfearing and Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the most benign of my 
people and the most magnificent.” 
 
That Mu’awiyya’s policies had invited criticism, even from the earlier 
generation of Muslims, is indeed true. Al-Tabari (1987) narrates in his book 
several occasions where Mu’awiya allegedly ordered his followers to insult Ali 
and his family and to abuse Ali’s followers (Tabari, 1987, pp. 5, 123, 149). 
However, Humphreys (2006) raises doubt on whether Mu’awiya had actually 
ordered these offences or that this was part of a black campaign against him, 
which started to happen in the Abbasid period. Humphreys (2006, pp. 3–10) 
describes how the Abbasids publicly condemned him and his family. In detail, the 
habit of condemning Mu’awiya and the Umayyad clan was started by the first 
‘Abbasid Caliph, Abu al-‘Abbas al-Saffah (r. 749-754 CE) during his speech in 
Kufa (Humphreys, 2006, p. 4). Apparently, this move was to gain sympathy from 
the followers of Ali and was, at the same time, a strategy to delegitimate the 
Umayyads and to legitimate the ‘Abbassid coup. Other Abbasid Caliphs continued 
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this practice. Al-Ma’mun (r. 813-833 CE) and al-Mu’tadid (r. 892-902 CE) were 
trying to take the condemnation further: they tried to paint Mu’awiya not only as a 
corrupt, bloodthirsty tyrant, but also as an apostate (Humphreys, 2006, pp. 4–6).  
Sunni scholars who were not part of Abbasid machinations to sully 
Mu’awiya’s and the Umayyads’ name were undecided on Mu’awiya’s personality. 
Personally, Mu’awiya had been a trusted Companion of the Prophet, as proven by 
various hadith. Yet, on the other hand, he had been against the Prophet at the 
beginning of Islam. Mu’awiya had been a good administrator, political leader and 
military general. But he also had deliberately refused to acknowledge Ali as the 
fourth Caliph. If only at that time Mu’awiya was bringing peace and unity to the 
umma, he would be a great, unblemished, hero in Islamic history. Ultimately, 
there was so many controversies around him, making scholars reluctant to grant 
him the status of hero but also unable to condemn him. Nevertheless, Humphreys 
(2006, p. 10) says that Sunni scholars concluded that disagreements based on 
Mu’awiya’s political behaviour were not enough to condemn Mu’awiya. 
The third counter against the proposition that there was conflict between 
true and sham believers is to argue that this proposition fails to understand the true 
nature of conflict during the first century of Islam. Berkey (2003, p. 71) argues 
that the tensions within the umma, which worsened after the assassination of 
Uthman and culminated in the civil war between Ali and Mu’awiya, was not a 
conflict between true or sham believers. It did not prove that there were groups 
which tried to uproot Islam as the foundation of the society. On the contrary, the 
conflict happened and became so prominent in the Muslim society precisely 
because Islam was the religious foundation for the conflicting actors. In their 
aspiration to create the perfect umma, the conflicted parties accused their rival as 
“imperfect” thus unsuited to be the leader of the umma.  
Muslims took the incapability of their leaders seriously. According to 
Islamic teaching, someone’s soul is reflected in his/her unconscious activities. 
Akhlaq is the part of the soul which inspires unconscious activities. It is formed 
through repetitive practice of the Islamic rituals and internalisation of its values, 
and will appear in spontaneous behaviour (Esposito, 2003, p. 89). Thus, when the 
Muslim community saw that their leaders performed actions that they perceived as 
injustices, they saw these as the reflection of their flawed souls and spirituality. 
Social and economic gaps were not only reflecting the leaders’ bad leadership 
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skills, but also their violation of Islamic principles, making it a problem of 
spiritual quality. During the leadership of Uthman (643/44-656 CE), parts of the 
Muslim society were dissatisfied with his leadership because they saw his 
behaviour was not in line with the principles of modesty and piety that Islam had 
taught. The perceived unbalanced division of wealth and status among the society 
might be upsetting to some, but the lack of resolve in Uthman’s leadership to 
address this inequity and his perceived nepotism was infuriating to the believers 
because it transgressed the spirit of social justice brought by Islam (Donner, 2010, 
pp. 151–152).  
The religious interpretation of the conflict is also apparent in the way 
Muslim scholars referred to the conflict as the first fitna, or tribulation, among the 
community (Berkey, 2003, p. 71). That various tribal instruments were also at 
play during the conflict and the later history of the society was understandable 
since the presence of Islam as religious foundation was not necessarily 
contradictory to the presence of tribalism in the society. The interaction between 
the teaching of Islam and tribal elements need not be a zero-sum interaction, and it 
is possible for both to be present in a multi-layered society (Berkey, 2003, p. 72). 
Further discussion on the conflict and its effects on the formation of the umma 
will be elaborated in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. 
Instrumentalisation of piety 
Observation of later periods in Muslim history reveals the prevalence of 
pragmatism shown by various political actors. The presence of political rivalries 
or economic gains are the most common characteristics observed. This has led to 
the proposition that later generations of Muslims were no longer Islamic. However, 
it is inappropriate to dismiss the presence of religion entirely despite the presence 
of pragmatism or material benefits in certain actions. On the contrary, since Islam 
has a profound effect in Muslims’ minds, Donner (1988, p. 98) explains that 
Muslim society was built upon the foundation of piety. Religious piety has 
become a social and political currency. While this might be perceived as 
diminishing Islamic values, Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16) have 
observed that it is possible for parties to maintain their pragmatic agendas while 
adopting a certain normative discourse. Thus, instead of erasing or diminishing 
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the religious motive, the presence of political rivalry or economic benefit may 
even strengthen the need to display religious symbols and perform religious rituals.  
During early Muslim history, Islam was heavily used to legitimate political 
claims, to solve social problems, to gain economic benefits, even to justify wars. 
During a rivalry, each faction sought legitimacy from Islam and would try to “out-
piety” the others. This excessive use of Islam subjugated the society to Islamic 
authorities which were manifest in government and the ‘ulama and sharia courts. 
Berkey (2003, p. 79) states that the Umayyads built their caliphate as the centre of 
authority both in religious and in political issues, playing the part of just religious 
judges and pious political actors to appease the citizens. Princes and governors 
sought to increase their influences by performing the hajj. The hajj became their 
instrument to attain political power not because hajj gave them control over the 
populace but because during the hajj, they could show their piety and could ‘out-
piety’ rivals. Yet, at the same time, these princes and governors were subjecting 
themselves to entering the cultural performances that would instil a broader 
consciousness, of the universalism of Islam and brotherhood of people of the faith. 
The hajj also induced normative and affective dispositions that these princes and 
governors would carry back to their domains. 
Another example on how the Umayyads were eager to incorporate Islamic 
symbols and rituals into their political instruments is the decision of Abdul al-
Malik (r. 685-705) to mint new coinage with the shahada and Qur’anic verses 
inscribed on the sides, a departure from the common design of Byzantine coins 
(Donner, 2010, pp. 203–217). Other caliphs, such as Sulayman (r. 715-717 CE), 
patronised poets whose poems then exalted the Caliph as the great leader, saying 
in effect that there had been no other leader like him since the death of the Prophet 
(Rubin, 2003, pp. 93–94). Moreover, in al-Walid’s (r. 743-744 CE) letter about his 
choice of successors, he tried to anchor his position as a Caliph as the successor of 
the Prophet. He started his letter in a long narrative praising God and the Prophet, 
subtly shifting the letter to him as the Commander of the Faithful and successor of 
the Prophet in protecting the religion and the believers. He thus deserved due 
respect and loyalty from the populace. Only then did he end the letter by calling 
for support for his successors (al-Tabari, 1989b, pp. 106–112). The Umayyads 
also possessed relics and regalia which they claimed had been handed down in a 
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successive hereditary line originating from Muhammad, such as Muhammad’s 
sword, his pulpit (mimbar) or his signet ring of authority (Rubin, 2003, pp. 95–99).  
The effect of the instrumentalisation of piety was not only that religious 
symbols and rituals were being used to enhance legitimacy, but also that political 
actors were required to adopt religious symbols and perform religious rituals to 
gain power. The involvement in religious practices might be initially based on 
purely pragmatic motives, as commonly happens in the spread of contemporary 
normative discourse as Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999) notes. But this 
involvement would inadvertently submit the political actors to the authority of the 
religion. According to Geertz (1973, p. 109), submitting oneself to a religious 
authority is the embodiment of belief. Thus, like it or not, understanding it or not, 
every time a person uses Islamic symbols or rituals to strengthen his or her 
political legitimacy or to gain practical benefits from it, he or she submits to 
Islamic authority in effect and confirms at least a tacit adherence to belief in Islam. 
The more he or she draws from Islam, the more he or she interacts with its 
symbols to the point that Islamic symbols would provide him or her with 
orientating motivations.  
Such a consequence can be seen in the flourishing of Islamic knowledge 
during the Abbasid period. The Abbasids started their claim over the leadership of 
the umma by riding the wave of a messianic movement which believed that a 
member of the family of the Prophet will come and lead the Muslims towards an 
era of justice and prosperity (El-Hibri, 1999, p. 3). In order to maintain this 
legitimacy, early Abbasid caliphs were invested in various enlightenment projects 
which ushered in a Golden Age of Islamic learning. According to Robinson 
(2004a, p. 91), the Abbasids were responsible for the initiating and thriving of 
learning institutions, integrating various locales in one judicial system and 
government and promoting Arabic language as the language of learning. Other 
than that, the infrastructure developed during the early Abbasid period also made 
travel easy, thus allowing for the collection of hadith.  
From Islamic Global Consciousness to Islamic Global Society? 
Based on historical observations, there are signs of global consciousness in  
previous empires. Robertson and Inglish (2006) describe the development of 
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global consciousness in Greek and Roman civilisations. This consciousness 
fuelled the rapid expansion of these civilisations in both their economy and 
politics. In contrast with such civilisations, the Quraysh did not develop any signs 
of global consciousness. Yet, after the advent of Islam, the Quraysh became a 
proponent of a translocal movement, which then resulted in the Umayyad Empire 
spanning from al-Andalus to Persia. This thesis argues that the reason behind the 
change of behaviour in the Quraysh was Islam. Islamic teaching provided the 
Quraysh with a sense of consciousness beyond their traditional locale, an 
awareness of belonging to an umma. This consciousness then propelled them to 
form a wider society, essentially trying to establish the umma as social reality. 
While this awareness of a broader world clearly had practical constraints built into 
it, that it stemmed from Islamic teaching and was motivated by common Islamic 
goals are sufficient to consider it as an Islamic global consciousness (Geertz, 1973, 
p. 98).  
Other than providing a motivational goal, Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98) also 
explains that religious activities could influence the moods of the believers by 
conditioning the believers to do or avoid certain actions. This behavioural-shaping 
ability is mainly achieved through the practice of religious rituals. By attending 
religious rituals, believers shape their worldview in accordance with the religion’s. 
They then conform their actions to the values embedded in this particular 
worldview. Geertz’s assertion of the influence of religion on the societal activities 
of the believers is important in understanding the transformation of the umma 
from a religious idea to a societal phenomenon. Through Muhammad, Islam 
introduced the notion that human society is characterised by faith, instead of by 
blood. In the time and location where tribalism was the prevalent societal system, 
it was a revolutionary idea.  
The umma as an idea had to go through stages of objectivation described 
by Berger and Luckmann (1966) before it could emerge as a social reality. The 
transformation of the umma from a religious terminology into a symbolic universe 
occurred through the possibility of religious activities inducing motivation and 
moods in the believers. As detailed by Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98), religious 
activities motivate the believers by providing the believers with the underlying 
cause they strive for. In the case of the Muslim umma, it is plausible that the social 
activities done by Muslims were within the framework of the Islamic umma when 
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the Muslims perceived their actions to be required steps to achieve the Qur’anic 
virtue of rahmatan lil ‘alamin. For example, when Muslims went to faraway 
places in order to spread Islam to the people of other cultures and to integrate 
them in a greater Muslim enterprise, this action of travelling and spreading Islam 
could be considered as motivated by the concept of the umma. 
Later chapters of this thesis will show the efforts done by Muslims to 
establish the umma as social reality through building various translocal networks 
and interactions that connected distant areas.  Chapter Three will describe the 
establishment of Muslim intellectual networks, which blended Islamic religious 
teaching and foreign intellectual traditions, and how these networks played an 
important role in connecting geographically separated lands and in allowing the 
movement of both ideas and people between those lands. Chapter Four will 
discuss the development of the concept of the caliphate as Muslim scholars seek 
to address the question of authority in the Muslim umma after the death of 
Muhammad. The practical implementation of the caliphate itself and how these 
political instruments helped the integration process in the Muslim umma are 
detailed in Chapter Five. In Chapter Six, this thesis will describe the development 
of Islamic mystical movements, the Sufi orders, whose religious expressions 
further helped to strengthen the image of a global umma. All of these will 
illustrate the transformation process from global consciousness in the form of the 
idea of an umma to the efforts to build a global society named the umma. 
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Chapter Three: 
Intellectual Networks and the Integration of the Umma 
 
 
The presence of connections and interactions among the inhabitants of 
various parts of the known world can be traced throughout history. The Silk Road, 
for example, was one of the main routes of trade and travelling between the area 
of contemporary China and Europe. There were also naval routes that connected 
various ancient cities and ports in Africa and Asia. Through this and many other 
routes, people exchanged goods and wealth, incorporated into what Abu-Lughod 
(1989) concludes as a “world economy system”. Integrated in this translocal 
activity was the tribe of Quraysh, an Arabian tribe which would play important 
part in the advent and spreading of Islam, and the formulation of the Muslim 
umma. 
The tribe of Quraysh was not a stranger to this translocal activity and the 
record of their trading activities was generally accepted by various historians. 
Muslim historian al-Mubarakpuri (1996, pp. 45–46) describes that trading had 
become the main economic activity for the Quraysh. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, this account is supported by Hodgson, who argues that there were two 
major routes where the Quraysh’s trade routes thrived. One of the routes 
connected Yemen and the Indian Ocean in the south to the Mediterranean lands 
and Syria in the north. The other was part of the Silk Road, connecting Persian 
territories in the west to Abyssinia and Africa in the east (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 154). 
While there is a small number of scholars who argue to the contrary, such as 
Crone (1987), the majority of historians such as Hoyland (2001, pp. 102–110) and 
Kennedy (2004, pp. 23–24)  acknowledge the prominence of Meccan trade routes 
and their importance as the main income for the Quraysh.  
The presence of translocal activity, however, does not warrant the presence 
of a global society that unites the participating actors. As has been previously 
explained in Chapter One, social reality is the product of human consciousness 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 33). Therefore, in order to develop a global 
society, it is necessary for members of a society to have the consciousness that 
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acknowledges the world as an interconnected and interrelated unity, instead of 
comprising multiple, independent locales. This lack of a global consciousness was 
what had held back the Quraysh in becoming a part of the Byzantine or the 
Sasanid efforts in establishing their vision of global society before the spreading 
of Islam despite their translocal activities. The discussion in Chapter Two reveals 
that while they conducted extensive trade activities with various foreign actors, 
the Quraysh had not considered their interaction with other actors as a form of 
unification. They also did not perceive their trading partners as part of themselves; 
instead, they saw those actors as “the foreigners.” This parochial consciousness 
remained prevalent in Qurayshi society until the adoption of Islam, which brought 
a new paradigm of universal brotherhood of Muslims to the Quraysh.  
While the question of “how did the early Islamic society move towards a 
global consciousness?” was discussed in Chapter Two, this chapter and the 
subsequent ones will address the next question, “how is the concept of the umma 
related to the concept of global consciousness and to the concept and historical 
formation of a global society?”. In particular, this chapter will address how the 
global consciousness inspired by Islamic teachings and rituals was objectivated in 
the Muslim society and transferred through Muslim intellectual networks to 
various locals. The first part of this chapter will explain how a network of Muslim 
scholars in an intellectual chain could play an important part in the objectivation 
and transference process of Islamic global consciousness among the Muslims. The 
second part will provide empirical evidence of this intellectual chain which 
connected Muslim society in various geographical areas, thus encouraging the 
sense of unity among them.    
Intellectuals and Global Society 
The Importance of Intellectuals 
Following Berger and Luckmann (1966), human consciousness of social 
reality stems from ideas about the self and the surrounding environment that an 
individual has. Each individual projects his or her idea on to objects outside his or 
her body, and presents the subjective idea to the society through signs and 
languages. While there might be freedom to some extent for each individual to 
present his or her subjective narrative, the collection of narratives requires what 
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Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 49-62, 110-146) call objectivation and 
legitimation processes before it can be considered as the social reality. After that, 
the social reality undergoes an internalisation process and becomes embedded in 
the individual members of the society. 
Intellectuals play a significant role in the objectivation and legitimation 
processes of knowledge. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), subjective 
personal knowledge requires several steps in order to evolve into an objective 
social reality. In the first step, habitualisation, it is necessary for the knowledge to 
be repeated frequently into a certain pattern. The presence of pattern will simplify 
the decision-making process an individual should face, and will relieve the 
individual from the psychological burden that accompanies each decision-making 
process. This will provide the individual with free energy, which he or she can 
spend for deliberation or innovation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 70–71).  
In the second step, the processes that already fall into patterns will be 
institutionalised when various individuals reciprocally designate a certain 
habitualisation to a certain group of actors. For example, when individuals 
acknowledge that punishment should be delivered by a certain class or caste, 
while harvesting should be done by another class or caste, then the habitualisation 
of delivering punishment and performing harvest is already being institutionalised 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 72–76). Institutionalised practice then will gain 
an objective characteristic, in the sense that it is acknowledged by the individuals 
as a natural part of the society, that it is an undeniable fact, that it is “out there”, 
an external condition to one’s body and unchangeable by one’s wishes or wants. 
At that moment, the institution becomes a social reality and gains a measure of 
control over the population (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 77–78).  
It is important to note, however, that the “objectivity” inherent in an 
institutionalised practice is a product of social construction. Therefore, it is 
possible, albeit not easy, to deconstruct it and replace it with other types of social 
construction. The changing nature of slavery is one of the examples of 
institutionalised practice that had gained objectivity and had been considered as a 
natural condition of the world for a time, before being dismantled by the anti-
slavery movement. Today, slavery is no longer being considered as the natural 
condition of the world by the majority of individuals. Under the same premise, 
Chapter Two has elaborated the changes within the Quraysh before and after the 
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spread of Islam. While they had been maintaining a stance of neutrality in the 
rivalry between the Byzantine and the Sasanids, after embracing Islam and 
instilled with Islamic global consciousness, the Quraysh had the aspiration to 
establish the umma.  
Eventually, institutionalised practices must be transmitted to the next 
generation. Since the next generation is lacking the first generation’s history and 
social processes which lead to the adoption of the practice into an institution in the 
beginning, they require a second order process to be able to perceive the practice 
as a social reality. This second order process is defined by Berger and Luckmann 
(1966, p. 110) as the legitimation process. The legitimation process endorses the 
practice as a natural part of social reality by providing cognitive validity to its 
meanings. At the same time, the legitimation process also justifies the practice by 
ascribing a normative dignity to it. Legitimation not only teaches the next 
generation on what the social reality is, it also teaches why this is what it is. 
Therefore, the production of knowledge that both intellectually validates and 
morally justifies is imperative for the success of the legitimation process (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 111). While the common usage of signs and language 
plays an important part as the first level instrument of legitimation and is then 
strengthened by the usage of theoretical propositions such as proverbs and wise 
sayings, higher level legitimation processes require the development of elaborate 
and complex knowledge such as the production of scientific theories in support of 
the practice by certain specialised personnel (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 
112–113).  
In the Islamic world, the duty to produce complex knowledge to support 
the umma falls largely to the Muslim scholars. It is through the works of the 
scholars that Muslims teach the next generation about social reality according to 
the Islamic teaching, constructing the children’s imaginary of self and the 
environment, introducing which behaviour is proper and which is not, what 
actions they should do and what they should avoid. The codification of Islamic 
practices led to the establishment of the schools of thought (madhhab-s) within the 
Islamic intellectual world. The presence of the schools of thought and their 
development throughout the Muslim world assisted the habituation and 
legitimation processes of Islam, establishing familiar patterns of Islamic social 
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reality which then culminate in, borrowing from Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 
113), a symbolic universe for the next generation of Muslims to adopt. 
Therefore, the Muslim intellectuals during the earlier age of Islam held 
two fundamental tasks in the development of the umma as an Islamic global 
society. First, Muslim intellectuals provided the theoretical framework for the 
existence and the development of a new and comprehensive social reality for the 
next generation of Muslims. Muslim scholars drew from the abstract concept of 
global consciousness found in the verses of the Qur’an and traditions of the 
Prophet as detailed in Chapter Two, which usually allude to characteristics such as 
the equality of mankind in front of God and the brotherhood of mankind, and 
transformed it into a theoretical conceptualisation and the practical application of 
their vision on a global society called the umma in accordance with the relevant 
conditions of their time. This development of knowledge was necessary to initiate 
the objectivation and institutionalisation processes of the global consciousness 
alluded to in the holy texts. 
Second, Muslim intellectuals through their teacher-student relationships 
and intellectual connections provided empirical evidence of the presence of a 
global connection among Muslims. Through this chain of relationships, Muslim 
scholars were engaged in journeys, both in the literal, physical journey from one 
geographical area to another in search for knowledge, and in the metaphorical, 
intellectual journey of reading the work of other scholars far away from his or her 
domicile. This connection allowed the process of transference of ideas from one 
locale to another, and passionate scholars often became important figures and 
established their own centres of learning (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 93), or in Risse-
Kappen and Sikkink’s (1999) terminology, they became “norm entrepreneurs”. 
Thus, it was possible for the Shafi’i school of thought that originated in Egypt to 
flourish and continue spreading to India and Indonesia, becoming the most 
established Islamic school of thought in various places thousands of miles away 
from its original centre (Shafi'i, 1987, p. 48).  
The presence of a translocal intellectual chain in the Muslim world and the 
ease of Muslim scholars in undergoing literal and metaphorical journeys were 
important in their efforts to develop a (to certain degree) unified Muslim society 
in the later period. Not only did this intellectual chain function as the theoretical 
foundation that validated and justified the establishment of the umma, it also 
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functioned as the evidence itself of the emergence of the unified Muslim world. 
The intellectual chains among Muslim scholars were the fibre that put the fabric 
of Muslim society together. Therefore, when the Islamic intellectual society was 
disrupted by the infiltration of Western ideas, which culminated in the Tanzimat 
Movement in the Ottoman period, an integrated umma also became more difficult 
to establish and maintain. 
Theory of Intellectual Chains 
The transference process of ideas previously described is an abstract 
process but the manifestations of the concept are plenty, and often exist in 
interactions seemingly small and common around us. In the case of the umma, the 
transference process could be seen in various interactions among Muslims. A 
relation between teacher and student in an intellectual network is one such 
transference process. While it might be considered as small and simple, the 
interaction between teacher and student actually consists of a complex set of 
intellectual rituals that also belong to a larger intellectual chain. It is through these 
intellectual rituals that the transference process happens from one intellectual to 
another. Therefore, the intellectual chain is directly relevant to relations that 
formulate a global society because the chain both connects people from various 
locales into one network and integrates them through the adoption of intellectual 
rituals.  
This process of intellectual rituals is extensively detailed by Randall 
Collins in his work Sociology of Philosophies (1998), a book on the network of 
intellectuals and transference of ideas among them. Collins’s main argument is 
that “intellectual life is about conflict and disagreement” and that the study of 
intellectual history is the observance of patterns of rivalries between small warring 
camps of intellectuals (Collins, 1998, p. 1). While it is possible for intellectuals to 
be solitary and not attached to a particular network, there are benefits that an 
intellectual will gain from joining a certain network/chain. It is therefore 
important to take into account the development of intellectual groups and the 
dynamic interactions inside an intellectual group or between groups (Collins, 1998, 
p. 21).  
According to Collins (1998), in order for an intellectual to be able to 
produce new or important ideas, the person needs to possess emotional energy, 
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cultural capital and an opportunity structure. The first factor, emotional energy, is 
the surge of enthusiasm that runs through an individual participating in an 
interaction ritual in his or her intellectual network. This emotional energy 
connects the individual to the ritual, and instils the group’s mood into the said 
individual. It motivates individuals to do heroic works, which might result in an 
intellectual breakthrough. The emotional energy exists even after the ritual is over 
and the individual is alone, before it eventually diminishes and fades away. In 
order to replenish the energy, an individual needs to attend and participate in 
another ritual (Collins, 1998, pp. 23–24).  
The second factor, cultural capital, is a collection of symbols that are 
created or gathered during the ritual. Unlike other rituals which produce sacred 
symbols important to their own group, intellectuals produce sacred symbols that 
are important to both their own group and the public: their claim to “truth”. 
Through various modes of interactions such as lectures, conferences and 
discussions, intellectuals debate their notion of truth. This academic interaction 
and debate about truth can be equated to performing a ritual ceremony in which 
the intellectuals “worship” their sacred object (Collins, 1998, pp. 24–26). 
Individuals who are able to defend their claim of truth through face-to-face 
interactions will accumulate cultural capital in his or her network, which will lend 
greater authority for his next work. (Collins, 1998, p. 32) The development of 
writing and printing services enables intellectual networks to objectify their sacred 
symbols into books, and to distribute them widely. Thus, books are often 
perceived as sacred symbols of the intellectual networks, but books in reality 
represent a form of objectivation of the true sacred symbols: the claim to truth. 
Without the face-to-face rituals described above, writings and books would never 
be able to transfer emotional energy and be no more than emblems of a dead 
religion (Collins, 1998, p. 27) 
The third factor, opportunity structure, is one’s standing in the network of 
intellectuals, which often provide a structural constraint to a person’s individual 
achievement. The more egalitarian a network, the better opportunity structure for 
its members since an egalitarian network allows individuals with little cultural 
capital to gain credibility and fame using the network’s assets. A permissive 
opportunity structure then can be converted into a greater route to achievement by 
the network’s members (Collins, 1998, pp. 29–30). A network with good 
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opportunity structure will also help to distribute various assets that its members 
have, which in turn will help members to progress better in a network than in a 
solitary environment.  
One of the benefits of a good network is the distribution of cultural capital 
and emotional energy to its members. While cultural capital and emotional energy 
typically influence each other, these two are independent variables. It is possible 
for someone to have one, but not the other. If someone is having high emotional 
energy but no cultural capital, his or her enthusiasm will wane, and it is possible 
that he will end up disillusioned. Young scholars who are very enthusiastic in their 
research but lacking the necessary books and sources of information are a good 
example of having emotional energy but lacking cultural capital. This will lead to 
their frustration and perhaps withdrawal from current research (Collins, 1998, pp. 
44–45). On the other end of the spectrum, a senior researcher might possess a 
wealth of information and collections, but his lack of enthusiasm blocks him from 
being productive (Collins, 1998, p. 46). The presence of a network with a good 
opportunity structure will help to alleviate these issues, either by providing 
members with high emotional energy through participating in intellectual rituals 
or by distributing cultural capital to energetic members needing it.  
The last benefit of being a member in an intellectual network is the greater 
chance to distribute one’s work. Collins (1998, p. 59) states that to achieve 
greatness, an intellectual requires more than creativity. A great intellectual is 
determined by how interested people are in his works after long periods of time. 
Thus, in addition to creating a qualified work, an intellectual has the burden of 
distributing his work. Since the best way to distribute intellectual works is by 
using chains of personal contacts (Collins, 1998, p. 65), then joining an 
intellectual network and creating successive links in the chains  become even 
more essential for assuring the impact of one’s work (Collins, 1998, p. 66). 
Furthermore, personal interactions with fellow intellectuals (not to mention 
greater intellectuals) can provide significant benefits such as larger intellectual 
capital, higher emotional energy and experience in rivalry (Collins, 1998, p. 73). 
Collins’s conceptualisation of intellectual ritual is reminiscent of Geertz’s 
(1973) conceptualisation of how religious rituals affect the believers that was 
expounded upon in Chapter Two. In order for an intellectual group to flourish, 
Collins argues that it needs to establish rituals in which its members should take 
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part. These rituals employ symbols, which then manipulate the initiates’ emotions 
and drives, something akin to Geertz’s concept that religious rituals are capable of 
manipulating the believers’ moods and motivations. This does not necessarily 
mean that an intellectual ritual should be religious in nature, or that religious ritual 
should accommodate intellectual activities. Often, one ritual is completely devoid 
of the other. However, this similarity between intellectual rituals and religious 
rituals becomes more apparent in the Islamic intellectual world due to its 
characteristics, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Characteristics of the Islamic intellectual world 
In the Islamic intellectual world, religious rituals and intellectual rituals 
are indeed inseparable. This is because Islam teaches that learning is part of the 
duty of the believers. There is a hadith from Muhammad that made seeking 
knowledge an obligation for all Muslims. This well-known hadith is recorded by 
Ibn Majah in his Sunan (vol 1/224), “seeking knowledge is a duty upon every 
Muslim”. This intertwined and intimate nature between the intellectuals and the 
religious in Islamic intellectual rituals is the first defining characteristics of the 
Islamic intellectual world. Both rituals often affect one another or one activity can 
be interpreted as intellectual, religious or both. Throughout Islamic history, it was 
possible for a Muslim scholar to gain intellectual emotional energy by performing 
religious rituals as well as engaging in intellectual debate. At the same time, 
religious Muslims usually put priority on seeking knowledge, to the point of 
travelling far away for the sake of knowledge, as will be detailed later.  
Other than simple faith from a scholar who believed that his intellectual 
activities would benefit him in the hereafter, practices related to knowledge and 
knowledge sharing were also infused with religious symbolism and rituals. A 
shaikh giving a lecture should be in a pure condition before teaching, as should 
students receiving ‘ilm, or knowledge, from the shaikh. The class should be clean 
and the session should start with a prayer. Before a copyist could copy a book, he 
was advised to perform ablution first, to maintain his purity while copying the 
knowledge. Even papers that contained the name of prophets, angels, companions 
of the prophets or respected ‘ulama were considered sacred and should not be 
pulped again (Chamberlain, 1994, pp. 125–130).   
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Grunebaum (1955, p. 111) explains that this nature stems from the early 
period of Islamic society, when Muslims developed their knowledge to fulfil the 
needs of the society to learn Islam. Therefore, at first, Islamic knowledge was 
developed with a focus on learning the Qur’an and hadith. Intellectuals focused 
their efforts in studying the holy text and preserving the records of Muhammad’s 
deeds and sayings, which culminated in the codification of the hadith by various 
scholars (Peters, 1973, p. 213; Kennedy, 2000, p. 20). At the same time, the 
expansion of the Islamic empire from the Umayyad period onwards exposed Islam 
to non-Arabs in an unprecedented intensity. It was necessary to develop Arabic 
into a systematic body of knowledge in order to explain the Qur’an and hadith to 
people from various non-Arab backgrounds. Philology thus became a sacred 
science, imperative for Muslim intellectuals to learn, since it was required to 
connect the holy scriptures to the masses (Peters, 1973, p. 213). 
The sacred characteristic of Islamic intellectual life also influenced the 
behaviour of Muslim scholars. Since the absolute truth in the Islamic intellectual 
world was already determined by God in the Qur’an and further refined by 
Muhammad in his hadith, there was little need to build sacred symbols upon the 
intellectuals’ perception of truth. The Qur’an and hadith themselves were sacred 
symbols for all Muslim intellectuals. Cultural capital was then gained by showing 
deep comprehension of the holy texts. This is the reason why mastering branches 
of knowledge that led to better understanding of the holy text, such as philology, 
also provided a Muslim scholar with tremendous cultural capital, bestowing on 
him or – to a lesser extent -- her the authority to speak on a wide range of issues 
(Peters, 1973, pp. 215–235).  
Only after the fundamentals of the sciences of the Qur’an and hadith had 
been laid down,  the Islamic intellectual world expanded its attention to the 
development of the more mundane sciences (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 113). Yet, even 
the mundane science had been tinged by sacredness because many of those 
developments were initiated to satisfy daily life necessities as a Muslim, such as 
the development of astronomy and mathematics that were required by Muslims 
travelling far to determine the direction of Mecca for their prayers. Thus, Muslim 
scholars maintained their characteristic as masters of both religious and mundane 
sciences. Complementing their inquiry into their specific field of investigation, 
Muslim scholars were still required to master the verses of the Qur’an and the 
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hadith, in order to ensure that their knowledge seeking activities were within 
acceptable boundaries. Saliba (2007, pp. 183–204) describes in detail how Muslim 
scholars proficient in astronomy were also proficient in religious knowledge, and 
how they used Aristotle’s work on astronomy selectively to suit their need: 
adopting his mathematical model but at the same time disregarding the 
astrological implication of his cosmology since the cosmology model was not 
suitable to the Islamic worldview.  
Watt (1963, pp. 15–16) notes that by the time of the Abbasids, there were 
many Muslims of non-Arab origin. They, perhaps inadvertently, included their 
scientific traditions in the development of a new body of knowledge, which many 
consider as Islamic. As the consequence of this intellectual tradition, there was no 
differentiation between “religious scholars” and “worldly scientists” which is 
common in the contemporary world. Instead, the Muslim scholars were 
categorised under one large umbrella as ‘ulama or “those with knowledge”. There 
were scholars who attained specialisation in some subject areas but the trend was 
that scholars should be proficient in multiple subjects. This can be seen from the 
profile of famous Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazali, who was not only 
proficient in theology but also in philosophy and mysticism (Ormsby, 2008).     
The second characteristic of the Islamic intellectual world is the strong 
concern about political issues. During his life, Muhammad had become the centre 
of Muslim daily life. He was the spiritual teacher and also the political leader. He 
was the personal friend of many Muslims and yet he also the general that led them 
all to battles. The death of Muhammad removes a significant foundation of Islam 
and it shook Muslims on both personal and communal levels. The death of 
Muhammad raised many questions for the Muslims, the foremost was whether any 
political cohesion that had been built during Muhammad’s time should survive 
after his death. Many Bedouin tribes who had submitted considered his death as 
the end of their allegiance, further weakening the fledging state (Hodgson, 1974a, 
p. 197).  
In order to avert the crisis, Muslims had to address the question of 
leadership. Eventually, Abu Bakr was chosen as the successor of the Prophet. 
According to Donner (1981, pp. 83–84), Abu Bakr gained the majority’s support 
because of several reasons: first, he was universally respected for his strong 
attachment to Islam and to the Prophet. Second, he was accepted by the Muhajirin 
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because of his Qurayshi origin and by the Ansar because of his loyalty to the 
Prophet. Third, Abu Bakr was well known for his expertise in tribal genealogy. In 
a political culture that heavily relied on tribal connections and lineages, the 
knowledge of genealogy was held in high regard. Genealogists did what 
contemporary political analysts do: examine the relations between political actors 
and the power relations among them. Donner’s argument as to why Abu Bakr was 
chosen indicates, again, the importance of knowledge in lending credibility and 
legitimacy to Muslims’ political activities. Abu Bakr was chosen not only because 
he had political connections but also because his scholarly knowledge provided 
further credibility to his political aspiration. 
Abu Bakr was faced with a great task right after his election as 
Muhammad’s successor. He needed to find ways to maintain the unity of the 
umma in the face of various secession movements. There were two types of 
opposition that threatened the unity of the umma. The first type were groups that 
challenged the political position of the umma. Included in this group were various 
tribes that had been allies of Medina but then refused to pay fealty tax to Medina, 
considering that their agreement had ended with Muhammad’s death. The second 
type were groups that challenged the religious claims of Islam. These groups were 
led by false prophets and prophetesses and sought to establish their own creeds as 
the hegemonic ideology of the area (Donner, 1981, p. 85). 
In Islamic tradition, the wars against these opposition groups were 
collectively called the Wars of Ridda. Ridda is the Islamic term for apostasy or 
repudiation of Islam, thus implying the spiritual nature of the wars. Donner (1981, 
pp. 85–86) argues that the first type of opposition did not reject Islam per se, that 
they only rejected the political superiority of Medina. Islamic tradition, however, 
disagrees with Donner’s argument. Ibn Kathir (2006, pp. 76–78), for example, 
argues that it was not secular taxes that the tribes were reluctant to pay, but it was 
zakat, the religious alms obligatory on all Muslims according to their wealth. Thus, 
their reluctance was an affront to Islamic teaching. Baladhuri and Hitti (1916, pp. 
143–162) give a detailed account of the causes of the wars, and while many of 
them were related to conflicts over policy or governance, they were still called 
“apostasy” since the rebels were revolting against the successor of the Prophet and 
broke from the unity of the umma. 
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Abu Bakr managed to quell the rebellions and defeated the armies of false 
prophets and prophetesses. Despite his successes, Abu Bakr’s succession was 
disputed by some. His and other subsequent succession processes sparked the 
intense debate on leadership in Islamic tradition. At first the debate was 
theoretical with two different positions formulated: one which supported the 
succession through popular means and one which supported the succession 
through bloodlines. Yet the division escalated further, transforming the 
intellectual positions into political camps which intertwined with religious sanctity 
and sacredness. Islam was fragmented into conflicting denominations, with Sunni 
and Shia as the two largest ones (Robinson, 2009, p. 194). The transformation of 
the intellectual positions into political and religious movements, the conflicts 
between those denominations and the connotation these conflicts brought to the 
concept of umma, will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
This strong concern for political issues has remained a distinguishing 
characteristic of the Islamic intellectual world even today. Kennedy (2000, pp. 
18–19) argues that this is because Muslims feel the need to establish a theoretical 
foundation for their political activities. Normally, new political entities are built 
from reflection through history, sometimes referencing their past and the good ol’ 
days of certain leaders. But this was not the case with Islam. The advent of Islam 
made the ideals of the past irrelevant, thus forcing Muslim intellectuals to develop 
their own theory of statecraft. How the intellectuals developed the political theory 
of the caliphate and how the fiqh schools were established as the legal institution 
of the caliphate will be elaborated further in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
It is important to note that while all Muslim scholars shared these defining 
characteristics of the Islamic intellectual world, the intellectual life inside this 
world was not a monolith or uniform. Even though all Muslim scholars drew from 
the Qur’an and hadith as their main inspiration, their intellectual process could not 
be considered as objective and independent from their subjective experiences. On 
the contrary, the subjective experiences of each scholars and the condition of their 
environment were important in their intellectual formation and thus influenced the 
knowledge that they produced. One prominent example of how subjective, 
personal experience might influence the process of knowledge production is 
illustrated by Khadduri (1987). In his introduction to Shafi’i's Risala, Khadduri 
explains how the renowned Muslim scholar, Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 
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820 CE), had publicised his influential work only to criticise his own work later 
and changed his opinion on various issues while he was older and gained a wealth 
of experience (Shafi'i, 1987, pp. 7–15).  
Far from being monolithic, the works of Muslim scholars were vibrant and 
even often in conflict with one another. However, since all scholars developed 
their work from the holy texts, these dynamic interactions took place in a shared 
symbolic universe. Thus, instead of destroying the social reality that the Muslims 
had built, the debates among Muslim scholars were essential in strengthening the 
Islamic worldview as their shared symbolic universe. They were all working 
within a common normative framework. These specific characteristics of an 
Islamic intellectual network were taught and transmitted to the corners of the 
Islamic world through various chains of interactions both vertical, comprising 
master-pupil relations, and horizontal, comprising relations between 
contemporaries, peers and even rivals (Collins, 1998, p. 65). 
The Schools of Thought (madhhabs) 
One prominent feature which highlights the dynamic nature of Islamic 
intellectual life is the existence of different schools of thought or madhhab in 
Islam. There are four well known schools of thought in Sunni tradition: Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali. While there were political and legal consequences of 
the development of the schools, which will be explored further in Chapter Four, 
the initial development of these schools was presumably driven by intellectual 
inquiries as the result of interactions between the infallibility of the Qur’an and 
the changing subjectivity experienced by Muslims. The schools seek to establish 
methodology by which Muslim scholars could contextualise the ideal principles of 
the Qur’an to the contemporary conditions in order to provide better guidance to 
Muslims. All Islamic schools of thought build their methodology and logic 
reasoning upon the foundation of the Qur’anic texts. They, however, differ in the 
methods of extracting a legal opinion from the Qur’an in order to answer a 
specific problem. Some put more emphasis on the usage of logic while others put 
more emphasis on the literal readings of the text.  
There is considerable debate on when the development of Islamic schools 
of thought, which then evolved into schools of law, started. Schacht (1964; 1979) 
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argues that these schools developed in the second century of hijra, or 
approximately the eighth century. Schacht used the development of usul al-fiqh or 
the theoretical sources of laws by Shafi’i as his starting point for the development 
of Islamic legal thinking. Before Shafi’i, Schacht argues, there was no definite 
methodology in Muslim legal practice (1964, p. 28). The learning centres 
presented at that time were defined by their geographical distribution instead of 
methodological differences, thus Schacht’s addressing them as “regional schools” 
of Hijaz and Kufa. These “schools” were then challenged by Shafi’i, resulting in 
their transformation into more cohesive schools which adopted allegiance to a 
certain master. The school of Kufa was transformed into the Hanafi school, while 
the school of Hijaz became the Maliki school (Schacht, 1979, p. 10). 
Schacht’s argument that Islamic legal thinking was developed in the 
second century of the hijra, however, is criticised by Motzki (2002). According to 
Motzki (2002, pp. 18–45), Schacht tends to downplay the importance of scholarly 
works before Shafi’i. Schacht  also rejects the authenticity of isnad, or the chains 
which narrate a hadith, and considers them to be fabricated and the narrators as 
unreliable or even randomly selected. Motzki (2002) then provides a detailed 
study of the development of Islamic thinking in Mecca during the first two 
centuries of Muslim history. Using the work of ‘Abd al-Razzaq (d. 744 CE), 
Mushannaf, which is dated earlier than manuscripts that Schacht had used for his 
research, Motzki constructs a theory on how Islamic scholars of Mecca developed 
Islamic laws during “the last three decades of the first/seventh century” (Motzki, 
2002, p. 297), much earlier than Schacht’s starting point.  
Motzki (2002, pp. 287–291) then elaborates the development of Islamic 
thinking by the Meccan scholars. The foundation of their school of thought was 
based on the teaching of ‘Abdullah ibn al-Abbas. During the years of 660-685, Ibn 
Abbas resided in Mecca and laid a foundation for Meccan scholarship. After Ibn 
Abbas passed away, his students continued the school. The famous students of Ibn 
Abbas were Mujahid and ‘Ata ibn Abi Rabah. The characteristic of this school 
was that instead of relying on the holy texts, they primarily expressed their own 
opinions and cited authoritative holy texts only to a limited extent. There might 
also have been consensus among Meccan scholars and they might have consulted 
with each other. These characteristics were prevalent up to the time of Shafi’i, 
who had studied under one of the Meccan scholars, Muslim ibn Khalid, before 
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studying under Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), the eponymous founder of the Maliki 
school. 
In Kufa, a different development occurred in Islamic thinking. Instead of 
consensus, the scholars of Kufa had different positions on various issues. Adding 
to that condition was the freedom of the people to follow the legal opinion of a 
scholar in one time and to follow another in yet another time, making it hard to 
relegate the term “school” to Kufa. What had developed in Kufa was intellectual 
culture where individual scholars developed their own methodology and disciples 
learned from various scholars (Hallaq, 2001b, p. 21). One of the most prominent 
scholars in Kufa was Abu Hanifa (d. 767). His methodology put emphasis on 
using reason for conducting istihsan or juristic preference. According to Abu 
Hanifa, scholars and jurists must exercise their reason to get the most appropriate 
result from the Qur’an regarding a case. At the time of Abu Hanifa, the science of 
hadith had not developed at all; thus he ruled that juristic preference could be 
done without relying on the hadith. After the third century of the hijra, when the 
science of hadith had produced a massive collection of prophetic literature, 
scholars of the Hanafi school changed the rule so that juristic preference could 
only be done based on the presence of supporting hadith (Hallaq, 1997, pp. 107–
111). In later centuries, the Hanafi school became the largest school of thought in 
the Islamic world, gaining large followers in Persia, Central Asia, Turkey and the 
Indian peninsula. 
The intellectual tradition of Medina enjoyed a period of prominence during 
the time of Malik ibn Anas. Malik was a distinguished scholar, well known for his 
compilation of hadith, al-Muwatta. His methodology was founded upon the 
Qur’an, the hadith of the Prophet, the traditions of the people of Medina and then 
the use of reason to judge the benefits of a legal ruling (masalih mursala) (Hallaq, 
1997, pp. 112–113). Ibn Khaldun described the three branches within the Maliki 
school: Cordoba, Qayrawan and Iraq. All three played an important part in 
Muslim world affairs. The Maliki school was introduced in al-Andalus by the time 
of Caliph Abdurrahman ibn al-Hakam (822-852) and soon gained considerable 
prestige. The Maliki school in Qayrawan extended the influence of the school to 
Africa and inspired the politico-religious movement of the Almoravid dynasty. 
The Maliki school in Baghdad was important as the fore-runner of the classical 
Shafi’i school (Melchert, 1997, pp. 156–177). 
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The Shafi’i school was considered the amalgamation of the previous 
traditions and Shafi’i’s own genius. Shafi’i (d. 820) tried to find the middle 
ground between the use of reasoning and the holy scriptures. Shafi’i's book, al-
Risala, was considered the foundation of the science of Islamic law and it had a 
profound effect on the future of Islamic intellectual life. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Shafi’i wrote two books entitled al-Risala. The old al-Risala 
was written during his time in Baghdad while the new one was written later, 
during his time in Egypt. The later book was considered more mature, reflecting 
the accumulation of his wealth of knowledge and experience (Shafi'i, 1987, pp. 
21–25). In al-Risala, Shafi’i put down his methodology on Islamic thinking: using 
the Qur’an, the hadith, consensus from the Companions of the Prophet and then 
using reason in the form of ijtihad (personal reasoning) and qiyas (analogy). 
Although allowing the usage of reason, Shafi’i limited it to a lesser degree if 
compared to the extent of reason in Abu Hanifa’s methodology (Shafi'i, 1987, pp. 
32–40). The Shafi’i school gained considerable influence in the Muslim world, 
especially in Egypt, eastern Africa and Southeast Asia. 
The fourth school of thought in Islamic world was founded by Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal (d. 855). Among the four schools of thought, the Hanbali school was the 
most traditional, in the sense that it strongly advocated the usage of holy texts, 
from both the Qur’an and the hadith, and at the same time limited the usage of 
reason in legal reasoning (Melchert, 2006, pp. 61–62). Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah 
(d. 1350 CE), a Hanbali scholar, summarised the Hanbali methodology as founded 
upon (in order of importance): the Qur’an, well-attested prophetic hadith, well-
attested opinions from the Companions of the Prophet, opinion closest to the 
Qur’an and the hadith if the Companions disagree, weakly-attested hadith, and 
finally qiyas or analogy (Melchert, 2006, p. 77).  
This free and fluid academic culture that allowed for the rise of diverse 
legal schools was changed in the later centuries, when attachment to a scholar 
became stronger. This fierce attachment, known as taqlid, banded people to a 
certain scholarly figure, proclaiming their allegiance to him and his teaching to the 
point of being hostile to the followers of other scholars (Hallaq, 2001a, pp. 81–85). 
Schacht (1964, pp. 70–71) argues that the taqlid phenomenon had closed the door 
of ijtihad at the end of fourth century of the hijra/tenth century CE, consequently 
deeming that the Islamic intellectual world had been in stagnation ever since. 
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However, while acknowledging the presence of movements which were 
promoting taqlid instead of ijtihad, Hallaq (1984b; 1986; 2001a) disagrees with 
Schacht’s notion on the closure of the door of ijtihad and argues that the door of 
ijtihad had never been closed. Scholars and jurists such as al-Tabari (d. 310), al-
Mawardi (d. 450), al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and many more were performing ijtihad to 
address contemporary matters in their time.  
Nevertheless, the intellectual life in the Islamic world then became a fierce 
competition among scholars. Schools were formed around competent and 
knowledgeable scholars, each defending a particular methodology as their sacred 
symbol. Scholars in one school perceived scholars of the other schools as rivals 
for the accumulation of, in Collins’ terms, cultural capital and an opportunity to 
expand their influence and strengthen their position in the Islamic intellectual 
world. Each desperately sought to consolidate their influence in order to command 
greater authority in front ofthe masses. 
Intellectual Networks and the Integration of the Umma 
The intertwined rituals of religion and intellectual activity provided the 
impetus for the development of Islamic intellectual networks. During medieval 
times, Islamic intellectual networks flourished and travels for the sake of religious 
scholarship became a trend. These travels were expressed by the term rihla 
(travel), but later gained a specific term as talab al-‘ilm (seeking for knowledge) 
to distinguish it from other kind of travels in Muslim culture (Gellens, 1990, p. 
53).  
The popularity of rihla was likely driven by several motives. The first 
motive was that travelling in search of knowledge was considered as a religious 
obligation for all Muslims, following various hadith from Muhammad that 
encourage learning activity. There are many hadith in which Muhammad was 
recorded commending those who travel to seek knowledge. Muslim in his Sahih 
(vol. 35/6518) narrated that Muhammad praised several good characteristics of 
Muslims, one of those is “…he who treads the path in search of knowledge, Allah 
would make that path easy, leading to Paradise for him.” This hadith, and others 
like it, literally identify seeking knowledge with physical travelling and its 
promise of Paradise as the reward has surely provided religious motivation to 
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Muslims to conduct rihla. The second motive was that travelling provided the 
opportunity for young scholars to expand their knowledge by learning from 
experts in distant cities, to exchange ideas and books, and also to establish links 
and networks to other scholars. It was essentially an intellectual ritual that, again, 
combined religious conviction with intellectual processes, a characteristic 
recurring in Islamic intellectual life.  
In his comparative study on medieval Muslim societies, Gellens (1990) 
describes how rihla/talab al-‘ilm as social phenomena permeated the Muslim 
society. This culture of rihla propelled the establishment of extensive intellectual 
networks from all corners of the Muslim world. Muslims performed rihla not only 
to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, but also to various centres of learning in 
Jerusalem, Baghdad, Cairo and Nishapur. In Egyptian accounts, Gellens found 
that Egyptians during the first four centuries rarely performed rihla, but instead 
became the destination of people from other cities. While never rivalling the 
illustrious Baghdad, Egypt had developed its own centres of learning and 
Egyptian scholars were often cited by Muslim intellectuals (Gellens, 1990, p. 58).  
Intellectual life in al-Andalus, in contrast, was centred on rihla. There are 
thousands of biographies that recorded  rihla and these documents portray its 
importance  to Muslims in al-Andalus. Gellens (1990, pp. 59–60) attributes its 
importance to two factors: geography and politics. Geographically, al-Andalus 
was in the western periphery of the Muslim world. Whereas the study of fiqh was 
developing in al-Andalus, the study of hadith did not. Therefore, it was natural for 
Muslims in al-Andalus to travel for knowledge to other cities, especially those 
with a strong tradition of hadith to study under scholars in this discipline. 
Politically, Muslims in al-Andalus faced continuous conflicts with Catholics. 
During the sixth century AH/twelfth century CE, the escalation of conflict 
prompted emigration of Andalusian Muslims to North Africa and Egypt, 
diminishing the intellectual life in Spain and thus making  travel even more 
imperative.  
The relationships that had been established during rihla did not diminish 
even though the travel had ended. On the contrary, the relations between Muslim 
scholars persisted and constituted a greater chain of connections: the Islamic 
intellectual chain. After they had finished their studies, students acquired a 
certificate (ijaza) and, more importantly, a continuous link to their teacher, and the 
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teacher of their teacher, and the teacher of the teacher, and so on. This continuous 
link, called isnad, was the formal symbol of their inclusion in the intellectual 
chain. Not only signifying their mastery in the subject, the certificate and the 
isnad also functioned as cultural capital that lent credibility to the young scholars 
(Berkey, 1992, pp. 31-33, 176-178).  
The intellectual activities in the Muslim world and its various rituals and 
symbols such as the rihla, isnad and ijaza described above did not only benefit the 
development of science. It also provided the Muslim society with a common 
platform in which Muslims from various locales could interact and establish 
bonds which surpassed geographical and racial boundaries. During these 
interactions, the notion of an interconnected broader society of Muslims, idealised 
in the teachings of the Qur’an, unwittingly spread both through the proliferation of 
theological concepts and social theories produced by Muslim scholars and through 
the actual connection through the practices of common intellectual rituals and 
inclusion in common intellectual networks. In the following sections, this thesis 
will describe the cases of Islam in Africa and Islam in Indonesia as two such 
networks that not only played an important part in the distribution of Islamic 
knowledge but were also vital in the integration process of Africa and Indonesia 
into the Muslim world. 
Expanding the network: the Case of Islam in Africa 
The first case to show the extensive networks in Islamic intellectual world 
is the spreading of Islam in Africa. Islam arrived in Africa through several 
methods. Islam reached the northern part of the continent by the method of 
military conquest. The Arab army under Umar ibn Khattab conquered Egypt and, 
while it was not accompanied by forced conversion, it established political, social 
and economic conditions which were favourable to the spreading of Islam (Fasi 
and Hrbek, 1995). From Egypt, Islam extended in three directions: through the 
Red Sea to the eastern coastal areas, up to the Nile valley to the Sudan and across 
the western desert to the Maghrib (Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, p. 2).  
The spreading of Islam to the southern part of Africa did not occur in a 
single process. Robinson (2004b, p. 28) summarises the expansion of Islam in 
Africa through three stages. The first stage was introduced by Muslim merchants 
involved in the Trans-Saharan trade routes. At first, the merchants were of 
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Arabian origin but later, there were many Muslim merchants of African origin 
(Fasi and Hrbek, 1995, p. 91; Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, pp. 2–4). The presence 
of Muslim merchants initiated the establishment of Muslim quarters and enclaves 
in cities where pagan and non-Muslims were still the majority. The second stage 
was often recognised as “court” Islam since the main feature of this stage was the 
adoption of Islam by rulers and members of the ruling class. During this time, 
Islam had a strong presence in cities but with no significant presence in the rural 
area. The third stage was the expansion of Islam to the rural area and villages, 
where the majority of the populace were (Robinson, 2004b, p. 28). 
Scholars played an essential role in the expansion of Islam in Africa. 
Scholars from Islamic schools of thought were involved in the expansion, both as 
missionaries and as advisors to the Muslim merchants, and in later the stage of 
Islamisation, advisors to the Muslim rulers. Often, scholars were also regarded as 
holy men as they claimed to possess mystical powers (baraka) or as people 
attributed mystical powers to them (Lewis, 1966, p. 27). The presence of these 
scholars, their guiding African Muslims to understand Islam better and their 
advising on practical issues were invaluable for the development of African 
Muslims’ spiritual life. At the same time, the presence of these scholars also 
helped the development of African Muslims’ intellectual life. In addition to 
introducing the Qur’an and Islamic law, the scholars initiated the establishment of 
learning centres in Africa. It was in these learning centres that complex social 
interactions among Muslims from various origins were established. It was from 
these learning centres that common ethical and legal norms emerged that would 
transform the societies in Africa for the next centuries. More importantly, these 
learning centres provided the Muslims of Africa with links to the outside world, 
inadvertently promoting a cosmopolitan view for Africans (Reichmuth, 2000, pp. 
419–420). 
There were many Islamic learning centres in Africa, with the most notable 
being Timbuktu. Timbuktu was initially an important market city in the Trans-
Saharan trade route. It then developed into an independent city, known as the 
“City of Scholars” under Malian and Songhay rule. Around the sixteenth century, 
Timbuktu had established close relations with Maliki scholarship centres in 
Middle East and North Africa. By the seventeenth century, the scholars of 
Timbuktu had gained considerable authority for the Maliki school (Reichmuth, 
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2000, pp. 426–428; Conrad, 2005, p. 41). Other important Islamic learning centres 
in Africa were Jenne and Harar. Jenne was an important city during the height of 
the Mali Empire. It was located along the Niger river, and had been said to be 
more famous than Timbuktu because of its gold deposits (Conrad, 2005, p. 54). 
According to Sa’di (2003, p. 18), Jenne became a Muslim city in the eighth 
century after its ruler, Sultan Kunburu, converted to Islam and his people followed 
his example. Harar was a centre of Islamic learning in East Africa. It also 
functioned as a trade hub between the Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula and the 
outside world. Harar was well known as the “City of Saints”, where the shrines of 
hundreds of saints existed and were venerated by Muslims from the surrounding 
area (Caulk, 1977, p. 372; Gibb, 1999, p. 92). 
The presence of such prestigious Islamic learning centres provided 
benefits not only to Muslims, but also non-Muslims. Islamic learning centres 
provided services that were accessible to non-Muslims, such as education on 
mundane sciences, healing services and divination practices. Kings and leaders 
valued Islamic learning centres since the presence of Muslim scholars benefitted 
their kingdoms. These scholars brought with them not only knowledge but also 
extensive networks to the outside world, which could then be utilised to establish 
trade or political connections between the African kingdoms and other powers in 
the Muslim world (Lewis, 1966, pp. 30–31; Reichmuth, 2000, p. 421). Kings from 
Bornu and Songhay sought the attention of the West African scholar Jamal al-Din 
al-Suyuti (d. 1505), hoping that by gaining his service in their courts, the scholar 
could help the kings in obtaining formal recognition as vice-regents of the 
Abbasid caliph (Reichmuth, 2000, p. 427). 
The presence of a Muslim intellectual network in Africa impacted not only 
intellectual life but also political and military life. Through their connections, 
African Muslims played an important role in various aspects of Muslim history. 
One of the examples where an intellectual network resulted in political activity is 
the establishment of the Almoravid dynasty (r. 1062-1147 CE). The dynasty was 
born as the direct result of the presence of the Maliki school’s penetration of 
Africa. Without the intellectual foundation provided by the Maliki school, the the 
Almoravid dynasty would never have never been established and the fall of al-
Andalus would had been occurred earlier than what it was. 
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The history of the Almoravids began in 1038 CE, when Yahya ibn Ibrahim, 
the chief of the Sanhaja confederation of tribes in the Western Sahara, was on 
pilgrimage and met a Maliki scholar, Abu Imran al-Fasi. Yahya sought the 
scholar’s wisdom and asked the scholar to send a disciple to accompany him back 
and to teach Islam to members of his tribe. Unable to recommend another scholar 
to go with the chief, Abu Imran al-Fasi sent Yahya to meet one of his former 
students, Wajjaj ibn Zalwi, who had established a school called Dar al-Murabitin 
in Sus al-Aqsa, northwest of Sahara. Accepting the tribal chief and his former 
teacher’s letter, Ibn Zalwi then commissioned his disciple, Abdullah ibn Yasin, to 
go with the chief and to teach Islam to members of the Sanhaja confederation 
(Messier, 2010, pp. 2–4).  
It was the teaching of Ibn Yasin that served as the ideological foundation 
of the tribe and transformed it into one powerful dynasty. The Islamic ethos 
hammered by Ibn Yasin remoulded the tribesmen and provided them with the 
motivation to expand their dominion, again showing how Islamic consciousness is 
capable of transforming a society. Even after Ibn Yasin’s death, his legacy 
persisted. The Almoravid dynasty continued to flourish to the point that under the 
leadership of Yusuf ibn Tashfin, it was capable of sending an army to help al-
Andalus and defeat a Christian army in the Battle of Sagrajas on 23 October 1086 
CE. After their defeat in this battle, the Christian kings had to halt their invasion 
to al-Andalus for several generations to recuperate (Messier, 2010, p. 82). 
Even after the demise of the Almoravid dynasty in 1147 CE, the Maliki 
school still held a prominent position in West Africa. Local Islamic scholarship 
was heavily influenced by Khalil ibn Ishaq’s Mukhtasar, which in the sixteenth 
century had become the most authoritative textbook of the Maliki school of law. 
The popularity of Mukhtasar in West Africa’s Islamic scholarship was initiated by 
Mahmud ibn ‘Umar Aqit (d. 1548 CE), then the qadi of Timbuktu. Journeying 
back from his pilgrimage in 1509-1510 CE, Ibn Umar Aqit visited Cairo and met 
the leading Maliki scholars such as Ibrahim al-Maqdisi, Shaikh Zakariyya al-
Ansari and al-Qalqashandi. After coming back to Timbuktu, Ibn Umar Aqit wrote 
the first known local commentary on Mukhtasar which directly stimulated the 
popularity of the book throughout West Africa (Sa'di and Hunwick, 2003, pp. 54–
55). 
 106 
Connecting the “Periphery” to the “Centre”: the Case of Islam in Indonesia 
The second case to consider is the spreading of Islam to Indonesia. 
Indonesia has been deemed as the “periphery” of the Muslim world. In his book 
Islam Compared, Geertz contrasts Morocco and Indonesia, saying that while 
Morocco had been in the periphery, it, at the very least, was in the immediate 
vicinity of the great Islamic civilisation of al-Andalus. Indonesia, on the other 
hand, had never been near any major centres of Islamic civilisation (Geertz, 1971, 
p. 70). Since its place is in the fringe of the periphery, the common opinion is that 
Indonesia was excluded from the intellectual networks connected to the Muslim 
world. Islamic intellectual networks had only been established in the early 
nineteenth century (Geertz, 1971, p. 71). 
The dichotomy of “centre” and “periphery” in the Muslim world suggests 
the presence of hierarchy between various locales and even exclusion of certain 
locales, such as Indonesia, from the established networks. The hierarchy was 
conceived on the basis of proximity to the sacred space of Muslims, the holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina. The proximity to the centre will imbue a person with 
sanctity, lending him or her greater authority in religious or political legitimacy 
(Eickelman and Piscatori, 1990, p. 12).  However, Eickelman and Piscatori (1990, 
pp. 12–13) argue that the presence of translocal networks and movements, to some 
extent, has provided a challenge to the established hierarchy of various places, as 
can be seen in the case of Indonesia below.  
How and when Islam came to Indonesia is a subject of considerable debate. 
The most famous opinion, generated by European historians, is that Islam came to 
Indonesia through the merchants of Gujarat, India in the twelveth or thirteenth CE 
(Winstedt, 1917, pp. 171–173; Drewes, G. W. J, 1968, pp. 439–440). Some 
Indonesia historians, however, argue that Islam came to Indonesia through Arabs 
from Egypt since the Shafi’i school adopted by Indonesians originated from Egypt 
(Hasjmi, 1989). Attas (1969, p. 11) provides yet another opinion by stating that 
Islam arrived in the Indonesian archipelago and what is now Malaysia during the 
seventh century. This argument was supported by the report of Chinese merchants 
who observed the presence of small Muslim communities in Indonesian coastal 
cities. After that, the Islamisation process went through several phases. In the first 
phase, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, Islam was spread by jurists 
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from the Shafi’i school teaching fiqh to the locals. The second phase, between the 
thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, was the continuation of the first phase with the 
addition of the arrival of members of Sufi orders to the archipelago. The third 
phase, the sixteenth century onwards, saw the arrival of the West to various 
territories in the archipelago, starting the westernisation process (Attas, 1969, pp. 
29–30). 
If we follow Attas’ (1969) argument, then an Islamic intellectual chain had 
been established, connecting Indonesia and the Arab region from at least the 
eleventh century by the presence of Shafi’i jurists in Indonesia. This argument 
found a strong empirical base since Shafi’i then became the prominent school of 
thought in Indonesia, even today. The intellectual chain became more prominent 
during the seventeenth century. Azra (2002) describes that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, students from Yemen, India and Southeast Asia had come 
to study in various learning centres such as Mecca and Medina. They then 
completed the study and were awarded the ijaza and included in the isnad, 
connecting their hometown to the intellectual chain of the Muslim world. Most of 
these young scholars then went home and established their own schools, extending 
the intellectual chain to their hometown. A few students were chosen to stay at 
their schools and became respected teachers.  
In his work, Azra (2002, pp. 69–71) narrates the life of Sayyid Shibghat 
Allah ibn Ruh Allah Jamal al-Barjawi (d. 1606), a scholar from Bharuch, India. 
Shibghat Allah came from a Persian family in India. He learned Islam from 
various teachers, the most popular of them was Wajih al-Din al-Gujarati (d. 1589). 
After completing his training in India, Shibghat Allah taught for a while, before 
going on hajj in 1591. Coming back from hajj, Shibghat Allah decided to travel 
across India, staying for a while in Ahmadabad and Bijapur before returning to 
Mecca in 1596. After his second hajj, Shibghat Allah decided to stay at Medina 
where he was warmly received and taught in Masjid al-Nabawi. During his time in 
Medina, a contingent of pilgrims from Aceh, Indonesia attended his lecture, 
became entranced with him and brought his teachings back to Aceh (Azra, 2002, p. 
71). Azra (2002, pp. 97–106) then identifies further links between Ahmad al-
Qushashi, the student of Shibghat Allah, with several Indonesian students. Al-
Qushashi apparently had succeeded in establishing his own reputation as a Sufi 
master, thus enhancing his appeal to young scholars who hoped to learn from him.  
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Among his disciples, there were at least two students from Indonesia, who 
were known as “Jawi people” – Jawi was the colloquial term for Indonesians at 
that time since the concept of “Indonesia” had not been established. Of these two 
students, Shaikh Yusuf Taj al-Khalwati al-Maqassari was from Makassar, while 
‘Abd al-Rauf al-Sinkili was from Aceh. Both of them brought the teachings of 
Shaikh Ahmad al-Qushashi to Indonesia and established Islamic education centres 
in Indonesia which then became the means of integration of Indonesian Muslims 
at that time to the long chains of a Muslim intellectual network. Al-Sinkili was 
especially prominent in Sumatra, due both to the vastness of his knowledge and to 
the extensiveness of his networks. He managed to establish connections from 
Aceh to Mecca, working both as scholar and as diplomat to the point that the 
Sharif Barakat of Mecca sent a delegate to meet the Sultana Zakiyyat al-Din of 
Aceh in 1683 CE and forged close ties between the two places (Azra, 2004, p. 78).   
Unlike al-Sinkili who promptly returned to Indonesia after his graduation, 
al-Maqassari spent several decades travelling and seeking for knowledge before 
returning to his home town. He, however, was not welcomed in Makassar since he 
sought to abolish anti-Islamic practices such as gambling, drinking, using opium 
and the like. He then departed to Banten, West Java, and started his school there 
(Azra, 2004, p. 94). While in Banten, al-Maqassari was increasingly pulled into 
the political arena, especially during Banten’s wars against the Dutch imperialist 
forces. He was captured by the Dutch, sent to Ceylon and then exiled to the Cape 
of Good Hope in 1694. Despite being an exile, al-Maqassari’s influence was great. 
He survived only five years but before his death in 1699, he had laid the 
foundation for the establishment of Islamic society in the Cape of Good Hope. His 
tomb was enshrined by his followers and is considered a holy site in the Cape 
Peninsula (Blij, 1969, pp. 246–247). 
Later generations of Indonesian Muslim scholars forged even closer 
relations between Indonesia and Mecca, further diminishing the hierarchical 
nature of the previous relations. One of the prominent Muslim scholars from 
Indonesia in the early  nineteenth century was Shaikh Muhammad Nawawi al-
Bantani from Banten (d. 1897). He went to Mecca to study Islam when he was 
fifteen and completed his education after three years. Reluctant to go home to 
Indonesia because of Dutch colonialism, he chose to stay in Mecca. One Meccan 
scholar, Shaikh Ahmad Khatib, gave the opportunity for al-Bantani to substitute 
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for him as imam of Masjid al-Haram, thus allowing al-Bantani to start his own 
class at the mosque. Al-Bantani was famous at this time, to the point that he 
received the title “Sayyid al-Ulama al-Hijaz” or “prominent scholar of Hijaz”, the 
region encompassing Mecca and Medina (Hanifa, 2013). Hurgornje depicts 
Nawawi al-Bantani as an intelligent and courteous man, who stayed humble even 
after he wrote twenty highly acclaimed books (Hurgronje, 2007, pp. 287–296). 
The life of Shibghat Allah and the connections between him and 
Indonesian students are but small examples of membership in an Islamic 
intellectual chain. It was through this Islamic intellectual network that Muslims 
from Indonesia could integrate and become part of a greater Muslim society. 
Bowen (1989) explains how the ritual of salat had been used by the Acehnese to 
project their position in the universal society of Muslims. New intellectual chains 
had also been established after the nineteenth century, predominantly by 
Indonesian Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, 
which share intellectual connections with various learning centres in the Islamic 
world even today (Federspiel, 1970; Jones, 1984). 
The relations between Mecca and Indonesia were hierarchical at the 
beginning: Muslims from Indonesia were included in the intellectual network as 
students, seeking ‘ilm (knowledge) from masters in the supposed centre of the 
Muslim world. However, exploration in historical accounts of Indonesian Muslim 
scholars in later centuries would provide us with information that Indonesian 
Muslim scholars were no longer only “taking” knowledge from the centres of the 
Muslim world but also contributing to the intellectual activities. Shaikh Al-
Maqassari contributed to the penetration of Islam in the Cape of Good Hope and 
established the first cohesive Islamic society in southern Africa. By establishing a 
Muslim society in southern Africa, Al-Maqassari inadvertently established a 
connection between Indonesia and Africa, a connection that is still existent. Other 
scholarly figures such as Imam al-Nawawi al-Bantani contributed to the Islamic 
intellectual world by participating in the education system in Mecca, becoming the 
respected teacher and master in the heart of Islamic religious authority. Their 
intellectual achievements were not only benefitted the Islamic intellectual world 
but also served as bridges, intimately connecting Indonesia to Mecca and making 
the relationships between the two more reciprocal. 
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Intellectual chains as framework for integration 
The description of networks and connectivity between various Muslim 
scholars in the two cases above illustrates how intellectual activities helped in 
integrating the Muslim world and fostering a larger sense of belonging. The 
influence of Muslim scholars and the school of thought where they belonged can 
be seen even until today. Since Islam spread to West Africa from North Africa 
where the Maliki school flourished, the majority of Muslims there follow the 
Maliki school. On the other hand, Islam spread to East Africa through the Arabian 
peninsula, thus the majority of Muslims follow the Shafi’i school that prevailed in 
Arabia (Anderson, J. N. D, 1969, pp. 38–40; Levtzion and Pouwels, 2000, p. 2). In 
Indonesia, the majority of Muslims follow the Shafi’i school, contributing to the 
argument that Islam arrived in Indonesia directly from the Arabian peninsula and 
that the Shafi’i jurists were critical to the process (Attas, 1969, p. 11; Hasjmi, 
1989). 
Along with providing tangible connections between various Muslim 
localities, the intellectual chains in the Muslim world also provided the populace 
with various branches of theology and science. As described by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–129), these kinds of knowledge were essential in 
legitimating the presence of an interconnected umma. While there were 
differences between centres of learning, or even rivalry among them, the 
intellectual activities transmitted the same characteristics of the Islamic 
intellectual world, thus they belonged to the same symbolic universe. The chains 
of interactions themselves not only helped the transmission of messages from one 
scholar to another, they also helped the objectivation of an integrated society 
among Muslims. This could be seen in the case of Timbuktu which established 
strong scholarship connections with Maliki centres of learning in North Africa or 
how students from Indonesia embarked on the perilous journey to Mecca and 
Medina to study from renowned scholars.  
The implication of a globalised consciousness was that Muslims from one 
locale possessed greater awareness of the conditions of Muslims from another 
locale. This could be seen in the way that the Almoravid dynasty, which consisted 
of Muslims of African origin, showed their concern to Muslims of al-Andalus 
who were threatened by the Christian kingdoms. The political and military actions 
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of the Almoravids sending armies to al-Andalus should be considered as the fruit 
of the global consciousness instilled through the chains of intellectuals brought to 
them by Abdullah ibn Yasin. While other motives such as political and military 
expansions, marriage and trade relations undoubtedly existed and to some extent 
influenced the decision to send an army to al-Andalus, the underlying framework 
of Muslim solidarity should not be ignored. To quote Geertz (1973, p. 98), 
“Charity becomes Christian charity when it is enclosed in a conception of God's 
purposes”. 
Another, more specific impact of Muslim scholars on the maintenance of 
the concept of the umma is the development of the concept of caliphate. A 
symbolic universe, such as the concept of the umma, requires institutions to 
protect and maintain its presence (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 122–141). In 
the history of Islamic society, one such institution was the caliphate. Watt (1963, 
pp. 15–16) describes that the caliphate contributed to the unity of the umma by 
providing a common judiciary and governance system and various policies such 
as promotion of the Arabic language as the lingua franca of the Muslim world. 
Yet, both the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions did not provide details as to how 
Muslims should manage the caliphate. Therefore, the duty to provide conceptual 
and operational definitions for the caliphate fell to the scholars, which will be 
explained further in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Conceptual Development of the Caliphate 
 
 
The advent of Islam initiated a new wave of development of knowledge in 
the Muslim world. Influenced by Islamic teaching, Muslims developed a distinct 
intellectual framework which integrated religious rituals into intellectual practices. 
Seeking and producing knowledge are perceived not only as an intellectual pursuit 
but also as religious endeavour that Muslims should aspire to. The chains of 
relations between teacher and student in the Islamic intellectual world are 
considered as sacred relations, in which not only knowledge is transferred but also 
religious values and authority are bestowed, as has been discussed in the previous 
chapter. These scholars also diligently produced bodies of knowledge in their 
efforts to explain Islam and bring its values into practical applications. Together, 
these intellectual practices provided the fundamentals which constituted a greater 
tradition: the umma as a symbolic universe. 
A symbolic universe is the amalgamation of meanings, produced by both 
the subjective experiences of individuals and the objectivation process of the 
society. It encompasses every historical and biographical event that takes place in 
the society. It provides a worldview by which people can identify their self and 
their position in the larger world and determine what is appropriate for their 
everyday activities. A symbolic universe is the highest form of legitimation of an 
idea, more powerful than languages, propositions and theories. It provides an idea 
with cosmological attributes giving various experiences a shared, overarching 
meaning (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 113–115). The development of bodies 
of knowledge, particularly mythology, theology, philosophy and science will 
strengthen a symbolic universe by providing rational explanation and normative 
justification for the idea established as the symbolic universe (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 127). 
It is possible for a society to develop different interpretations of its 
symbolic universality, especially during transmission of the idea from one 
generation to another. If this differing interpretation is shared by enough members 
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in the society, it will also undergo the objectivation and institutionalisation 
processes, resulting in an alternative definition of the social reality.  The group 
that carries it will become what Berger and Luckmann call “the heretics” (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 124). Heresy is a major danger for any society, yet, at the 
same time, it often becomes a turning point which inspires those who espouse the 
“official” interpretation of the idea to produce a more systematic conception of the 
symbolic universe, resulting in the development of various bodies of knowledge to 
support and defend the idea (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 125–126).  
In the case of the development of the concept of the umma, Berger’s and 
Luckmann’s (1966) theoretical framework can be applied as follows: the concept 
of a Islamic global society firstly acquired legitimation when Muhammad uttered 
the concept in Arabic and attached the concept of a global society to the word 
“umma”. As this chapter will elaborate shortly, the usage of the word “umma” in 
the Qur’an subtly shifted the word’s meaning so that by the end of the Prophetic 
era, the word “umma” had a particular meaning attached to the concept of an 
Islamic global society. Attaching the idea of an Islamic global consciousness to 
the word “umma” was important since it opened the opportunity for dialogue on 
this concept among the Meccans and, later, among the Medinans. It also made the 
transference process of the idea to other parts of the larger Arabian society 
possible.  
When the number of Qur’anic verses articulating the concept of the umma 
was increasing, this concept became more and more divine. At the same time, the 
Prophetic traditions kept it practical. This made the concept of umma to be 
perceived as a divinely sanctioned social practice, transcending any other ordinary 
social practices. At this time, the umma became a symbolic universe in the minds 
of Muslims. As a symbolic universe, the umma may be said to connect a person to 
another person or identify a society, but also to connect the said person to God and 
identify his or her place in a cosmological order. The conditions of the umma are 
considered as the mirror of God’s Mercy towards mankind. A joyful occurrence in 
the society is seen as a form of blessing from God while any turbulence in the 
society reflects back on the holy texts and gains meaning and position in the 
Islamic cosmology, whether as a trial or as a divine punishment.  
The works and activities of Muslim intellectuals in later periods further 
strengthened the position of the umma as a symbolic universe in the minds of 
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Muslims. As discussed in Chapter Three, Muslim intellectuals, through their 
chains of intellectuals, provided the empirical evidence for the presence of a 
translocal connection among Muslim individuals. Yet, not only that, the scholars 
were also fundamental in the development of theoretical bodies which helped the 
maintenance of the idea of the umma in the minds of Muslims. Through 
interpretation of the holy texts in the Qur’an and hadith and reflection on their 
personal observations and experiences, these scholars expanded the Islamic bodies 
of knowledge, such as codifying the hadith, developing the Islamic jurisprudence 
and, as this chapter will demonstrate, the development of governmental theories 
supporting the caliphate as the governing institution of the umma.  
Conceptual development of the umma 
The umma in Medina 
Before Islam, Arab tribes had not developed any form of political 
institution advanced enough to unite all Arabia (Grunebaum, 1963, p. 6; Watt, 
1956, pp. 238–239). Instead of relying on political institutions to govern their 
affairs, the Arabs had relied on their tribal structure to provide them with basic 
needs and protection. Without a tribe, a person would not be able to survive in the 
harsh environment of the desert (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 148–149; Hoyland, 2001, 
pp. 113–117). The few Arab states in the northern part of Arabia had been acting 
as dependencies to larger political institutions, the Byzantines and the Sasanids, as 
can be seen in the case of the Ghassanid kingdom that owed fealty to the 
Byzantine Empire or the Lakhmid kingdom, which was the vassal of the Sasanid 
Empire (Grunebaum, 1963, pp. 6–7). These kingdoms’ existence had been 
influenced by the whims of the great empires, evident in how Khusrau II 
abolished the Lakhmid kingdom of Hira in 602 CE and replaced the Lakhmid king 
with a Persian governor (Kennedy, 2004, p. 11). 
Islam changed the Arab society by introducing the concept of umma. The 
umma was a revolutionary concept with both transcendental and social 
characteristics. According to Denny (1975), in the Qur’anic term, umma refers to 
a body of people who are objects of the divine plan of salvation. The term 
 115 
ummatun wahida, such as in the Qur’an 21:927, implies a concept of human unity 
which is bound collectively in a special, religious way (Denny, 1975, p. 48). The 
terms ummatun muslima and ummatun wasatan, which are mentioned in the 
Qur’an 2:1288 and 2:1439, are specifically referring to the society of Muslims 
which upholds and enforces God’s Law, faithful and obedient to His teachings 
and will achieve success by doing so (Denny, 1975, p. 69). In the Qur’an sura 
3:110, kuntum khayra ummatin ukhrijat linnaasi10, the meaning of umma gains a 
global perspective: that the society of the Faithful is the best society ever created 
during the history of mankind (Denny, 1975, p. 69). In this verse, the connection 
of faith and the umma is very strong; faith has become the fundamental attribute 
of the umma and it is faith that will make the umma as the best society among the 
history of mankind (Denny, 1977a, pp. 36–38). 
                                               
7
 The full verse of the Qur’an sura 21:92 and its English translation by Sahih International:  
Inna haadhihi ummatukum ummatan wahidatan wa ana rabbukum fa’ buduun  
[Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me]. 
8
 The verse of the Qur’an surah 2:128 should be put into the larger context, a prayer from Abraham 
to God, which is described in the Qur’an surah 2:127-129 as follow (with English translation by 
Sahih International): 
Wa idh yarfa'u ibrahimu al-qawa’ida min al-baiti wa isma'ilu rabbana taqabbal minna. Innaka 
anta as-sami'ul-‘alimu. [127] 
[And (mention) when Abraham was raising the foundations of the House and (with him) Ishmael, 
(saying), “Our Lord, accept (this) from us. Indeed You are the Hearing, the Knowing.] 
Rabbanaa waj’alna muslimain laka wa min dhurriyyatina ummatan muslimatan laka wa ‘arinaa 
manaasikanaa wa tub ‘alainaa. Innaka anta at-tawwabu ar-rahimu. [128] 
[Our Lord, and make us Muslims (in submission) to You and from our descendants a Muslim 
nation (in submission) to You. And show us our rites and accept our repentance. Indeed, You are 
the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful.] 
Rabbanaa wa-b’ath fiihim rasuulan minhum yatluu ‘alaihim aayaatika wa yu'allimuhumu al-
kitaba wa al-hikmata wa yuzakkiihim. Innaka anta al-‘azizu a1-hakim. [129] 
[Our Lord, and send among them a messenger from themselves who will recite to them Your 
verses and teach them the Book and wisdom and purify them. Indeed, You are the Exalted in 
Might, the Wise.”] 
9
 The verse of the Qur’an sura 2 verse 143 should be put into the context of moving the qibla, or 
direction of prayer, from Jerusalem to Mecca; thus it addressed the Muslims specifically.  
Sayaquulu as-sufahaau min an-naasi maa wallahum ‘an qiblatihimu al-latii kaanuu ‘alaihaa. Qul 
lillahi al-masyriqu wa al-maghribu. Yahdii man yashaau ilaa syiraati mustaqiim. [142] 
[The foolish among the people will say, "What has turned them away from their qibla, which they 
used to face?" Say, "To Allah belongs the east and the west. He guides whom He wills to a straight 
path."] 
 Wa kadzaalika ja’alnaakum ummatan wasatan litakuunuu shuhadaa-a ‘alaa an-naasi wa 
yatakuuna ar-rasuulu ‘alaikum shahiida. … [143…] 
[And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the 
Messenger will be a witness over you….] 
10
 The full verse of the Qur’an sura 3:110 and its English translation by Sahih International: 
Kuntum khayra ummatin ukhrijat linnaasi. Ta’muruuna bil ma’ruufi watanhawna ‘aani 
almunkari wa tu’minuuna billahi wa law amana ahlu alkitabi lakana khayran lahum minhumu 
almu’minuuna wa aktharuhumu alfasiquun 
You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid 
what is wrong and believe in Allah . If only the People of the Scripture had believed, it would have 
been better for them. Among them are believers, but most of them are defiantly disobedient. 
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Building a new Muslim society based on this concept would, inevitably, 
weaken the established political practice based on the tribal mechanism. It shifted 
the foundation of Arab society from loyalty to kinship to commitment to the 
teaching of Islam, the Oneness of God and the leadership of Muhammad as the 
Prophet of God. Blood relations were no longer prominent, since brotherhood in 
religion is preferable (Kennedy, 2007, p. 38). It also required a new institution, 
since tribal institutions with their heavy emphasis on kinship and blood relations 
could not accommodate the concept of the umma. To provide the concept with an 
institutional foundation, Muhammad then formulated what is commonly called the 
Constitution of Medina (variously referred in Arabic as Dustur al-Madina or 
Sahifat al-Madina), which is hailed by Hamidullah (1968) as “the first written 
constitution in the world.”  
This document has been scrutinised by many scholars and considered by 
most scholars as authentic. Watt (1956, pp. 225–228) provides a detailed account 
of an investigation into the authenticity of the document before finally asserting 
that the document is authentic. He, however, acknowledges the possibility that the 
document is actually a compilation of several documents written in different times. 
Analysing the content of the document and its social and political implications, 
Watt (1956, pp. 239–242) argues that the umma born from the Constitution 
supplanted tribal social and political mechanisms. The society in Medina was no 
longer founded upon kinship but based on religion. This fundamental change was 
epitomised in the hijra. Not only moving physically from one locale to another, 
hijra was a symbolic proclamation of cutting oneself off from his or her kin and 
binding oneself to the umma. Hijra has physical, societal and ideological 
implications, negating the practices of old and embracing the new society of the 
umma, as has been elaborated in Chapter Two. 
At the same time, however, Watt (1956, pp. 243–246) notes that the umma 
did not entirely discard already established tribal practices. Instead, it took 
particular instruments of tribal practices and adapted them in accordance with 
Islamic values. For example, Muhammad would bestow certain rights and 
protections to Muslims considered as members of the umma, in parallel with how 
a tribal chief would protect and provide for the members of his tribe. The enemies 
of the umma were those who rejected the religious claim of Islam. Yet, the 
behaviour of the Muslims toward their enemies was in accordance with the 
 117 
established practices among two hostile tribes. While some tribal instruments 
were adapted to the new umma, the Muslims would disregard the established 
practices if those were related to the pagan religions, consistent with their efforts 
to maintain the purity of Islam.  
The Constitution of Medina provided the Muslims with detailed legal 
guidance. Through the Constitution, Muhammad clearly defined the umma and 
described both the rights and obligations that bound its members. The Constitution 
is quite explicit on that, as documented by Ibn Ishaq (1967, pp. 231–233). There is, 
however, debate on which groups constituted the umma. Did the umma described 
in the Constitution only refer to the Muslims or also included the Jews? Watt 
(1956, p. 241) considers that the Jews were included in the umma, just like 
Muslims. The Jews were specifically allowed to practise their own religion, 
making the umma a religiously inclusive society. Denny (1977b, p. 44), however, 
argues that the Jews constituted a separate group beside the Muslim umma. The 
Constitution of Medina was a political-military document in which the Jews were 
considered as a special group, or a “sub-umma” to use Denny’s terminology, and 
that the two groups agreed on working together but kept their distinct religious 
characteristics. This argument is in line with his definition of the umma that puts 
emphasis on the presence of a common religion as its defining characteristic. 
Observing the Constitution of Medina from a sociolegal perspective, 
Arjomand (2009, pp. 564–570) opines that the document was vital to the 
establishment of the umma. The first and second article of the Constitution 
effectively declared the creation of the umma as a united society. Muslim 
emigrants from Mecca and Muslims from the tribes of Aus and Khazraj were 
regarded as the soul of the umma, but the umma’s legal protection also 
encompassed the polytheists and Jews who were members of the Muslim clans’ 
clients and allies. As Muhammad’s power grew, the Constitution of Medina also 
encompassed Arab tribes in the surrounding area which decided to be his allies, 
essentially establishing a Pax Islamica around Medina (Arjomand, 2009, p. 271). 
This thesis agrees with Arjomand’s observation and further argues that the 
expansion of the umma in later periods put more non-Muslims under the 
jurisdiction of the umma with their own rights and obligations, making them an 
inseparable part of the society. 
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The question of authority and the birth of the caliphate 
After Muhammad, the Muslim society gradually expanded. With each 
victory, the Muslims both spread the message of Islam to other people and put 
more territories under their rule. The vision of a global society named the umma 
became more vivid with each passing day; the idea became imaginable. Yet, at the 
same time, there was a problem of internalisation of the idea to both younger 
generations of Muslims and foreign people later integrated in the society. As 
described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 112–114), in order to survive, a 
symbolic universe needs to develop supporting bodies of knowledge. In the 
history of Muslim umma, the expansion of the Muslim world was then followed 
by the development of various bodies of knowledge to support the idea of an 
integrated umma, such as the science of hadith and fiqh or the development of 
Arabic language. In later period, Muslim scholars also attempted to formulate a 
more coherent theory on Islamic governance to further support the idea of a global 
umma and the presence of a centralised authority over it, which took form as the 
caliphate. 
In their attempts to develop the science of governance, Muslim scholars 
would base their works on the Constitution of Medina and develop further from 
there. The greatest challenge in this scholarly endeavour was addressing the 
practical application of authority. According to Islamic teaching, the ultimate 
authority is in God’s hand. However, since God did not rule the umma directly, 
there had to be someone who has the authority to control the umma and lead it to 
success as God has promised in the Qur’an. During the time of the Prophet, 
Muhammad himself became the source of authority. As the Prophet of God, his 
policies were divinely sanctioned, thus requiring no further explanation or 
legitimation. Khadduri (1955, p. 10) describes this era as if God was the titular 
head of state and Muhammad was the head of government. After Muhammad’s 
death, however, the umma lost its authoritative figure. This was a grave matter for 
Muslims since without an authoritative figure, how could the umma work to attain 
the success that God had decreed? It was thus essential for the umma to develop 
institutions as the embodiment of the concept of authority. 
The Muslim society managed to get through this ordeal by appointing Abu 
Bakr as the successor of the Prophet. While the decision was not without 
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controversy, it was considered as a sound decision in a time of turbulence. Unlike 
Muhammad with his sacred authority, Abu Bakr declared that he was merely 
administrator of the Muslim affairs and enforcer of the divine law. Ibn Kathir 
(2004, pp. 71–72) provides a historical account of Abu Bakr’s sermon after his 
appointment, in which Abu Bakr stressed his nature as a common man, just like 
the rest of the umma. In the sermon, Abu Bakr also emphasised that he would only 
follow Muhammad’s path in guiding the umma. He also asked for advice from the 
Muslims and even encouraged them to reprimand him when they perceived him at 
faults. Abu Bakr’s sermon managed to win the loyalty of most Muslims11. Thus, 
the caliphate was established. 
Etymologically, the word khilafa means “succeeding to someone.” The 
term was then adapted in the political context and came to refer to the office of the 
person who succeeds Muhammad as the leader of the umma but not as the Prophet 
of God (Ahmed, 1962, p. 93; Donner, 1999, pp. 10–11). Abu Bakr’s appointment 
and his sermon signified fundamental characteristics of a caliph: he essentially 
was only an elected executive of the state, with no power over divine legislation 
and with the limited judiciary function of interpreting the sacred law. Khadduri 
(1955, pp. 9–11) asserts the traditional Sunni view that the election of Abu Bakr 
took into account the “popular opinion” from the Muslims and this somewhat put 
the caliphate in accordance with the social contract theory of state, whereby the 
Caliph established a contract with the Muslim society to lead them within the 
boundaries of the divine law. It follows, accordingly, that a caliph should be 
responsible to the people as long as the people deem him faithful in enforcing the 
divine law. However, the later concept of the caliphate developed by Muslim 
                                               
11
 The figure of Abu Bakr as the first caliph of the Muslim world has become a powerful political 
symbol in Muslim history. Abu Bakr and his sermon signify the establishment of a political 
institution that plays a crucial role in safeguarding the umma, both as an idealised concept and as a 
social truth. In our modern age, where there is no political institution as the agent of the umma, 
some political actors seek to establish their authority over the umma by associating themselves 
with Abu Bakr and quoting his sermon, linking symbolically their rule to the first caliphate. Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi, the so-called caliph of the Islamic State,  quoted the first Caliph during his 
inaugural sermon on 5 July 2014. Several months after that, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani also 
quoted the same line during his inaugural speech in September 2014. Abu Bakr’s famous line that 
was quoted by both is: “If you see me [Abu Bakr] doing the right-hood, help me, and if you see me 
on falsehood, advise me and lead me to the right path.”  
For the video and transcript of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s speech: 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/07/ISIS-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdidi-first-Friday-
sermon-as-so-called-Caliph-.html 
For the transcript of Ashraf Ghani’s speech: http://president.gov.af/en/news/36954  
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scholars deviated from these characteristics and, instead, put the caliph into an 
exalted position to be unreservedly obeyed (Khadduri, 1955, p. 13). 
Rosenthal (2009) provides another observation on the nature of the 
caliphate. Instead of highlighting the civil governance attribute of the caliphate 
like Khadduri, he put emphasis on its divine origin. Rosenthal draws the 
philosophical foundation of the caliphate from various verses in the Qur’an and 
categorises the caliphate as an absolute theocracy (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 26). This is 
in contrast with Khadduri, who argues that since a state is regarded as a theocracy 
if it claims to be governed by a god or gods, then the caliphate is not a theocratic 
state since it has never been governed by God. Khadduri instead offers the term 
nomocracy to better reflect the nature of the caliphate, which is defined by the 
Oxford Dictionary as “a system of government based on a legal code; the rule of 
law in a community,” again emphasising the civil governance attribute of the 
system (Khadduri, 1955, pp. 14–16). 
Despite having a different view of the nature of the caliphate, Rosenthal 
shares the same opinion with Khadduri that the nature of the caliphate was 
transformed during the later period. The reign of Mu’awiya and his dynasty 
changed the caliphate into an absolute monarchy (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 26). During 
the Abbasid period, Rosenthal further suspects that the Muslim scholars had 
deliberately developed a distinct theory of statecraft in order to validate the divine 
purpose of the caliphate and, at the same time, to support the Abbasid regime 
against insurgents (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 27). 
The development of theoretical knowledge on the caliphate and general 
authority over the umma and the practical implementation of such authority are 
both important to this thesis since both support the maintenance of the imagined 
umma. The development of knowledge affords the umma with rational and 
normative justifications (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 127). During the 
Prophetic era, the development of theoretical knowledge was mainly mythological. 
The umma was how the Qur’an and the Prophet willed it to be. During the era of 
the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the Umayyads, the theoretical knowledge was 
expanded to theological knowledge, evident with the development of fiqh to 
further refine Islamic knowledge to support the idea of the umma. In the Abbasid 
period and later, the development of knowledge advanced further into the realm of 
philosophy, if not also entering the domain of science. 
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The presence of an actual social group as the perceived embodiment of the 
umma further enforces the idea that the umma is truly present in practical and 
actual levels (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 134). In the Prophetic era this social 
group were the Companions of the Prophet. After Muhammad’s death, there were 
the Rightly Guided Caliphs and their supporters who supported the umma. When 
the power moved to the Umayyads, this social group was the Umayyads and their 
client families. Yet, during the time of the Abbasids, there were many social 
groups within the umma, some espousing alternative narratives of the idea of the 
umma; thus rivalry between such groups was inevitable. This rivalry was reflected 
in the different paradigm found in various scholarly works on the issue of 
caliphate and authority over the umma. With this in mind, we can explore the 
works of several prominent Muslim scholars on the issue of the caliphate and 
authority over the umma in order to understand the dynamics within the 
conceptualisation of the umma and also to observe the interplay between social 
groups and intellectual actors within the umma. 
Theoretical foundation on the caliphate: Al-Mawardi’s Ordinances  
One of the most influential scholars developing the theory of the caliphate 
or statecraft in Islam is al-Mawardi. His book, the Ordinances of Government or 
al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, is considered one of the authoritative books on this 
subject (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 55). Al-Mawardi was a Shafi’i jurist in the service of 
the Caliph al-Qadir (r. 991-1031 CE). The condition of the caliphate after 940 CE 
was contentious at best. The caliph steadily lost power and could not control the 
power of the amirs in surrounding areas. In order to keep his position, the caliphs 
had to appoint a new position, amir al-umara or the commander-in-chief, whose 
duty was to protect the well being of the caliph. In truth, the amir al-umara was 
the de facto leader who held the real power in the caliphate. This position was 
coveted by the regional and local polities, which competed against each other to 
control Baghdad and the caliphate. Starting from 945 CE, this position was held 
by the Buyid dynasty, which adopted Twelver Shi’ism as their religion and since 
964 CE had encouraged the development of distinct rituals of Twelver Shi’a, 
separated from other Shi’ism and even more so from Sunnism (Kennedy, 2004, p. 
227).   
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Al-Mawardi wrote the book approximately in circa 1050 CE to defend the 
caliph’s position against the growing power of the Buyid dynasty. In this book, 
Al-Mawardi lays out the theory of statecraft in the Muslim world. Al-Mawardi 
opens his book by directly stating that the Imamate is the successor of 
prophethood. It exists as “a means of protecting the deen [din, religion] and of 
managing affairs of this world” (Mawardi, 1996, p. 10). Al-Mawardi then goes on 
to elaborate the divine nature of the caliphate, arguing that since the Qur’an orders 
mankind to obey Allah, His Messenger and ulil amri or those in authority, then 
Muslims have the obligation to obey whoever is in command of them. He also 
cites a hadith from Muhammad that encourages Muslims to obey a person in 
authority whether he rules them by uprightness or not. This hadith declares that if 
the governor is rightful then the benefits will fall to the governor and the people 
who obey him. If the governor is corrupt then the people will still obtain benefits 
in this world while the corruption will be held against them in the next (Mawardi, 
1996, pp. 10–11). 
In order to be a caliph, someone is required to fulfil seven characteristics 
according to al-Mawardi (1996, p. 12): be just, knowledgeable and able to 
perform ijtihad, have good health in hearing, sight and speech, be sound in limbs 
guaranteeing free movement, have sound judgement and be courageous and brave 
to defend the territory of Islam and of the family of the Quraysh. Al-Mawardi then 
offers two methods for electing an imam. The first method is through election by 
qualified electors, those with justice (‘adl), knowledge (‘ilm) and wisdom 
(Mawardi, 1996, pp. 12–16). The second method is through designation by the 
previous imam (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 23–26). If an imam is appointed through one 
of those methods, then it is binding for the whole umma to obey him. Al-Mawardi 
also stresses the importance of unity, to the point that when there are two 
Imamates, he prefers the first person to receive the oath of allegiance as the 
legitimate imam. If both of the imams received the oath precisely at the same time, 
then according to him, both of the oaths are considered null and there should be a 
new oath to one of them, or to another person other than those two (Mawardi, 
1996, p. 17). 
After describing the divine texts which could be perceived as supporting 
the existence of the imamate and the obligation for Muslims to obey the imam and 
maintain unity, al-Mawardi then describes the duties of the imam. First, the imam 
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must guard the faith, maintain it on its established principles and guard it against 
innovations. Second, he presides over legal matters and preserves justice. Third, 
he must protect the territory of Islam and defend the people against threats. Fourth, 
he has to uphold hudud law, in accordance with God’s rule in the Qur’an and to 
protect the rights of the people. Fifth, he is obliged to fortify borders and perform 
military actions against enemies. Sixth, he must make jihad. Seventh, he must 
collect the spoils of war and zakat. Eighth, he should distribute the fund from bait 
al-mal punctually. Ninth, he must ensure the employment of trustworthy 
counsellors. Tenth, he must personally observe the affairs of the umma (Mawardi, 
1996, pp. 27–29). 
Al-Mawardi then dedicates a large part of his book to providing details on 
the delegation of authority from an imam to various officers. He provides divine 
support for the delegation of authority by quoting Qur’an sura 20, Taha, verses 
29-32, in which Moses prays to God to appoint Aaron as his wazir (Mawardi, 
1996, p. 37). He then describes the name of the offices and their officers, the job 
description and the extent of authority each office has, as well as the legal contract 
uttered by the imam to the officer during his selection for the office and guidance 
for interactions among the officers. There are several offices that are relevant to 
this thesis, thus deserving brief elaboration. The first is the wazirate, with the 
officer being a wazir. There are two types of wazir: a delegation minister and an 
executor minister. A delegation minister is an officer appointed by the Imam on 
whom the Imam endows his authority. Thus, the delegation minister could act 
with all the authority that the Imam has and to perform duties that the Imam 
should perform. Al-Mawardi, however, cautions both the Imam and the minister 
that the Imam should oversee the minister’s work and the minister should always 
keep the Imam informed. An executor minister is an officer tasked by the Imam to 
perform a certain duty. If the officer is not making judgements in this duty, he is 
more fitting to be called “mediator” or “ambassador” (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 37–47). 
The second is the amirate, with the officer being an amir. An amir is the 
governor of a territory. An amir could receive his appointment either from the 
imam or from the wazir. If the appointment is from the imam, then the delegation 
wazir could subject the amir to the wazir’s control and monitoring, but could not 
dismiss or move him to another territory. If the appointment is from the wazir, 
then the wazir could dismiss or move him to another territory. Also, if the amir 
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was appointed by the wazir and the imam dismisses the wazir, then the amir 
would also be dismissed unless the imam affirmed his appointment and renewed 
the amir’s authority in the territory. The amir has the authority to manage his 
territory, including collecting taxes and zakat and using funds from taxes for army 
provision while using funds from zakat for improving social welfare (Mawardi, 
1996, pp. 48–56). There is a special office of amirate, which al-Mawardi calls the 
amirate of jihad, which is an office particularly concerned with fighting the 
unbelievers, as well as fighting renegades, rebels and bandits (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 
57–97). 
The third is the judiciary system. Al-Mawardi stipulates seven 
requirements for a judge. First, he must be male and have reached puberty. Second, 
there must be consensus that he is competent and capable of solving complex 
cases. Third, he must be a free man, not a slave. Fourth, he must be a Muslim 
since he would be required to have legal standing in an Islamic court. Al-Mawardi 
acknowledges that Abu Hanifa allows non-Muslims to be appointed as judges for 
their own people but refuses this appointment as part of the Islamic judiciary 
system. Instead, non-Muslim judges should be considered as the leader of their 
people and their judgements are binding because of their people’s respect for them. 
Fifth, he must be of just character. Sixth, he must be sound of hearing and sight so 
that he would be able to attend to the people’s rights and claims. Seventh, he must 
possess the knowledge of sharia laws to the point he could make ijtihad and issue 
fatwas.  
Al-Mawardi notes that Abu Hanifa allows those without the capability to 
make ijtihad and issue fatwas as judges but his opinion is that those appointments 
should be considered void. While he himself was of the Shafi’i school, al-
Mawardi clearly expresses his approval that followers of Abu Hanifa could be 
appointed as judges. He even states that a follower of Shafi’i could adopt an 
opinion of Abu Hanifa, if his ijtihad leads him to do so. Other than these issues, 
al-Mawardi provides in detail the code of conduct for a judge, from forbidding 
them to receive gifts to how to treat litigants waiting trial (Mawardi, 1996, pp. 98–
115). 
Following the description of al-Mawardi’s book, there are several points in 
the book that this thesis seeks to discuss further in order to discern his 
interpretation of the umma as a symbolic universe and the caliphate as, using 
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Risse-Kappen's and Sikkink’s (1999) terminology, norm entrepreneur for the idea 
of the umma. First, al-Mawardi uses the term imamate instead of caliphate. 
Ahmed (1962, p. 93) argues that the these two terms are interchangeable. 
However, while it is a trans-sectarian term, the term imamate had been more 
popular as a Shi’i term and, during ‘Abbasid times, there were tensions between 
the Sunni and the Shi’a in Baghdad. Thus, there might be something more than an 
unintentional use of the term. It might be possible that by using the word 
“imamate” and linking the term to his vision as a Sunni scholar, al-Mawardi 
implicitly asserts that there is only one legitimate form of leadership in the 
Muslim world, the Sunni concept of caliphate, which he then described in detail in 
his book.  
Looking from the theoretical perspective developed by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) and considering the political context during the writing of the 
book, al-Mawardi’s usage of imamate as a leadership term could be seen as an 
attempt to usurp the Shi’a’s interpretation of the umma and the leadership over it. 
It also could be seen as an effort, by way of contrast, to impose his Sunni 
perspective on the term. The readers might then be persuaded by his arguments of 
Sunni imamate, thus undermining the rival Buyid version of social reality. This is 
an example of how scholars defend their interpretation of the symbolic universe 
and attack the offending, heretical, alternative narrative when a schism emerges. 
Whether al-Mawardi did use the term to affirm his conception of caliphate or not 
is open to debate but his work set the precedent for subsequent Sunni scholars to 
use the term “imamate” when addressing the conceptual leadership of Muslim 
society. 
Second, when he elaborates on the nature of the imamate at the beginning 
of his book, al-Mawardi raises the question of whether the obligatory nature of the 
caliphate is derived from the rational inclination of men to submit to authority or 
is derived from the sharia. In this engagement, he never takes into account the 
option that the caliphate is not obligatory at all. This is in contrast with the de 
facto condition of the period, when the caliphate was weak and any valuable 
positions of power were in the hand of the Buyids. Therefore, it is possible al-
Mawardi deliberately composed his wording to provide the illusion that the 
caliphate is the natural condition for a political society. Indeed, Mattson (2000, pp. 
400–401) also offers the same conclusion, that through his book, al-Mawardi tried 
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to interpret the existing political order using an Islamic framework and sought to 
establish a legitimacy for the Abbasid caliphate, despite its apparent weaknesses. 
Third, by dismissing rational inclination as the possible cause for the 
existence of the caliphate, al-Mawardi takes his position against the Mu’tazilites 
whose doctrine was based on human rationalism. One of the controversies 
initiated by the Mu’tazilites was that the Qur’an was the product of a created 
accident and could not be considered as eternal (Fakhry, 1999, pp. 278–280). The 
development of Mu’tazilism was encouraged by earlier Abbasid caliphs and 
reached its peak under the patronage of the caliph al-Mamun (r. 813-833 CE). In 
833 CE, al-Mamun, with the support of Mu’tazilite scholars, instigated the mihna, 
a religious inquisition to eradicate all other branches of Islamic theology and 
established Mu’tazilism as the official school of thought in the caliphate. This 
effort was also supported by the subsequent caliphs and lasted for about fifteen 
years before it ultimately failed in dominating Islamic theology. Instead of 
increasing their authority over the scholars, the mihna damaged the reputation of 
the Abbasid caliphs permanently (Donner, 1999, p. 27). While during al-
Mawardi’s time Mu’tazilism largely had ceased to be an influential political 
movement, there were still Mu’tazilite thinkers and teachers in Baghdad (Kennedy, 
2004, p. 225). It might have been considered wise by al-Mawardi to use this 
opportunity to further disapprove Mu’tazilism and to put considerable distance 
between the caliphate and the Mu’tazilites in order to gain support from the Sunni 
scholars. 
Fourth, with regards to the methods of electing an imam, al-Mawardi 
accommodates both election by qualified electors and designation by the previous 
imam. However, Rosenthal (2009, p. 33) notes that al-Mawardi puts more efforts 
on legitimising the designation succession method. Al-Mawardi even claims that 
designating three successive heirs is in accordance with the sharia, despite no 
Qur’anic text or Prophetic tradition supporting it. This view could be understood 
as a way to maintain both the order and the authority of the caliphate. If al-
Mawardi admitted that both the Qur’an and hadith do not provide support for the 
designation succession method, then he essentially would have judged the entire 
Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates as un-Islamic and a breach of the holy scriptures. 
This would have created chaos and might have benefited the Shi’a, something that 
al-Mawardi would not want to do. 
 127 
Fifth, examining al-Mawardi’s conception of the powers of the Imam and 
how to exercise them, Hodgson (1974b, p. 55) observes that al-Mawardi is very 
concerned to legitimate the delegation process of imamate authority to 
subordinates, such as wazirs and amirs. Mattson (2000) identifies several passages 
in the book that justify the overbearing presence of the Buyids by painting it as if 
the Buyids were appointed by the Caliph. Thus, their “managing” of the caliphate 
was not an affront to the Caliph; instead, it was presented as a deliberate action by 
the Caliph to appoint the Buyids to help him in fulfilling his duties. It is also 
curious to note that al-Mawardi specifically provides a detailed explanation on a 
type of amirates that he calls  amirate of conquest. According to Mawardi (1996, 
p. 53), the amirate of conquest is an amirate that forms as an amir takes 
possession of a territory by force. The Caliph then legitimates the conquest and he 
grants the amir with the authority to rule the territory. Al-Mawardi describes the 
rules in establishing the amirate of conquest, the first and foremost is that the 
amirate of conquest has to serve to protect the office of the imamate, which means 
that the amir’s military endeavours should not threaten the Caliph. Relating his 
work to the actual situation during his time, this thesis assumes that the inclusion 
of these various offices was part of al-Mawardi’s efforts to justify the existence of 
various powerful actors other than the Caliph without undermining the caliphate. 
Scholars like Rosenthal (2009) and Mattson (2000) advocate caution in 
approaching al-Mawardi’s book. In their view, it cannot be treated as the blueprint 
for the caliphate in Islam, as divinely ordained by God or as directed by the 
Prophet. It could not even be considered as treatise on the ideals of the caliphate. 
It was, above all, a documentation of the existing practice in statesmanship and 
politics during his time. It also served as a tool to reinforce Caliph al-Qadir’s 
legitimacy by framing his actions and conditions with Qur’anic texts and Islamic 
history, especially the history of the Four Rightly-guided Caliphs. Political 
propaganda, if you will. While I agrees with this caution, this thesis appreciates 
the book as a form of intellectual endeavour to further articulate the abstract 
concept of the umma into a more practical application, in this case through the 
authority of the institution of the caliphate. 
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Later developments: contestation of authorities 
Al-Mawardi’s Ordinances had been valuable in maintaining the authority 
of the Abbasid caliphate. Using religious texts and rhetoric, al-Mawardi 
intertwines the spheres of religion and government into one inseparable union of 
al-din wa al-dawla, where one could not exist without the other. In order to 
maintain the Caliph’s temporal authority, al-Mawardi interprets the relations 
between the Caliph and the amirs as a hierarchical one, with the amirs in 
subordinate position to the Caliph. His book was part of efforts to maintain and 
expand the authority of the caliph by providing intellectual support to the cause 
(Hanne, 2004, pp. 67–68). 
Despite these efforts, the caliphate continued to decline. Caliph al-Qaim (r. 
1031-1075) eventually had to accept the protection of the Seljuk Sultan Toghril-
beg to be able to get rid of the Buyids. The Caliph then bestowed upon the Sultan 
the title of al-sultan al-mu`azzam, or “the mighty Ruler”. With the title went all 
the actual authority over political and military affairs in the caliphate to the Sultan 
and his successors (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 43). In contrast to the declining caliphate, 
the Seljuk sultanate’s military prowess brought fame and increased their 
reputation in the eyes of the Muslims. Toghril-beg’s successor, Alp Arslan, was 
renowned for his military conquests, including the victory over the Byzantines in 
the Battle of Mazinkert (1071 CE). His son and successor, Malik Shah, managed 
to take control of the Holy Cities and expanded the sultanate’s influence to Yemen 
(Hodgson, 1974b, pp. 44–45). 
Critical to the success of the Seljuk sultans was not only their military 
prowess but also the political acumen of their wazirs. Toghril-beg’s wazir, al-
Kunduri was fundamental in orchestrating the alliance between the Caliph al-
Qaim and Sultan Toghril-beg, if their relations could be called as an alliance. Alp 
Arslan and Malik Shah I’s wazir, the capable Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092 CE), 
maintained the alliance between the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk sultanate. 
He also developed the political ideology supporting the sultans’ interests and the 
establishment of a bureaucracy and tax system to provide necessary funding for 
the sultans’ endeavours (Hodgson, 1974b, pp. 43–46). His book, Siyasat-nama or 
Siyar al-Mulk or the Book of Government, which was presumably compiled in 479 
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H/1086 CE by the order of Sultan Malik Shah, contains his thoughts on 
governance in the Islamic world (Mulk, 1960).  
Nizam al-Mulk opens his book by declaring that God always chooses one 
man in every age and time to lead the human race and close the doors of 
corruption, confusion and discord. In his contemporary age, argues Nizam al-
Mulk, this divine mandate had fallen to Malik Shah I, and granted him virtues as 
possessing royal lineage for generations, high moral qualities and great devotion 
to the faith (Mulk, 1960, pp. 9–11). In Malik Shah I laid the powers and merits 
that “had been lacking in the princes of the world before him,” (Mulk, 1960, p. 
10). Even the caliphs were inferior to him since their rules were never free from 
unrest while Malik Shah I’s was blessed by stability. He then again emphasises 
Malikshah’s superiority by stating that “he has no need of any counsellor or 
guide” (Mulk, 1960, p. 11). The rest of the book describes various governmental 
offices and functions that could help a sultan in administering his realm. 
The political thought espoused by the Book of Government provides a 
different political structure compared to that of al-Mawardi’s Ordinances. The 
first difference is the marginalisation of the caliphate. Instead of relying on the 
caliphate as the only instrument of power and authority, this book suggests the 
division of authority between the caliphate and sultanate, with the greater 
proportion of power attributed to the sultan. In the Ordinances, it was the caliph 
who gains divine mandate and acts as the leader of the Believers, in both temporal 
and spiritual matters. Sultans are the deputies of the caliph. Their authority was 
derived from the caliph who delegates a part of his to them. But in the Book of 
Government, the sultan has become a more prominent figure than the caliph. He is 
portrayed as a sovereign and his authority comes directly from God. According to 
Lewis (1988, pp. 51–53), while the term “sultan” had been utilised in Muslim 
history to refer to a position of power before the time of the Seljuks, it gained a 
new sense during this period. The term “sultan” during this time referred to the 
claim of a universal empire. For the Seljuks, there was one sultan to rule the 
Muslim world, as there was one caliph.  
The Book of Government still acknowledges the presence of a caliph, but it 
assigns a lesser role to the caliph compared to the Ordinances while assigning the 
greater roles as political and military leader to the sultan. The distinction between 
a sultan and a caliph in the time of the Seljuks did not signify a separation 
 130 
between religious and worldly affairs in Muslim politics, though, because, as 
described in the Book of Government, kingship and religion are like two brothers 
and disorder in one will affect the other. Therefore, it is imperative for a king to 
have sound faith to be able to master both (Mulk, 1960, p. 63). The Book also 
describes extensively the religious duties of a sultan (Mulk, 1960, pp. 62–65). A 
sultan, however, was regarded as having more political and military powers while 
a caliph was regarded as the spiritual symbol of the Muslim world. 
Another difference between the Book of Government and the Ordinances 
is that the Book of Government promotes an absolutist rule against the 
Ordinances’ more constitutional one. In the Ordinances even the caliph has to 
adhere to what al-Mawardi called “the contract of the imamate”, essentially a set 
of rights and obligations between the caliph and his subjects. The Ordinances also 
put great power on to the scholars including, theoretically, to elect a new caliph. 
These elements are conspicuously absent in the Book of Government. Instead, the 
Book describes that a rightful king is determined by God’s will, which 
spontaneously will bestow authority, power and capability on to the recipient. 
There is no mention of the involvement of other agencies in the selection of a 
sultan nor the sultan’s contract with his subjects such as the “contract of the 
imamate” developed by al-Mawardi (Simidchieva, 2004, p. 103). Thus, in the 
Book of Government, while a sultan is placed as the central figure in the Muslim 
world, he is also portrayed as a character detached from the rest of humanity, 
more so than a caliph in the Ordinances.  
The Book of Government instigates three profound shifts in the 
construction of the political conception of the umma. First, it shifts the figure of 
authority in the Muslim world from the caliph to the sultan. Second, it shifts the 
character of the political institution from constutionalism to the absolutism of a 
sultan. As the sultan is portrayed as elected by God Himself, he consequently has 
limitless authority. Who would defy God’s will? As his responsibility was 
conferred on him directly by God, he answers only to God, eliminating any kind 
of civil obligation that might be attached to his office. Third, it also demands 
passive obedience from the people to the sultan. As the sultan attained the divine 
mandate, he also gained supreme qualities and virtues, making him superior 
compared to other humans. Thus, his opinion is always the best. It is enough for 
the common people to obey him, rather than challenge him or offer him advice. 
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Nizam al-Mulk’s conception of political leadership in the umma was 
endorsed by al-Juwayni, a scholar who was chosen by Nizam al-Mulk as the head 
of al-Madrasa al-Maymuna al-Nizamiyya in Nishapur. Presumably between 1072 
and 1085 CE, he wrote a treatise on government titled Ghiyath al-Umam (Hallaq, 
1984a, pp. 27–28). In this book, al-Juwayni agrees with the importance of the 
imamate to preserve the unity of the umma. However, according to him, the form 
and the rulings of this institution are open to discussion because the Qur’an and 
the hadith do not provide detailed explanations. Al-Juwayni then expounds upon 
the ideal characteristics of the imamate. By emphasising the ideals, he implicitly 
portrays the weaknesses of the Abbasid caliphate. Next, he presents a hypothetical 
condition where the imamate is extinct. He argues, that in this condition, military 
leaders and scholars should take affairs into their own hands. This structure allows 
al-Juwayni to argue against the Abbasid caliphate and, at the same time, present 
an alternative structure that centred on the hands of the Seljuk sultanate (Hallaq, 
1984a, pp. 30–31). According to Hallaq (1984a, p. 32), al-Juwayni’s attitudes 
stemmed not from grudge against the Abbasids but from his fear that the 
weaknesses of the caliphate would bring discord and chaos to the umma. 
Al-Juwayni’s disciple, al-Ghazali, took a middle position between his 
teacher’s and al-Mawardi’s, as can be seen in his books. In Kitab al-Mustazhiri 
(Book of  the Mustazhiri, 1094-1095 CE), he defends the caliph al-Mustazhir (r. 
1094-1118 CE) as the legitimate imam and argues that all Muslims should obey 
him. This book was supposedly written at the request of al-Mustazhir (Ormsby, 
2008, p. 89). His further books show that while he supports al-Mawardi’s 
conception that the ultimate authority in the Muslim world lies in the caliph and 
no other institution is valid unless emanating from him, al-Ghazali acknowledges 
the importance of the sultanates and seeks to incorporate the sultanates into his 
theory of statecraft. According to Lambton (1981, p. 115), al-Ghazali lays the 
fundamentals of his theory in Iqtisad al-I’tiqad, which has been translated as 
Moderation in Belief. Later works such as the famous Ihya ulum al-din do not add 
or advance his theory; they only further reamplify it and provide an explanation of 
its consequences . 
In Iqtisad al-I’tiqad, al-Ghazali opens his discussion on the imamate by 
affirming the obligatory nature of the imamate (Ghazali, 2013, p. 229). He argues 
that this obligatory nature originates from the sharia. The ultimate goal of the 
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sharia is to guide Muslims in achieving success in religious affairs. Yet, to 
achieve this, Muslims need someone to establish order and provide them with 
basic needs and security in worldly affairs. Thus, the presence of an authoritative 
imam is necessitated by the sharia (Ghazali, 2013, pp. 230–231). Al-Ghazali then 
describes three aspects that should exist in an imamate: first is the power to 
maintain order, second is the representation of the collective unity of the Muslim 
society and third is its functional and institutional authority from the sharia. In the 
event an imam does not have enough power by himself, al-Ghazali states that the 
imam could be designated by a person, or persons, of influence, whose allegiance 
to the imam would force others to obey the imam (Ghazali, 2013, p. 232). 
This thesis argues that by acknowledging that a powerful and influential 
man can support a caliph, al-Ghazali provides a legal and doctrinal basis for the 
existence of the Abbasid caliph and, at the same time, acknowledges the 
importance of the Seljuk sultans as the power behind the caliphate. This reflected 
not only the actual situation in his time but also his conceptual position which 
differed from al-Mawardi’s. Binder (1955, pp. 238–239) agrees with this 
observation and further argues that the exchange of oath of allegiance between a 
sultan and a caliph and the subsequent oath of appointment from the caliph to the 
sultan formed the established governmental practices in al-Ghazali’s period. This 
exchange of oaths rendered the sultan’s position stronger in al-Ghazali’s 
conception of politics than it was in al-Mawardi’s. Instead of being considered a 
servant of the caliph, a sultan now held his own authority and power, which the 
caliph needed to establish his. The consequence of this conceptual construction 
was, according to Lambton (1981, p. 116), the shifting articulation of obedience in 
the Muslim world. Not only did the people have to affirm their allegiance to the 
Caliph, they also had to obey the Seljuk sultans as the holder of  de facto power.  
Conceptual development after the destruction of Baghdad 
Despite its weaknesses, the Abbasid caliphate served the majority of 
Muslim society as the source of authority and their symbol of unity. It is true that 
the Abbasids had to contend with the claims of the Fatimids in Egypt and the 
Umayyads in Andalusia but the Abbasids managed to outlast the other caliphates, 
somewhat securing its position as the symbol of the umma. Medieval Sunni 
scholars commonly attributed the application of the Islamic leadership concept to 
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the Abbasids, and their books on Islamic governance either support the authority 
of the Abbasid caliphate or at the very least acknowledge its presence as granted. 
The Abbasid caliphate was an integral part of the debate in defining and 
legitimising the instrument of authority in Muslim society. 
This, however, changed when the Abbasid caliphate was destroyed by the 
Mongols in 1258 CE. The destruction and loss of knowledge and wealth from the 
invasion were astounding but it paled in comparison to the mental shock that 
swept the Muslim world when they heard about the death of the Caliph and 
destruction of the caliphate. Caliph al-Musta’sim was not merely a political leader, 
though admittedly of limited capacity; he was also the symbolic leader of the 
umma. He was the embodiment of the concept of a universal leader which was 
necessary for the embodiment of the concept of a universal society of Muslims. 
Since the death of Muhammad, Islamic leadership and unity were symbolised in 
the caliph’s person, starting from the Rightly Guided Caliphs, to the Umayyads, to 
the Abbasids. There were times when there were contending caliphs, but there had 
never been a time since the death of the Prophet without a caliph. 
Al-Musta’sim’s death and the destruction of the caliphate were considered 
as heralding the end of the umma. Consistent with the nature of a symbolic 
universe, events in the society are considered as the reflection of cosmology. In 
Islam, the destruction of the caliphate thus acquired religious undertones. Muslim 
historian al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 500–503) describes this period as “a world without 
Caliph” and quotes elegies lamenting the destruction of Baghdad. This period 
without caliph lasted for three and half years, before finally al-Muntansir Billah 
arrived in Egypt and was acknowledged as the next Caliph in 1261 CE. Despite 
managing to satisfy the general Muslims’ need for a unifying symbol, the new 
caliphate lacked everything it had before. Not a single actual power left and the 
trauma inflicted by the destruction of Baghdad inevitably affected the minds of 
Muslims, especially scholars who then sought to conceptualise a different 
interpretation of the umma; the one without the caliphate as the unifying 
institution.  
The destruction of Baghdad brought profound effect on the scholars’ 
opinion on Islamic leadership and governance. This can be seen in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s (d. 1328 CE) al-Siyasa al-Shari’yya and Ibn Khaldun’s (d. 1406 CE) 
al Muqaddima which put less emphasis on the caliphate and more on legitimising 
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the presence of various sultanates, a common political practice during their time. 
Ibn Taymiyya opens his book by declaring it as a short treatise on divine 
government (al-siyasa al-ilahiyya) and prophetic counsel (al-ayat al-nabawiyya) 
(Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, p. 2). He, citing a saying from Muhammad, argues that 
leadership is a trust that all Muslims should shoulder (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, pp. 
13–14). To manage the public affairs in Muslim society, however, Muslims 
require public officers. Therefore, it is the obligation of the ruler to choose the 
best man available to hold the public office -- he who has capacity and loyalty. If 
a ruler has to choose between a candidate with greater capability and another with 
greater loyalty, Ibn Taymiyya advises that the ruler should choose the candidate 
with greater capability (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, pp. 20–21). 
Lambton (1981) observes that in al-Siyasa, Ibn Taymiyya uses the term 
wali al-amr to refer to the individuals with actual power and uses the usual imam 
or caliph to refer to the abstract concept of Islamic governance. Lambton assumes 
that Ibn Taymiyya maybe intentionally avoided linking the term imam or caliph to 
an actual person or position of power since there was no longer a powerful caliph 
to provide leadership to Muslim society in his era. The Abbasid caliphate in Egypt 
was a mere shadow of its former self, whose function was only to provide 
legitimation to the Mamluk sultans (Lambton, 1981, pp. 144–151). Malkawi and 
Sonn, in their work on Ibn Taymiyya’s political thought, also arrive at the same 
observation as Lambton’s that Ibn Taymiyya differentiated Islamic governance in 
its abstract form and in its practical form, and attributed different terms to each. 
They also observe that he did not provide great details on the form of government 
but  put more emphasis on its duties instead (Malkawi and Sonn, 2011, p. 117).  
In line with the observation above, this thesis presumes that Ibn 
Taymiyya’s choice of terminology was a move to reinterpret the concept of umma 
to fit the practical condition of his time. Since the caliphate had lost much of its 
power, it no longer could serve as the instrument of authority required to assist the 
development and legitimation of the umma. Ibn Taymiyya then sought a new 
instrument that could assume the role, and he found it in the form of sultanates. 
However, he also realised that the institution of sultanate was a relatively new 
institution in Islamic governance and did not enjoy a strong relationship with 
Prophetic history. Thus, he put forward his idea that the obligation to establish 
Islamic governance falls to all Muslims, not a particular family or group. 
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Moreover, the most capable and powerful among Muslims should be chosen for 
the role while allowing for personal defects in personality or character, unlike 
previous conceptions of authoritative figures which relied on the perceived 
superior characteristics of the figure (Ibn Taymiyya, 2005, pp. 20–22).  
Ibn Taymiyya’s argument on the decentralisation of Muslim leadership 
legitimates the presence of various sultanates as the authoritative figures in 
various Muslim territories.  Theoretically, since everyone is obliged to lead and 
the most capable should lead, the sultans’ efforts to rule is within an Islamic 
framework. Because they are capable, it is thus within their duty to provide 
leadership to the general populace. The sultans could find a legal foundation for 
their rule despite not getting their authority from the caliph nor having a long 
established history with the Prophet’s family. There is no need to re-establish the 
caliphate as the sole authoritative figure in the Muslim world because, despite its 
perceived moral or spiritual virtues, the caliphate had failed to show its practical 
capacity as the leader of the believers. 
Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 CE) further deconstructs the theory of authority in 
Muslim society in his al Muqaddima by attributing the source of vitality which 
enables empires to thrive to asabiyya. The term asabiyya was not coined by Ibn 
Khaldun. On the contrary, asabiyya had been a familiar term in pre-Islamic Arabic 
vocabulary. In his foreword to the English translation of al Muqaddima, Rosenthal 
describes that, according to custom, the definition of asabiyya is “making 
common cause with one’s agnates”. This kind of sentiment could lead to one’s 
blind support for his group, an expression which had been criticised by 
Muhammad. Rosenthal argues that, as a man of knowledge, Ibn Khaldun must 
have been aware of this negative view; thus Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya should be 
understood as a different attribute than the pre-Islamic asabiyya (Ibn Khaldun and 
Rosenthal, 1967).  
Rosenthal notes that Ibn Khaldun differentiates asabiyya into pagan 
asabiyya, which is condemned by Islam, and natural asabiyya, a condition which 
is inseparable from human basic instinct. It is the later asabiyya which Ibn 
Khaldun expounds upon. According to Ibn Khaldun, natural asabiyya is present in 
the affection that someone feels towards a brother or a neighbour when one of 
them is treated unjustly. This asabiyya is strong in people of primitive culture 
(umran badawi) and not as strong in people of civilised culture (umran hadari). In 
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primitive culture, the people (badu or bedouin) live in a natural environment 
which hones their bravery, self-reliance and affection to one’s family or group in 
order to survive. Blood ties (silat al-rahim) become paramount in the 
establishment of a social group in that culture, followed by alliance (hilf) and 
clientship (wala’). The strong solidarity among the members of the group 
provided by these attachments is what Ibn Khaldun calls asabiyya (Ibn Khaldun 
and Rosenthal, 1967). 
Asabiyya is characterised by alertness, dynamism and violence, attributes 
necessary to survive in such environment. It defends and protects all members of 
the group and is also important in offensive action against the enemy of the group. 
The leaders of asabiyya hold high esteemed positions which help them to settle 
internal problems and to shape the future of the group. With asabiyya, the 
primitive society is united and able to survive (Rabi', 1967, pp. 49–52). This 
strong pressure to survive is minimal in people of civilised culture who inhabit the 
cities (hadar). The presence of various instruments such as walls and guards 
provide the inhabitants with a sense of security, which in turn dull their sense of 
alertness. The development of a form of government, which usually takes the form 
of kingship (mulk) and its enforced law, weakens and later completely replaces the 
need for asabiyya from the city dwellers. Rather than being alert and dynamic, the 
city dwellers are immersed in their own pleasure and become complacent (Rabi', 
1967, pp. 52–53). When threats arise, instead of relying on their asabiyya to solve 
it, the monarch employs mercenaries to consolidate his internal power and to 
defend his dynasty against fresh primitive groups (Rabi', 1967, p. 54). 
Ibn Khaldun asserts that kingship is always established by force. Whoever 
has the necessary force to seize power, can do so. While asabiyya provides kings 
with this necessary power, Ibn Khaldun argues that religion is also important for 
the formation of  kingship due to its nature to further solidify the social group 
formed by asabiyya and to eliminate shortcomings in the group (Lambton, 1981, p. 
160). According to Ibn Khaldun, there are two types of governmental regime, one 
which takes its rule from the religion (siyasa shar’iyya) and one which is based on 
rational choice (siyasa aqliyya). Siyasa shar’iyya is based on God’s commands 
and the examples set by the Prophet. Its ruler seeks to establish the good of the 
ruled in this world and the hereafter, as captured in the principle of rahmatan lil 
‘alamin. The ruler of siyasa aqliyya might seek the good for the ruled in this 
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world but also might seek the good for the ruler in this world. This type of regime 
requires the presence of rational law to prevent it from oppressing the people. Yet 
even the rational law is inferior to the sharia, which ensures the wellbeing of men 
in their temporal and spiritual interests (Lambton, 1981, pp. 162–164).  
Using this theoretical framework, Ibn Khaldun assesses the historical 
development of Islamic governance. He rationalises the rise and fall of various 
Muslim governments by explaining the societal force working, or waning, around 
the involved actors. He uses the dynamics of asabiyya as a secular point of view 
in explaining the rise the fall of the caliphates, a distinct approach compared to the 
works of previous Muslim scholars (Rabi', 1967, p. 91). For example, Ibn 
Khaldun sees the conflict between Ali and Mu’awiya not as a theological conflict 
but as a necessary result of asabiyya (Lambton, 1981, p. 172). Also, unlike al-
Mawardi who tries to explain and legalise the waning power of the caliph and the 
increasing power of the sultans in his work by framing them under the sharia law 
and procedures, Ibn Khaldun frankly describes this shift as the failure of the 
Abbasid’s asabiyya to maintain supremacy over the younger, more dynamic, 
tribes (Rabi', 1967, p. 94). This unwavering focus on asabiyya made Ibn Khaldun 
become fascinated with Timurlane as a figure of power who could amass and 
command the great asset of asabiyya. In his view, Timurlane and his Mongol 
horde were the embodiment of his theory (Fromherz, 2010, pp. 2–4). 
Despite being the fundamental force allowing the formation of a tribal 
society, asabiyya in Ibn Khaldun’s conception is not racist in character (Rabi', 
1967, pp. 59–61). He did not promote the supremacy of a particular tribe over the 
other. On the contrary, his theory of asabiyya is universal in the sense that the 
cycle of asabiyya is observable in any tribe in the history of mankind. Any tribe 
with strong asabiyya can achieve greatness and any great society which loses its 
asabiyya will crumble against the onslaught of tribes with stronger asabiyya. Ibn 
Khaldun’s harsh observations on the Umayyads and the Abbasids and his 
fascination with Timurlane attest to this non-racist interpretation of asabiyya. 
Bland (1984, pp. 37–39) echoes this assertion by describing Ibn Khaldun’s 
evaluation of Jewish history. In al Muqadimma, Ibn Khaldun uses asabiyya to 
explain the history of the Jews, putting them on an equal footing with other tribes 
he assesses in his work.  
 138 
The absence of racism in the concept of asabiyya works well with the 
vision of forming a global umma. Since the theory of asabiyya is universal, it 
conceptually supports the rise of non-Arab tribes to be the ruler of the whole 
umma. Ibn Khaldun openly disagrees with the notion that imam should be of 
Qurayshi descent. He argues that the stipulation was put in place because, at that 
time, the Quraysh possessed asabiyya which was necessary to consolidate the 
Muslims into one society. Yet, their asabiyya later weakened as the consequences 
of their complacency and luxurious lives. Acknowledging that general opinion 
supports the notion of a Qurayshi imam to rule the umma, Ibn Khaldun argues that 
forcing this while the Quraysh no longer possess asabiyya is the same as selecting 
an incompetent imam. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the umma to choose 
another tribe, one with the strongest asabiyya among the umma (Lambton, 1981, p. 
170). 
This sentiment was well received by the non-Arab tribes, especially by the 
Ottomans. The earliest known Ottoman source familiar with the work of Ibn 
Khaldun is dated 1598 CE. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Ottoman 
scholars had cited Ibn Khaldun directly, showing a degree of familiarity with his 
work. By the eighteenth century, Ibn Khaldun was popular in Ottoman scholarly 
circles. Mustafa Naima (d. 1716), a prominent scholar often thought to be the first 
official historian of the Ottoman Empire, prefaced his history of the Ottomans by 
citing Ibn Khaldun on his formulation of the rise and decline of societies and on 
the five stages of the life of dynastic states (Fleischer, 1984, pp. 47–48).  The 
popularity of Ibn Khaldun and his works among the Ottomans is understandable 
because, due to their non-Arab origin, the Ottomans faced constant attack with 
their legitimacy questioned on the grounds they were not from the Quraysh. This 
attack occurred not only in the early Ottoman period but also during the late 
Ottoman period in the late nineteenth century with the rise of Arab nationalism. 
There were proponents of an Arab caliphate such as Rashid Rida who based their 
rejection of Ottoman rule using the so-called “Quraysh condition”. To answer 
these attacks, both in early and in late Ottoman periods, the Ottoman scholars 
cited Ibn Khaldun’s assertions on asabiyya and his dismissal of the Qurayshi 
descent as an indispensable element of the caliphate (Ardiç, 2012). 
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“Alternative” Interpretation: Shi’a’s interpretation of the umma 
“Alternative” history and the birth of the Shi’a Imamate 
As noted in Muslim historical accounts, the appointment of Abu Bakr to 
the position of caliph was not unanimously accepted. Some Muslims were 
dissatisfied by this and considered that the mantle of caliph should fall onto Ali 
instead. The dissatisfaction grew when Umar and then Uthman were chosen as the 
second and third caliphs respectively. Ali was finally chosen as the fourth caliph 
after Uthman’s assassination. However his reign was troubled by internal strife 
among Muslims. Some high profile Muslims such as Aisha, the widow of the 
Prophet, and Thalhah and Zubayr, both among the most eminent Companions of 
the Prophet, stood against Ali and rebuked him for not punishing Uthman’s 
murderers. Ali then left Madina and moved his capital to Kufa, hoping to get more 
followers from the Iraqis but pressures against him did not lessen. Finally the two 
groups met in a physical confrontation, well known in Muslim history as the 
Battle of the Camel, in 656 CE (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 214; Kennedy, 2004, pp. 75–
76).  
Unfortunately, the trouble did not end with the battle. Ali managed to win 
the battle, but the unity of the Muslims had been shattered. Tension was still 
palpable and another war broke out when Mu’awiya ibn Abu Sofyan, then the 
governor of Syria and the cousin of Uthman, revolted against Ali. The armies 
clashed in Siffin in 657 CE. There was no conclusive result of the war, until 
Mu’awiya’s army started to raise the Qur’an and asked for arbitration to end the 
conflict. Ali accepted. A part of his army rebelled against Ali’s decision for a 
negotiated settlement and followed their own commander. While most of them 
were obliterated by Ali’s remaining army, their movement spread and became 
known as the Kharijites (or Khawarij), “those who go out” (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 
215–216). 
The Battle of Siffin was not a battle for the caliphate since Mu’awiya at 
this stage had not made any claims to the caliphate. He was avenging Uthman’s 
murder, something which Ali could not do because the party thought responsible 
for the murder were his supporters in Kufa (Kennedy, 2004, p. 78). However, the 
result of the arbitration process was that there would be another arbitration in one 
year’s time which would decide who should be the amir al-mu’minin (Donner, 
 140 
2010, p. 163). The consequence of this arbitration was that Ali’s authority was 
severely reduced. Meanwhile, Mu’awiya was getting bolder. He claimed the 
caliphate over Syria. Soon, Egypt was lost to Ali. His appointed governor was 
killed in a rebellion and Egypt declared for Mu’awiya. There was even a near-
mutiny against Ali in Basra, inside his own territory (Donner, 2010, p. 164). In 
661 CE, Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite, ending his reign and the period of 
Khulafa al-Rashidun in Muslim history (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 216). 
That was the story from the Sunni side of history. The Shi’a have another 
narrative, one which puts emphasis on the figure of Ali and how Muhammad had 
bestowed upon him the mandate as the Prophet’s successor. There are several 
occasions that Shi’a point to as to when Muhammad appointed Ali as his 
successor. The earliest of these was just after Muhammad received his revelation 
and addressed his people of Quraysh. Muhammad invited them to a meal and, 
afterwards, he revealed his prophethood and asked the audience who would like to 
help him in this mission. None responded and Ali then said, “I, O Prophet of God, 
will be your helper in this matter.” According to a narration from Ali, “And he 
[the Prophet] put his arm around my neck and said: ‘This is my brother, my 
trustee and my successor among you, so listen to him and obey.’” (Momen, 1985, 
p. 12). 
The more popular account of when Muhammad appointed Ali as his 
successor is the event of Ghadir Khumm. After returning from the Farewell 
Pilgrimage, Muhammad and an entourage of Companions stopped at a place 
called Ghadir Khumm. There the Prophet led a mid-day prayer and then, 
according to this narrative, the following happened; he took Ali by the hand and 
said to the people: “Of whomsoever I am mawla, then Ali is also his mawla. O 
God! Be Thou the supporter of whoever support Ali and the enemy of whoever 
opposes him” (Momen, 1985, p. 15). The word mawla had many meanings and 
while the Shi’a translate mawla to mean “lord”, the Sunnis translate the word as 
“beloved”. Relying on these accounts, the Shi’a believe Ali had the right as the 
successor of Muhammad. They view Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman as betrayers, 
taking away the caliphate from Ali (Shahabi, 1988, pp. 16–18).  
After Ali’s death, his son Hasan became the head of the house. While 
some of Ali’s followers encouraged Hasan to take the leadership and claim the 
caliphate, he chose not to pursue this claim. The condition in Kufa was too 
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disunited for him to face Mu’awiya. He then chose to abdicate in a treaty with 
Mu’awiya in 661 CE and retired to Medina. His abdication left Mu’awiyya 
without contender (Keshk, 2010, p. 42). Hasan then died nine years later, at 670 
CE, at the relatively early age of forty-six. The Shi’i historical account claims that 
he was poisoned by his own wife under orders from Mu’awiya (Momen, 1985, p. 
26). Hasan’s younger brother, Husayn, then took the leadership of the house of Ali 
in 669 CE. During the reign of Mu’awiya, Husayn did not affirm a claim to the 
caliphate, out of respect for his brother’s treaty with Mu’awiya.  
After Mu’awiya’s death in 680 CE, his son Yazid ascended the throne as 
per Mu’awiya’s decree. While Mu’awiya’s ascension had caused controversy 
among the Muslims, Yazid’s caused outrage, especially among the followers of 
Husayn. Some messengers from Kufa arrived in Medina and persuaded Husayn to 
move to Kufa and assume leadership there. At the same time, the governor of 
Medina pressed Husayn to give allegiance to Yazid. He moved to Mecca and from 
there he left for Kufa. Unknown to Husayn, Yazid had replaced the Kufan 
governor with one of his followers, Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, who according to Shi’a 
sources established a reign of terror and either intimidated Husayn’s followers in 
the city or bribed them with money so that they would abandon Husayn (Momen, 
1985, pp. 28–29). 
A few of Husayn’s supporters managed to flee from Kufa and joined him, 
bringing news on the condition there. Husayn decided to press forward to Kufa 
and his group was intercepted by al-Hurr al-Tamimi, a young commander leading 
a thousand strong soldiers. Husayn and al-Hurr negotiated and Husayn agreed to 
change his journey, away from Kufa. Shadowed by al-Hurr and some of his 
soldiers, Husayn and his group travelled on. They arrived at the field of Karbala 
on the second day of Muharram, 61 AH (2 October 680 CE). On the following 
day, another contingent of four thousand soldiers under the leadership of Umar 
ibn Sa’ad arrived. They were ordered by Ubaydullah to keep Husayn in Karbala 
until he pledged his allegiance to Yazid. Husayn tried to negotiate with Ibn Sa’ad 
but to no avail. For days, Husayn and his followers were stranded in Karbala, 
without a way out or access to water (Momen, 1985, pp. 29–30). 
Ubaydullah then sent another order through Shimr: that Ibn Sa’ad was 
either to attack Husayn immediately or hand over the leadership to Shimr. On the 
morning of the tenth of Muharram, 61 AH (10 October 680 CE), the army of Ibn 
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Sa’ad attacked Husayn’s camp. Of the 72 armed men in Husayn’s camp, none was 
spared by the army. Even Husayn himself was killed by the order, and some 
accounts claim by the very sword of Shimr (Momen, 1985, p. 30). Husayn and the 
men fallen in combat were then decapitated and their heads were brought to Kufa, 
and then sent to Yazid in Damascus. Zaynab, Husayn’s sister who was at Karbala 
with him, addressed Yazid’s court and shamed him, so that he released the women 
and children captured in Karbala. This event was also recorded in Sunni historical 
accounts by scholars such as al-Tabari (Tabari, 1990a). 
The Shi’i historian, Jafri (1979), provides his analysis of the events of 
Karbala. In Jafri’s view, Husayn was well aware of the danger that he would face 
if he continued to travel to Kufa. If Husayn was seeking power alone, Jafri argues 
that he could have raised support in the Hijaz. However, he did not. This, 
according to Jafri, signifies that Husayn had other than military power on his mind. 
Jafri argues that Husayn was “planning for a complete revolution in the religious 
consciousness of the Muslims” (Jafri, 1979, p. 200). Jafri then explains that while 
Muhammad’s action had managed to suppress the Arabs’ conservatism, the same 
Arab conservatism reasserted itself and found embodiment in Yazid’s character, 
who managed to deface Muhammad’s teachings. Thus, Husayn sought to 
reactivate Muhammad’s teachings by shaking the conscience of Muslims through 
his sacrifice. His death, his family’s capture and their humiliation by Yazid were 
the means to broadcast his message to the Muslim society, something that Jafri 
finds was ultimately successful (Jafri, 1979, pp. 200–204). 
Yazid died in 683 CE, loosening the Umayyad grip on many territories. In 
684 CE, the former Kufan governor whom Yazid had displaced with Ubaydullah 
ibn Ziyad, Mukhtar ibn Abi Ubayd, returned to Kufa. He campaigned for a 
populist movement and rallied the sympathisers of Ali and Husayn under his 
banner. He called for the people to recognise Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, son of 
Ali by Khawla, as the amir al-mu’minin. He stated that this Muhammad was the 
mahdi or saviour of the Last Days, who had arrived to establish a just regime on 
earth. This incident is important since, according to Donner (2010, pp. 183–184), 
it was the first time in which the concept of the mahdi is evoked. It was also the 
first time that the call for arms was raised for someone of Ali’s direct bloodline 
but not that of the Prophet’s. This shows the subtle shift from the lineage of the 
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Prophet to the figure and lineage of Ali as the source of legitimacy and authority 
in Shi’a traditions.  
While Mukhtar managed to control Kufa and the surrounding area for a 
while, ultimately his revolt was crushed by Mush’ab ibn Zubayr in early 687 CE 
(Donner, 2010, pp. 183–186). However, the followers of Ali continued their 
resistance against the Umayyads. At the centre of this resistance were the 
descendants of Ali. During the Abbasid uprising against the Umayyads, the 
Abbasids tried to win the support of followers of Ali. The Abbasids claimed the 
imamate both from their lineage to the Prophet’s uncle al-Abbas ibn Abd al-
Mutallib and also by the last will and testament of Muhammad ibn al Hanafiyya, a 
son of Ali. Using this propaganda, the Abbasids managed to gain support from the 
family and followers of Ali, and so won the caliphate (Robinson, 2009, pp. 206–
207).  
Still, the Abbasids neglected their promises and did not recognise the 
importance of the family of Ali in their caliphate. The influence of the Shi’a 
waxed and waned according to the policies of individual caliphs. Some Abbasid 
caliphs such as al-Mansur and al-Mahdi (r. 775-785 CE) accommodated the Shi’a 
by including them in their court. Others such as Harun al-Rashid (r. 786-809 CE) 
were suspicious of them and limited their access to the court (Donner, 1999, p. 25). 
The influence of the Shi’a in the Abbasid caliphate gained momentum again when 
the Shi’ite Buyid dynasty controlled large parts of the caliphate, conquered 
Baghdad and became the de facto ruler of the Islamic empire from 945 to 1055 
CE (Donner, 1999, p. 30). 
In time, the followers of Ali developed their distinct religious attributes 
and formed a distinct society that we know now as the Shi’a. They developed their 
own variant of umma, combining their interpretation of Islamic holy texts, strong 
sense of loyalty to Ali and his family and political motives (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 
372). According to Lapidus (2002, p. 95), the Shi’i society was concerned with 
two endeavours. First, since the Shi’a denied the legitimacy of Abu Bakr and 
Umar, they could no longer be considered as authoritative figures in Islamic 
religious narration. Thus, the Shi’a rejected the collection of hadith reported 
through them and instead developed their own traditions, which centred on Ali. 
This resulted in the codification of Najh al-Balagha (The Peak of Elegance) as the 
Shi’a source of religious belief. Their political position vis-à-vis the Sunni 
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caliphate drew them closer towards other political dissidents such as the 
Mu’tazilites, thus affecting the development of Shi’i theology in contrast to the 
Sunni one. 
Second, the Shi’i scholars also needed to defend the legitimacy of their 
Imams in the face of growing body of political theory supporting the Sunni 
caliphate. Instead of drawing from the will of the people or the consensus of the 
jurists, the Shi’a developed their concept of imamate by emphasising the divine 
nature of their Imams (Ahmed, 1962, p. 99). According to Ja’far al-Sadiq (d. 765 
CE), the sixth imam, the true ruler of the umma was chosen through nass 
(nomination or designation), the sacred will of each Imam which provided his 
successor with legitimacy to rule the umma and the authority to interpret the 
Qur’an and hadith. The Shi’a attributed the concept of nass to the hadith of 
Ghadir Khumm, which they believe was the nass from Muhammad to Ali as his 
successor (Berkey, 2003, p. 131). By the end of the ninth century, this concept had 
evolved into the infallibility and sinless nature, or ma’sum, of the imams (Lapidus, 
2002, p. 95). This provides another breaking point with the Sunnis.  
Contending interpretations: divisions within the Shi’a 
The Shi’a’s quest for unification under the imamate did not result in a 
united movement. Just like the Sunnis, which broke into several schools of 
thought, the Shi’a eventually also fragmented into several branches. The 
fundamental cause of fragmentation. which is relevant to this thesis, was the 
different interpretation over imamate succession. Momen (1985, pp. 46–59) 
identifies at least twenty-one sects in Shi’ism, some already extinct now. The most 
well known of them are three: the Zaydiyya, Isma’iliyya and Ithna Ashariyya. The 
Zaydiyya derived their name from their acceptance of Zayd, son of Ali, the fourth 
imam and grandson of Husayn, as the fifth Imam. The Isma’iliyya and Ithna 
Ashariyya both rejected Zayd and instead acknowledged his half brother, 
Muhammad al-Baqir, as the fifth Imam. After Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja’far al-
Sadiq as the fifth and sixth Imams respectively, a new schism arose on the 
question of who the seventh Imam was. The Isma’iliyya believed the seventh 
Imam was Isma’il, son of Imam Ja’far. However, since Isma’il passed away 
before his father, some Shi’a believed that Ismail’s imamate was annulled and the 
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imamate went to Ja’far’s next son, Musa. This last group developed into the Ithna 
Ashariyya or the Twelvers (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 95–98). 
There are points of differentiation between each branch. Zayd established 
the doctrine that the imamate belongs to any descendant of Ali and Fatima who is 
learned, pious and raises the sword to establish the imamate. He also established 
the doctrine of Imamat al-Mafdul that opened the possibility for a man with lesser 
quality to become the imam during the lifetime of a man of greater excellence. 
Using this doctrine, Zayd considered the rule of Abu Bakr and Umar as expedient 
since they ruled in the lifetime of Ali. Thus, the men were not considered as sinful 
for rejecting Ali’s leadership (Momen, 1985, pp. 49–50). Since Zaydis required an 
imam to raise the sword, they rejected the concept of Hidden Imam and the return 
of the Mahdi. According to Zaydis, the imams were neither ma’sum nor capable 
of working miracles, yet another point of difference with the other branches of 
Shi’ism (Halm, 1991, pp. 206–207). The Zaydis managed to establish two 
imamates. The first was in Tabaristan, south of the Caspian Sea in 864 CE, but the 
imamate fell in 928 CE against the Samanids of Bukhara. The second imamate 
was established in Yemen in 893 CE and, despite attacks and occupations by the 
Fatimids and the Ottomans, managed to survive until the republican revolt in 
Yemen in 1962. 
As briefly noted above, the Isma’iliyya, also known as the “Seveners”, 
branched out on the question of who was the next imam after Imam Ja’far al-
Sadiq. They believed that since Imam Ja’far had designated his son, Ismail, as his 
successor, the imamate fell to Ismail. After Ismail’s death, his son Muhammad 
would be the next Imam. There are several unique doctrines the Isma’iliyya put 
forward. First, they adjudged a special role for Ali and started the imamate from 
Hasan. Thus, Imam Ja’far was their fifth Imam, unlike the other branches who 
considered Ja’far as the sixth Imam. Ismail was their sixth Imam and his son, 
Muhammad, was the seventh Imam (Halm, 1991, p. 162). Second, the Isma’iliyya 
believed that the Qur’an revealed two truths: the zahir or external, literal truth and 
the batin or internal, esoteric truth. In order to gain complete knowledge, one 
requires the guidance of the Imam who exemplifies both kinds of knowledge. 
Third, they combined active political activism and messianism, preaching equality 
and justice and the coming of the Mahdi (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 97–98). The Fatimid 
dynasty was one branch of Isma’iliyya Shi’a established by the fourth Great 
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Master of the sect. Unlike the previous leaders, he claimed himself as the Mahdi 
and adopted Caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi as his title in 910 CE. The Fatimids ruled 
Egypt for four generations and were in fierce competition against the Abbasid 
caliphate in Baghdad (Halm, 1991, pp. 170–177). 
The Ithna Ashariyya were the followers of Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq. After the 
death of Imam Ja’far’s apparent successor, Ismail, this group believed that the 
imamate devolved back to Imam Ja’far. Thus, after his death in 765 CE, the main 
body of Shi’a recognised his third son, Musa al-Kazim, as the seventh Imam. 
During the time of Imam Musa, the relations between the followers of Ali and the 
Abbasids soured, to the point that the Abbasid caliphs brought the Imams to their 
courts, put them under heavy surveillance and, according to Shi’a sources, 
poisoned them (Halm, 1991, p. 31). From the eighth Imam to the eleventh Imam, 
they died relatively at a young age and under the custody of the Abbasid caliphs. 
The eleventh Imam, al-Hasan al-‘Askari, died at the age of twenty-eight or 
twenty-nine, in 874 CE. He left no son, thus creating a succession crisis and 
plunging the Shi’a into chaos. The prevalent tradition was that Imam al-Hasan had 
a young son, Muhammad, who had been hidden from the Caliph by his father out 
of caution (taqiyya). As the tradition grew, the Shi’a were waiting for the twelfth 
Imam to come, thus their moniker as “the Twelvers” (Halm, 1991, p. 35). 
Since the Imams’ movements and interactions were severely restricted by 
the caliphs, Shi’i scholars had to do without them. Eventually, the Ithna Ashariyya 
developed a distinct judicial system independent of the Imams but theoretically 
subservient to their authority. They also constructed a theological system based on 
a Hidden Imam and the prerogative of the scholars to interpret the Imam’s will 
during his absence. They also needed to develop a distinct body of knowledge, 
independent from that of the Sunnis, to serve as the foundation of their theological 
system and imamate. The Shi’a then began the compilation of religious narrations 
in which Ali was the central authority. These texts were compiled, as we have 
seen above, into Nahj al-Balagha in the tenth century (Lapidus, 2002, p. 95). In 
the decades after the death of Imam al-Hasan al-‘Askari, the Shi’i scholar al-
Kulayni (d. 941 CE) compiled Kitab al-Kafi (The Sufficient Book) which plays a 
central part in Shi’a jurisprudence just like the compilations of al-Bukhari and 
Muslim in Sunni jurisdiction (Berkey, 2003, pp. 134–135).  
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The arrival of the Buyid dynasty in Baghdad provided the Ithna Ashariyya 
the chance to further develop their religious society. The Buyids provided political 
protection to Shi’a followers. They also developed distinct characteristics that 
would define the Ithna Ashariyya from the rest of the Muslims, especially the 
Sunnis. The first characteristic is the commemoration of the religious festivals of 
Ghadir Khumm on 18 Dhul Hijja and the mourning of Husayn’s murder on 10 
Muharram. The second characteristic was the veneration of tombs of the family of 
Ali and the development of pilgrimages to these tombs. The third was the public 
denigration (tabarra’) of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman as they were considered as 
usurpers, taking away the seat of leadership from Ali (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 225–
226).  
This distinct Ithna Ashari communal identity provoked a negative reaction 
from non-Shi’a Muslims in Baghdad. To counter the Ghadir Khumm festival, they 
developed their own festivals such as the Feast of the Cave. This festival was held 
eight days after the Ghadir Khumm and it commemorated the journey of the 
Prophet and Abu Bakr on their hijra and how they sought refuge in a cave. This 
feast emphasised Abu Bakr’s close relationship to Muhammad (Kennedy, 2004, p. 
229). The sectarian rivalry soon broke into physical conflicts. According to 
Kennedy (2004, p. 227), before 952 CE, there was no evidence of sectarian 
conflicts in Baghdad or the public denunciation of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. 
But by 972 CE, the walls of Baghdad were full of slogans denouncing the three 
caliphs. The city itself was rife with sectarian conflicts and was divided into 
fortified quarters, each for a sectarian group. The caliphs were powerless to stop 
the conflicts since they did not possess any actual might. Only after the Seljuks 
emerged as a strong contender to the Buyids’ power did the Caliphs start to assert 
their authority as the symbol of Sunnis, including by commissioning al-Mawardi 
to write his Ordinances, as described in the previous section. 
Reflection on the conceptual development of the umma 
By examining the works of Muslim scholars, we may gain insight into the 
conceptual development of the umma and also the development of the concept of 
the caliphate as the instrument of authority in the umma. The concept of umma 
was first externalised by Muhammad when he articulated a specific meaning for 
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the word “umma”. In the Qur’anic term, the word umma refers to a body of people 
who are objects of the divine plan of salvation (Denny, 1975). While at first the 
word referred to no particular group of people, eventually its meaning shifted to 
refer specifically to the Muslim society under the leadership of Muhammad. Later, 
the word gained a comprehensive perspective by the verse “kuntum khayra 
ummatin ukhrijat linnaasi…” (‘You are the best nation 12  produced [as an 
example] for mankind’) which put Muslim society into a wider context, both 
geographically and chronologically. 
The usage of umma in Islamic terminology eventually initiated the 
development of a global consciousness in the minds of early Muslims. The Qur’an 
provided them with a vision of a universal, interconnected society blessed by God. 
By joining with this society, a Muslim would achieve salvation and, at the same 
time, become rahmatan lil ‘alamin, a blessing to the world. Yet, the actual umma 
at that time was no more than the Arab people with Medina as their centre. To 
bring the conceptual umma into fruition, they needed the support of social 
organisation, in line with the theory articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966, 
pp. 134–136). In early Islamic history, social organisation supporting the umma 
was embodied in the form of the caliphate. Thus, the development of the caliphate, 
on both conceptual and practical levels, was important to the endeavours to 
establish the idea of a global umma. 
As time goes by, despite various political circumstances, the caliphate 
thrived and became a “fact of life”, normalised as the embodiment of authority 
over the umma post-Muhammad. Yet, while the presence of the caliphate was an 
accepted and unquestionable social truth in Muslim society, it lacked the 
theoretical support which legitimated its presence. Threats from various groups 
within the umma, which espoused alternative interpretations of the concept, 
triggered scholarly endeavours to conceptualise the caliphate as the rightful 
embodiment of authority over the umma. Thus, al-Mawardi’s book was published 
both as an argument to defend the caliphate and as a theoretical foundation for its 
past and future practices. Indeed, the lack of such theoretical explanations of the 
caliphate in the previous era made al-Mawardi’s book one of the most 
                                               
12
 Sahih International translates umma as ‘nation’ – a common translation in the modern period. As 
we discuss throughout this thesis, however, umma has pre-national connotations as the idea of a 
broad, translocal Muslim society. 
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authoritative texts on Islamic statecraft. Later scholarly works built upon or 
proposed different ideas than al-Mawardi’s, reflecting the nature of the caliphate 
as a socially constructed concept, not a divine one.  
After the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad in the thirteenth 
century, scholarly works on Islamic authority shifted again to reflect the changed 
condition of the umma. While the caliphate had long lost its actual political power 
before the fall of Baghdad, it had been a powerful symbol which embodied the 
concept of the umma. Its destruction necessitated the development of new 
perspectives on Islamic authority. Ibn Khaldun, with his theory of asabiyya, 
managed to de-sacralise the caliphate and presented the dynamic nature of the 
caliphate as a sociological phenomenon. While Ibn Khaldun’s conceptual work 
seems to legitimate fragmentation in the Muslim world, it actually promotes the 
idea that authority over the umma is universal; whoever manages to gather and 
command asabiyya will rule over Muslims. This concept eventually provided 
strong legitimation to the Ottomans during their campaigns to establish their 
authority over the Muslim world. Despite their non-Arab origin, despite 
possessing no link to the Prophet and his family, the Ottomans’ rule was deemed 
to be valid on the grounds that they possessed the strongest asabiyya in the 
Muslim world. 
The development of strong alternative concepts of the umma, such as the 
Shi’a’s, could of course be seen as diminishing the conceptual unity of Muslims. 
Not only did they protest against particulars policies, but they also provided a 
comprehensive alternative perspective on the social history of Muslims. Instead of 
looking at the period of the first four caliphs as the ideal period, as the “official” 
Sunni interpretation does, the Shi’a considered it as a bleak period full of 
treachery. By putting emphasis on the event of Ghadir Khumm, the Shi’a 
completely rejected the Sunnis’ interpretation of history and any type of 
legitimacy that was constructed based on that interpretation. Beyond just rejecting 
the political legitimacy of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, the Shi’a also rejected 
their religious authority which was central to the Sunni tradition. They then 
developed distinct religious doctrines and festivals to support their interpretation 
of the umma and the imama. This put Sunnis and Shi’a into two mutually 
exclusive camps, each with their own interpretation of the umma and its social 
instrument.   
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Despite the split, this appears to be a good case of how mythology and 
theology have been used, in each case, to support and defend an interpretation of a 
symbolic universe (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 127). Indeed, the schism does 
not dissolve the concept of the umma as a common symbolic universe among 
Muslims. On the contrary, the schism provides evidence that the concept of umma 
is central to the Muslims’ worldview to the point that even contending ideas are 
still centred on their authority over the umma. Regardless of their position on the 
debate over the caliphate, either Sunni or Shi’a, supporting or disregarding the 
Umayyads, the Abbasids or the Ottomans, the different norm entepreneurs used 
what they regarded as an ‘Islamic’ framework as the foundation of their works. As 
Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 124–138) have explained, the presence of 
different interpretations over a symbolic universe, “the deviants”, is inevitable, 
and the interpretation that can gather the most support will become the next 
“official” one. In this perspective, the Sunnis and Shi’a are two social groups 
bearing different interpretations of the idea of the umma. Each consider 
themselves as the embodiment of the “official” narrative of the umma and 
consider the other as a “heretical” group for espousing a “deviant” narrative. Both, 
however, claim authority over the whole umma and seek legitimacy for their claim 
by providing different interpretations of Muslim historical accounts. Although the 
accounts differ as to the meaning of particular events, they relate to a cultural and 
social field understood as ‘Muslim’. In a backhanded sort of way, their 
competition for the leadership over the umma and invocation of a common, 
though disputed, history, is evidence of the trans-sectarian importance of the 
umma idea. 
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Chapter Five: 
The Integration of the Umma under the Caliphates 
 
 
As society is the product of humans’ consciousness, the idea of a particular 
form of society requires the presence of humans and their activities to define and 
embody the concept. To understand the state of a symbolic universe or its change, 
one must observe the social organisation in which the processes of defining and 
embodying are happening (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 134). In the case of the 
umma, the social organisation where we can observe these processes of defining 
and embodying is the caliphate. The previous chapter has discussed the defining 
process on the umma through observing the Muslim scholars’ work on the 
question of authority. In this chapter, I will discuss the embodying process of the 
umma, particularly in how the historical caliphates fomented commonality and 
integration in practical, day to day, activities in their territories. 
Before moving forward with observing the umma under the caliphate, I 
must address one important issue with the regard to the caliphate: internal conflict. 
It is true that Muslim history has never been free from contestation over authority. 
At times, there was more than one caliphate or more than one power within the 
Islamic world which claimed to be the caliphate and tried to establish their rule 
over the whole Muslim world. There were also dissident movements, big and 
small. These might be perceived as evidence of an absent unity in the Muslim 
world, thus standing in opposition to the idea of the umma. Looking back at the 
theoretical framework provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966), however, it is 
not necessarily so. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) state that, in interpreting the symbolic 
universe, social actors might come with different interpretations, especially in 
later generations which do not experience the initial founding of the universe. The 
tensions between these different interpretations will become more pronounced 
when the “deviant” version is shared and objectivated in a strong social group 
within the current society, thus challenging the “official” interpretation of the said 
symbolic universe. In order to maintain unity, the “official” interpretation will 
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perform either therapy or nihilation on the deviants. Therapy is done to “cure” the 
wayward from their deviations and bring them back to the “official” interpretation 
of the symbolic universe. In order to perform therapy, the society will develop a 
therapeutical body of knowledge which diagnoses the source of conceptual 
deviation and determines the curative process required to rehabilitate the deviants. 
Nihilation, by way of contrast, is a process which deny and liquidate everything 
outside the “official” interpretation of a symbolic universe (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, pp. 130–132).   
Scholars are important since they are not only the producers of knowledge 
which constitute and legitimate the symbolic universe, but also producers of 
knowledge necessary to perform therapy and nihilation. It is through scholarly 
works that a symbolic universe exists and defends itself from the “deviant” reality 
espoused by the heresy –or for the “deviant” to defeat the “official” narrative. But 
in order to defeat the offending narrative completely, a symbolic universe also 
requires social groups to perform practical measures against the advocates of the 
opposing narrative. It is through these social groups that the symbolic universe 
becomes embodied and established as the “natural” condition to be embraced by 
all. While scholars debate how to defend their interpretation of a symbolic 
universe against the opposing narrative, the social groups put the theory into 
practice and battle to eliminate the practices of the opposing theory (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, pp. 136–138). 
Berger’s and Luckmann’s depiction of tensions and conflict within a 
symbolic universe provides a useful theoretical reflection on the development of 
the umma. As a symbolic universe, the concept of the umma was perceived by 
Muslims as the social practice divinely sanctioned by God through the holy texts. 
Scholars expounded upon this and built a theoretical framework of the umma as 
the natural order of society. However, the concept of umma then required social 
groups as the embodiment of the concept. While Muhammad had laid the 
foundation of the umma through the Constitution of Medina and by propaganda 
and diplomacy (Kennedy, 2004, p. 45; Robinson, 2009, pp. 188–189), his work 
was far from complete. After Muhammad’s death in 632 CE, the perceived divine 
concept of the umma then found agency in the form of tribesmen campaigning 
under the banner of the Caliphates (Robinson, 2009, pp. 192–193). Thus, the 
 153 
Caliphates emerged as the social institution necessary for the implementation of 
the concept of the umma. 
Contestation over the caliphate inevitably arose since some groups started 
to develop their own interpretation of the umma. This was started not long after 
the death of Muhammad, during the First Civil War (656-661 CE) with Ali and 
Mu’awiya each having different interpretations of the leadership over the umma. 
With the split of the Khawarij from Ali’s army, this turned the conflict into a 
three-pronged war. At the practical level, the contestation often left the umma 
fragmented based on the dynamics of political power. At the conceptual level, 
however, this contestation reinforced the importance of the caliphate and the 
integrity of the umma. Thus, the umma continued to be pivotal to the Muslims’ 
sense of self identity despite the various political conflicts and upheavals. 
Moreover, while the fragmentation might have limited the political integrity of the 
umma, it did not restrain Muslims from upholding the social-cultural integrity of 
the umma. This could be seen in the increasing level of integration of various 
Muslim locales into what we might deem as one umma, indicated by the 
increasingly complex interactions between the various locales as described in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
Integration under the Khulafa al-Rashidun 
 
Map 1. Integration of Islamic World (622-750 CE) 
Source: Kishlansky et al. (2008, p. 203) 
The Khulafa al-Rashidun provided the foundation for the emergence of an 
integrated umma. Each of the caliphs, perhaps inadvertently, contributed to the 
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establishment of commonality among the Muslims, which then developed into a 
sense of community. Abu Bakr (r. 632-634) managed to defend the orthodox 
interpretation of the faith from various “divergent” others, embodied in the false 
prophets and prophetesses, as explained in Chapter Three. He also managed to 
maintain the political unity of the fledging caliphate and secured Hijaz as the base 
of the caliphate. Without Abu Bakr’s insistence during the Wars of Ridda, the 
government in Medina would not have enjoyed its unchallenged authority and 
there would have been no foundation for the coming Muslim expansion (Kennedy, 
2004, pp. 52–57). Abu Bakr’s campaign against the separatists could be seen as a 
combination between therapeutic efforts to bring the separatists back to Islam and 
nihilation to completely destroy the apostles. 
Umar (r. 634-644) expanded on what Abu Bakr had secured. He added to 
the caliphate various territories that were under the Byzantine and the Sasanid 
empires. But not only expanding the territories, Umar also played an important 
part in the integration of these territories into the umma. First, Umar provided 
amnesty to the tribes that had rebelled during the Wars of Ridda and incorporated 
them into the umma. These tribes then gained their popularity by contributing in 
various expeditions in the Fertile Crescent (Berkey, 2003, p. 71). Second, Umar 
made Islamic values and rituals as the fundamental characteristic of the umma. He 
was well known for sending teachers to various towns to teach the people the 
Qur’an. Being a strict disciplinarian, he also expected his governors and soldiers 
to act in a disciplined manner, such as demanding that every soldier perform the 
minimum prayer ritual. He also adopted the hijri calendar based on the year when 
Muhammad performed his hijra, providing the umma with a common 
chronological framework (Hodgson, 1974a, pp. 210–211). 
Uthman’s reign (644-656 CE) is often identified as the beginning of 
tribulations that plagued the umma. It is often argued that Uthman favoured the 
Quraysh aristocracy above others, a contrasting policy to Umar’s, which 
distributed favour according to a person’s closeness to Muhammad (Hodgson, 
1974a, p. 212; Lapidus, 2002, p. 46). It is important to note, however, that the first 
half of Uthman’s reign was deemed successful (Kennedy, 2004, p. 72). He 
oversaw expeditions to Nubia and North Africa. He also expanded the Muslims’ 
naval presence in the Mediterranean under the control of the governors of Egypt 
and Syria. At 655 CE, the Muslim naval force won a decisive victory over the 
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Byzantines at the Battle of the Masts. He also completed the subjugation of the 
Sasanid empire (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 69–72). Nevertheless, the most important 
legacy of Uthman to the integration process of the umma was not territorial 
conquest. It was the codification and standardisation of the Qur’an (Hodgson, 
1974a, p. 213). 
Sunni Islamic sources highly praised Uthman’s codification and 
standardisation of the Qur’an. Ibn Kathir (2004, pp. 349–352) considers the 
standardisation as the greatest service from Uthman to the umma. Azami (2003, 
pp. 87–97) provides an elaborate discussion of the event. From Azami’s 
elaboration, there are several factors that drove Uthman to perform the 
standardisation. First, the death of many Companions who had memorised the 
Qur’an. Second, it was a symbolic act to signify the unification of the umma. 
Third, it was a natural response to the plurality of the Muslim society at that time, 
when many converts unfamiliar with the Qur’an and Arabic grammar, and having 
learned the Qur’an from different teachers with different dialects, were often in 
disagreement about the correct way to read the Qur’an. 
There was a considerable debate on Uthman’s decision to standarise the 
Qur’an. Hodgson (1974a, p. 213) recounts the resentment expressed by some 
Qur’an reciters, especially by Ibn Mas’ud. Donner (2010, pp. 153–155) further 
describes how the resentment arose perhaps not over the standarisation process 
itself, which some traditions described as involving a team of Companions led by 
Zaid ibn Thabit to collect and compare all copies of Qur’an manuscripts and also 
ask verification from the reciters. Rather, the resentment may have arisen over 
Uthman’s decision to send the standard version of the Qur’an to various cities and 
order other manuscripts to be destroyed. Resentment over this policy would have 
added to disagreements over political and administrative issues, resulting in higher 
discontent at  Uthman’s leadership. It might be not purely coincidental that one of 
the Companions who refused to destroy his copy was Ibn Mas’ud, who resided in 
Kufa, and that one of the centres of the anti-Uthman movement was also in Kufa. 
Nevertheless, despite controversies, Uthman’s decision to standardise the Qur’an 
provided the Muslim society with an important symbol of unity. 
During Ali’s rule (656-661 CE), the political unity of the umma had been 
shattered. The Battle of Camel, the Battle of Siffin and the emergence of the 
Khawarij were the most important events that are considered as the first great fitna 
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or revolt in the history of Muslims. These events, however, did not undermine the 
social integration of the umma. It was under Ali’s patronage that the study of 
Arabic grammar was initiated. One of the leading Arabic grammarians, Abu al-
Aswad al-Du’ali, was Ali’s disciple. This helped the integration of non-Arabs into 
the umma, both by learning the Arabic language while keeping their faith or by 
learning the Qur’an and becoming a Muslim (Momen, 1985, p. 25). Ali also 
moved the capital from Medina to Kufa, a step which unwittingly provided the 
inspiration for various caliphs to move their centre of power to the best location. 
This increased the dynamics of Muslim politics and the fluidity of the caliphate 
also encouraged mobility among Muslims (Donner, 2010, p. 191). 
While each of the Rightly Guided Caliphs ruled in a comparatively short 
period, they provided a strong foundation for the Islamic society to thrive in later 
years. The greatest question after Muhammad’s death was whether the Islamic 
society should survive after him or not (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 197). Yet, despite 
constant opposition from various actors, the Rightly Guided Caliphs managed to 
maintain the unity of the umma. Abu Bakr managed to subjugate various tribes 
and deviant religious movements, cementing the unity of the umma. Umar built 
upon the foundation left by Abu Bakr, adopting an inclusionist policy which 
reintegrated defeated tribes into the umma and directing the attention of various 
factions towards external enemies (Berkey, 2003, p. 71). Uthman standarised the 
Qur’an, providing the umma with a uniform holy text, which was important in 
enforcing the unity of the umma, both by providing the ‘mythological’ text 
necessary for unity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 129) and also for instilling 
mood and motivation in the believers (Geertz, 1973, pp. 96–98). Ali took the 
integration process further by providing patronage for the development of the 
Arabic language, providing the lingua franca for the umma. All of these played an 
important part in the formation of the umma, upon which the later leaders built 
their achievements. 
Integration under the Umayyads 
The next leader of the umma after the Rightly Guided Caliphs was 
Mu’awiyya. He was a highly controversial figure in the history of Muslims. 
Historians often paint him as a power-hungry figure who used Uthman’s death for 
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his own benefit (Crone, 1980, p. 30). However, some disagree and portray him in 
a more positive light (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 76–77; Humphreys, 2006). Regardless 
of the controversy surrounding the figure, what Mu’awiya did for the unity of the 
umma was indispensable. Mu’awiya established a greater sense of communal 
integration and he ruled with general common interests as his priority (Hodgson, 
1974a, pp. 217–218). He also developed the caliphate into a mature political 
institution, with features resembling a state such as standing army, solid 
bureaucracy and network of tax collectors (Donner, 2010, pp. 171–172). Yet, it 
must be acknowledged that he is also considered responsible and criticised for 
changing the nature of the caliphate into kingship with designation succession 
(Maududi, 2007, pp. 204–211). 
The caliphate of the Umayyads, a legacy of Mu’awiya, was the only 
caliphate in the history of Muslims that ruled and commanded all areas of the 
then-known Muslim world. At the height of their power, the Umayyad’s territory 
spanned from al Andalus in the west to Persia in the east.  Thus, their achievement 
in building authority and acquiring legitimacy to rule over a vast territory with 
various people as their subjects is something that cannot be underestimated. More 
so when we take into account that there were rebellions against the Umayyads’ 
rule, such as Abdullah ibn Zubayr’s in Hijaz, the Khawarij rebellions and various 
rebellions by the sympathisers of Ali. These rebellions were taxing to the 
Umayyads. Some, such as Abdullah ibn Zubayr’s, directly threatened their  rule to 
the point that the Muslim scholar al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 215–219) affirmed his 
caliphate and included Ibn Zubayr as one of the entries in his book Tarikh al-
khulafa (History of the Caliphs). Nevertheless, the Umayyads managed to control 
and defeat these rebellions, and their rule prevailed until the Abbasids’ revolt in 
750 CE.  
There are contending opinions on how the Umayyads managed to maintain 
their authority despite resistance and rebellions. Wellhausen (1927) argues that the 
Umayyads’ source of authority was their ethnicity and that they relied on tribal 
affiliations in order to build a strong ruling elite. Further in his argument, 
Wellhausen considers that the Umayyads were not keen on Islam. Some of them 
even possessed hatred toward Muhammad and his teachings, thus allowing the 
tragedy of Karbala to occur (Wellhausen, 1927, pp. 157–158). Other scholars such 
as Lewis (2002b) and Rubin (2003) disagree with Wellhausen. Both Lewis and 
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Rubin describe that the Umayyads, without diminishing their pragmatic motives, 
understood the importance of Islam for their rule and thus sought legitimation in 
Islamic teaching and symbolisms. The founder of the Umayyads, Mu’awiya, 
exploited  religious fervour by waging wars with the Christian Byzantines, thus 
enabling himself as the Champion of Islam (Lewis, 2002b, pp. 65–66). Abdul 
Malik ibn Marwan (r. 685-705) was known to put heavy emphasis on the figure of 
Muhammad and this led to the cultivation of hadith, essential to the 
instutionalisation of Islam, as discussed in Chapter Three (Donner, 2010, pp. 205–
206). 
To further strengthen their claim, the Umayyads also used Islamic symbols 
and relics as part of their regalia. In order to gain legitimacy over their caliphate, 
the Umayyads claimed that they were the successor of Muhammad, who had been 
the successor of a chain of prophets before him. Thus, it was their duty, and 
privilege, to lead the Muslim society, just as Muhammad and other prophets 
before him had (Rubin, 2003, pp. 92, 95). Poets in the Umayyad court exulted the 
fact that the Umayyads possessed the relics of Muhammad –for example, his 
pulpit (mimbar), his staff and his signet ring (khatam)-- and considered these as 
the tokens of authority for the caliphate (Rubin, 2003, pp. 95–96).  
The Umayyads were also well known for their patronage of the 
development of various religious buildings that played an important part as the 
destinations of pilgrimages. The most notable of these buildings was the Dome of 
the Rock in Jerusalem (Donner, 1999, pp. 22–25). The Umayyads also sanctioned 
their dynastic practice by associating it with the history of the prophets, in which 
the divine mandate was often passed from father to son, such as from Abraham to 
his sons, or from David to Solomon (Rubin, 2003, pp. 98–99). This practice set 
the precedent for the instrumentalisation of Islamic piety by political actors to gain 
legitimacy and authority as a fundamental trait of politics in the Muslim world, as 
I have described in Chapter Two.  
The Umayyads’ success in establishing legitimate claim to the leadership 
of the whole Muslim society was followed by their success in establishing 
institutional machinery to support the growing empire. Mu’awiyya (r. 661-680) 
established various administrative offices, such as shahib al-shurta and shahib al-
haras, which oversaw the police force and guards respectively (Kennedy, 2001, p. 
13). Abdul Malik ibn Marwan (r. 685-705) made further reforms by adopting 
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Arabic language as the official language of the caliphate (Hawting, 2000, p. 63) 
and minting coins with Arabic engravings, making the caliphate relatively 
independent from Byzantine coins (Saliba, 2007, pp. 50–51). Umar ibn Abd al-
Aziz (r. 717-720 CE) was well-known for his many reforms, including a new tax 
policy and making unpaid labour illegal (Gibb, H. A. R., 1955; Murad, 1985; 
Hawting, 2000). These reforms helped the Umayyads to establish an effective 
administrative body to support their rule. In return, the uniform governmental 
apparatus, regulations and practices provided a framework for the establishment 
of a general sense of identity among Muslims. They were speaking the same 
Arabic language, using the same coins and were administered by the same 
bureaucracy. 
Under the Umayyads’ administration, the usually divisive societies of 
western Asia and the Mediterranean were transformed into an integrated society. 
Corn fleets from the Nile supplied cities of Hijaz, Damascus and Basra. The 
people, assured of some justice and order, were able to marshal their resource to 
conduct trade to faraway lands. Trans-continental trade routes, both the sea route 
through the Red Sea and the combined route across the Persian Gulf, Iraq and 
Syrian desert, were under one control, invigorating trans-continental trade. As 
early as the eighth century CE, Muslim merchants and traders underwent journeys 
to China and South Asia, and in later centuries, to Southeast Asia, not only 
opening trade routes but also spreading the message of Islam (Chaudhuri, 1985, p. 
44).  
The common sense of identity among Muslims was augmented by the 
Umayyads’ support for the establishment and development of an Islamic body of 
knowledge as well as their fierce opposition to “deviant” narratives, such as the 
Khawarij and the Shi’a. Muslim historians record how Abdul Malik ibn Marwan 
was considered as one of four most knowledgeable men in Medina (Suyuti, 1881, 
pp. 220–221) or how Umar ibn Abd Aziz was considered of the same quality as 
the four Khulafa al-Rashidun (Suyuti, 1881, p. 233). It was during the reign of the 
Umayyads that the Muslim territories expanded, up to the conquest of al-Andalus 
(Tabari, 1990b, p. 164). Despite their various shortcomings, the Umayyads were 
considered as the guardians of Islam, under whose rule Islamic knowledge and 
practices thrived and an Islamisation process unfolded ('Isy, 2007, pp. 423–425). 
Without a doubt, these Islamic attributes benefitted the Umayyads’ rule and, at the 
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same time, they also accelerated the possibility of integration for the majority in 
Muslim society.  
Integration under the Abbasids  
The Abbasid caliphate came to power in 750 CE, when their revolution 
succeeded in destroying the already weak Umayyad caliphate. They, however, did 
not share the Umayyads’ exclusive claim to the leadership of the Muslim society. 
Starting from 909 CE, the Abbasids had to share their claim to the leadership over 
the Muslim society with the Shi’a Fatimid caliphate in Egypt. Another contender 
rose in 929 CE, when Abdur Rahman III declared himself as the Caliph over his 
dominion in al-Andalus. Later, the actual control of the Abbasids also lessened as 
they relied more and more on the client tribes. That, however, did not lessen the 
impact of the Abbasid caliphate’s achievements and the effects of those 
achievements on the integration of the umma.  
The Abbasids started their rule by claiming authority over the umma by 
drawing on the general narrative that the umma would prosper under the 
leadership of the Holy Family of Muhammad. At that time, the Shi’a had not 
consolidated their conceptual and theological claims and there were many 
branches of Muhammad’s family who contensted authority over the umma 
(Kennedy, 2004, pp. 123–124). The Abbasids claimed to start the caliphate anew, 
purging it from the evil Umayyads that had corrupted the institution and ushering 
in a new age of Islam (El-Hibri, 1999, p. 3). In order to symbolise their break, the 
second Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur (r. 754-775) built the city of Baghdad as the 
new capital on the side of the Tigris, in Iraq. His action of building a new capital 
to signify the start of a new era was considered a precedent by many Islamic rulers 
after him (Donner, 1999, p. 25). The Abbasids brought with them courtiers from 
Khurasan and placed these Persians into high ranking positions in their 
administration. The administration worked effectively in controlling the vast 
territory thanks to the development of an effective postal and intelligence service. 
These services proved vital in providing the administration with accurate 
information, relaying news both from and to provinces and transporting money 
and vital persons (Bennison, 2009, p. 28).  
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The Abbasids also revolutionised the army. During the previous caliphates, 
the Muslim society had not developed a professional army. Their soldiers at first 
were religiously motivated conscripts from various tribes (Mikhail, 2008, p. 275). 
The Umayyads tried to build a more professional army from the Arab tribes of 
Syria who owed their allegiance to the Caliph through tribal alliances. The early 
Abbasid caliphs adopted the same system with the Umayyads, only they relied on 
the tribes of Khurasan to support their army (Donner, 1999, p. 28). Wanting an 
army that was more professional than before and without tribal attachment that 
could disrupt their loyalty toward the Caliph, al-Mu’tasim (r. 833-842 CE) 
decided to build a new army composed from Turkish slaves, called  mamluks 
(Kennedy, 2001, p. 121). The Turks brought with them new military skills, 
including the important skill of mounted archery (Kennedy, 2001, p. 123).  
This development increased the strength of the military which helped in 
defending the caliphate. From the point of social mobility, the military reform 
allowed people from non-Arab origins and even slaves to advance their career. 
This allowed non-Arab citizens to access the power structure, something that had 
never happened before. It, however, also gave tremendous power to non-Arab 
military officers, especially the Turks, and sparked jealousy among Arab officers. 
Conflicts between these groups finally led to political and financial crisis among 
the Abbasid elite. It began with the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in 861 CE by 
his own Turkish guards. Then, civil war erupted between al-Musta’in and al-
Mu’tazz and the siege of Baghdad by the army of Samarra in 865 CE. This fiasco 
drained the wealth from both cities and allowed other provinces to build their 
military force unchecked. This inevitably resulted in the weakening of the 
Caliph’s power (Kennedy, 2001, pp. 134–142). 
The stability that the Abbasids managed to attain during its Golden Age 
brought many benefits to the society. It opened various travel routes for 
mercantile purposes, religious pilgrimages or military conquests. Arabic had 
become the lingua franca of the caliphate, making social and economic 
interactions easy. These developments made possible the establishment of strong 
trade routes, which connected various trading routes into what Abu Lughod calls 
“one integral world-system” (Abu-Lughod, 1987, pp. 10–11). The territories that 
the Abbasids held during their zenith were vital to the trade routes that connected 
China in the east to the Byzantines in the west and various merchant cities in the 
 162 
Mediterranean region. Baghdad was positioned in the most lucrative trade route, 
making the city pivotal to economic activities and becoming one of the most 
important cities in the world (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 190). The Abbasids also 
controlled important ports and from there, established their rule over the Indian 
Ocean which connected the Indian sub-continent to the cities in the Persian Gulf 
and Africa. Even though the Abbasid caliphs’ power waned during the later 
centuries, the Abbasid caliphate still played a vital part in the world-system. Only 
after the Mongols’ invasion did the Abbasids’ trading influence begin to crumble  
(Abu-Lughod, 1989, pp. 193–197). 
The wealth that many had accumulated was then channelled into the 
development of science and knowledge. Those with a religious inclination funded 
the development of Qur’anic studies, prophetic studies or religious law and 
theology. During the Abbasid period, there were religious movements to collect 
and validate the hadith. Two prominent scholars in this movement were al-
Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875); both left their compilations of hadith as an 
invaluable legacy towards the development of Islamic scholarship in the 
subsequent periods (Bennison, 2009, p. 168). The availability of knowledge and 
learning centres and the ease of travelling in the Abbasid period made it possible 
for Muslims from all over the then-known world to perform rihla, travelling to 
seek knowledge from famous scholars, which in turn established stronger and 
more varied intellectual chains among Muslims scholars, as described in Chapter 
Three.  
Poetry became the soul of the culture and poets gained access to the most 
prestigious courts. One of the great Abbasid poets known to our contemporary 
world was Abu ‘Ali al-Hasan ibn Hani’ al-Hakami or better known by his 
nickname, Abu Nuwas (d. 814 CE). He was a very famous poet but also a scholar 
of hadith and fiqh (Kennedy, 2005, pp. 1–7). After moving to Baghdad, Abu 
Nuwas managed to gain patronage from al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi’, the chamberlain of 
the Caliph Harun al-Rashid. It was perhaps through al-Rabi’ that Abu Nuwas 
received the Caliph’s acknowledgement (Kennedy, 2005, pp. 9–11). Another 
well-known poet was ‘Umar Khayyam (d. 1131 CE), whose full name was 
apparently Ghiyath al-Din Abu Hafs ‘Umar b. Ibrahim al-Khayyami (Davidson, 
2004, p. 135). ‘Umar Khayyam was known for popularising the ruba’i or quatrain 
style of poetry. During his life, ‘Umar Khayyam had served many courts such as 
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the Qarakhanid court in Bukhara and the Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah’s. Less well 
known is Khayyam’s expertise in mathematics and astronomy. He was proficient 
in those sciences and was invited as the member of board tasked with reforming 
the Jalali calendar by Sultan Malik Shah (Struik, 1958). 
The Abbasid elite also sponsored various translation projects and the 
development of history, philosophy and statecraft (Saliba, 2007, pp. 76–77). 
While at first the translation projects were a private endeavour among the elites, 
during the reign of Caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 786-809), the Caliph expanded the 
translation project using funds from the caliphate’s treasury and established a 
dedicated library for this project (Goodman, 1990, pp. 481–482). His son, Caliph 
al-Ma’mun, was even more supportive of the project. He also tried to entice the 
service of Leo the mathematician, a famous Byzantine scholar and the head of the 
imperial university at Constantinople to no avail (Goodman, 1990, pp. 484–485). 
Not only transmitting the knowledge, Muslim scholars also contributed to the 
development of the knowledge which then eventually passed to European scholars. 
The translation project could be considered as one of the greatest legacies of the 
Abbasids to the contemporary world since by translating Greek books, and also 
Persian and Indian books, the Abbasids unwittingly acted as a vital link between 
the old civilisations and the new ones (Bennison, 2009, pp. 175–176).  
The Mongols’ invasion and razing of Baghdad in 1258 CE was considered 
as one of the greatest catastrophes in Muslim history. Not only did they loot the 
wealth of the city and its inhabitants, the Mongols destroyed the most prominent 
symbol of the umma after the Prophet: the caliphate. Even though the Mamluks 
later established al-Mustansir II (r. 1261) as the Abbasid caliph under their 
“protection” in Egypt, the caliphate had passed its Golden Age and became no 
more than a spiritual symbol for the Muslim society. The Caliph had no actual 
power at all; his presence was only to bestow legitimation to the Turkish sultans 
(van Steenbergen, 2006, pp. 14–15). Actual political power was then held by 
various sultans and amirs, who were busy contending with each other as well as 
with foreign enemies. Thus, while according to Hodgson (1974b, p. 12) the 
political idea that supported the caliphate as a centralised government had broken 
down from 945 CE, the fall of Baghdad in 1258 CE signified the absence of 
political unity in  Muslim society.  
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Nevertheless, despite lacking political unity, the translocal activities still 
prevailed. The intellectual chains that connected teachers to students and scholars 
to their fellows in various locales were still present. The Islamic judicial system 
developed and maintained by the scholars was also intact and provided some 
orderly structure to the society. It also enabled social mobility between various 
region since a well-respected judge from one area could easily move into another 
area or even enter the service of another sultan or amir (Berkey, 2003, pp. 185–
187). Moreover, when faced with external threat, such as from the Crusaders, the 
call to jihad transcended political borders. Saladin, for example, could mobilise 
the translocal Muslim society for the liberation of Jerusalem (Humphreys, 1977).  
Integration under the smaller caliphates: the Fatimids in Egypt, 
the Umayyads in al-Andalus and the Abbasids in Egypt 
Having to defend their claims to leadership of the Muslim society against 
the bigger and greater Abbasid Caliphate did not deter the Fatimids and the 
Umayyads from contributing to the integration of Muslim society. The Fatimids 
managed to establish a caliphate in 909 CE by taking advantage of the weakening 
of the Abbasids following the period of anarchy at Samarra (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 
313–314). The Fatimid Caliphate was the rival of the Abbasids since not only did 
it contest the claim to leadership over the Muslim umma, it also presented a 
different interpretation of the umma. Founded upon Ismaili Shi’ism, the Fatimids 
disregarded any Sunni religious legitimation that might be used to strengthen the 
Abbasids’ claim. Thus, the struggle between the Abbasids and the Fatimids was 
not merely a political struggle but also an ideological one, between two differing 
interpretations of the idea of the umma.  
The Ismaili da’wa movement established a complex learning system 
among the Fatimids, designed to create an elite class of da’i. To support the 
learning system, there was a wealth of literature produced by the Fatimids, much 
of it still in existence (Edde, 2010, pp. 234–235). The Fatimids also built a great 
institution as the centre of their intellectual activity: the al-Azhar. At first, the al-
Azhar was built as a grand mosque to commemorate the conquest of Egypt by the 
Fatimids. It then grew into a centre of religious learning and especially a centre of 
disseminating  Ismaili ideas to the general populace, who were still Sunnis (Dodge, 
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1961, pp. 10–13). While the Fatimids were to meet their demise at the hands of 
Saladin in 1171 CE, the al-Azhar was preserved by the Ayyubids even though it 
was no longer being used as a centre of learning (Dodge, 1961, p. 36). Al-Azhar’s 
role as a centre of learning was revived under the Mamluks but as a centre of 
Sunni scholarship, and it remains as such until the present age (Dodge, 1961, p. 
55). 
In contrast with the Fatimids, the Umayyads in al-Andalus did not 
champion an alternative interpretation of the umma. They were Sunni Muslims, 
just like the Abbasids. If there was any conflict between them, it was political, 
even though the political contestation was disguised with religious rhetoric. 
Before the declaration of the Umayyad caliphate of al-Andalus by Abdurrahman 
III in 929 CE, the Umayyad amirs of al-Andalus did not claim the title but also did 
not acknowledge the caliphate of the Abbasids, thus making the Muslims of al-
Andalus politically disconnected from the greater Muslim society (Fierro, 2005, p. 
54).  
It was unknown for how long he had considered taking the title but from 
the start of his reign as the Amir of al-Andalus in 912 CE, Abdurrahman had used 
religious rhetoric extensively, including by leading five expeditions of jihad 
against the infidels in the North (Kennedy, 1996, p. 84). The actual reason why he 
claimed the title is also uncertain. There are several assumptions about his motive, 
however. First, he saw the decline of Abbasid power as the opportunity to claim 
the caliphal title that his ancestors once wielded. At the time of his proclamation, 
the Abbasids was showing definite signs of weakness. It was ruled by the Caliph 
al-Muqtadir bi-llah who ascended the throne when he was still thirteen years old, 
and was even deposed twice during his reign by rival Abbasids. During this period, 
the Karmatis, a sect of the Ismailis, were able to plunder Mecca and steal the 
Black Stone of the Ka’ba, causing distress throughout the Muslim world including 
in al-Andalus and further weakening the authority of the Abbasids (Fierro, 2005, p. 
55).   
Second, the establishment of the Fatimid caliphate conjured up the old 
enmity between the Umayyads and the Alids. Furthermore, the Fatimids were 
expanding their territories into the Maghreb, which posed a serious threat to the 
Umayyads. If the Umayyads wanted to counter this expansion, they needed to be 
on the same level of authority with the Fatimids, thus requiring the title of caliph 
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(Kennedy, 1996, p. 90). After adopting the title of caliph, Abdurrahman III 
claimed his authority as the leader of the Sunni Muslims and  mobilised Muslims 
in al-Andalus and the Maghreb against the Fatimids (Safran, 2000, p. 12). The 
battle against the Fatimids also occurred on the monetary front. In order to stop 
the distribution of Fatimid coins, which one could see as a tool of economy and 
propaganda, Abdurrahman III ordered the minting of Umayyad coins with an 
engraving claiming him as “the servant of God Abdurrahman, Commander of the 
Faithful, who brings victory to the religion” (Fierro, 2005, p. 59).  
Third, Abdurrahman III’s declaration of caliphate was designed to help his 
efforts in uniting the various princes and governors in al-Andalus. Because the 
Amirate of al-Andalus was in a weak condition before his ascension, 
Abdurrahman needed every shred of authority that he could get to subjugate them. 
In order to further increase his legitimacy, he encouraged the adoption of the 
Maliki school of thought and through the Maliki scholars, he established a strong 
link with Medina and its scholars, and through them established links to the legacy 
of Muhammad (Fierro, 2005, pp. 134–135). He, and Umayyad caliphs after him, 
also funded the development of centres of learning to rival Baghdad and 
commissioned works of Andalusian scholars which promoted the Umayyads’ 
claim toward the caliphate (Safran, 2000, pp. 111–117). These learning centres 
and the works of various prominent scholars of al-Andalus, such as the 
astronomer al-Zarqali (d. 1087 CE) with his astrolabe invention or Abu al-Qasim 
al-Zahrawi (d. 1013 CE) whose works in the medical field were second only to 
Ibn Sina’s Qanun or the philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), became the celebrated 
legacy of al-Andalus. 
Another celebrated legacy of al-Andalus is its reputation as a centre of 
tolerance, which persists to our contemporary age. Intellectuals who have written 
on al-Andalus and its role as an exemplar of tolerance include Maria Rosa 
Menocal with her Ornament of the World (2002). In her book, Menocal describes 
the life in al-Andalus from several perspectives and shows how tolerance was 
achieved through the cooperation of all elements of the society. She also 
highlights the possibility of social mobility, as depicted in one of the figures she 
describes, Samuel ibn Naghrila, a Jew who fled from Cordoba after the fall of the 
caliphate in al-Andalus and gained a position as the wazir in Granada. According 
to Filios (2008), the history of Andalusia often invokes a sense of nostalgia and 
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longing for the lost paradise, especially for contemporary exiled intellectuals, such 
as Menocal herself.  
Some authors, such as Filios (2008) and Collins (2012), however, express 
their scepticism as to whether tolerance was truly practised in al-Andalus and 
criticise what they perceive as its romanticisation. While it is ill-advised to portray 
al-Andalus as a perfect society where tensions did not exist, it is also unwise to 
completely disregard the Andalusian achievement. This thesis thus proposes to 
consider al-Andalus as a living, progressing society, and while having complex 
interactions among its inhabitants, it managed to achieve a certain level of 
pluralism. Certainly, there were clashes between social groups, political intrigues 
and wars. However, despite all those tensions, there were tolerance and 
acceptance of groups with different social and religious backgrounds. Hillenbrand 
(1994), Brann (2002) and also Menocal (2002) provide detailed descriptions of 
how the various elements of Andalusian society interacted with each other, 
progressed cautiously and achieved a level of tolerance as the result of social 
interaction, which in turn opened up opportunities for social mobility to the 
general populace. 
The meaning of the Umayyad caliphate in al-Andalus for the construction 
of the umma is contentious. On one hand, it created another breach of unity in the 
Muslim society. Instead of one caliphate, there were three different caliphates 
vying for the leadership of the umma. Against the Fatimids, the Sunni scholars 
could vilify their existence as part of the “deviant” narrative of Shi’ism. But this 
kind of argument would not work against the Umayyads. Not only were the 
Umayyads Sunni, but they maintained a devout appearance, especially after 
establishing a link with Maliki scholars. But, on the other hand, the presence of a 
caliphate in the west made integration among Muslims in the West and North 
Africa easier. With the Umayyads’ protection, the western part of the Muslim 
world entered a Golden Age of prosperity and social mobility, which enticed 
people from other areas to seek their fortune there. Because of close relations with 
Medina, the travelling route between al-Andalus and Medina teemed with scholars, 
students and pilgrims. Thus, while the establishment of the Umayyad caliphate 
splintered political unity, it intensified translocal social interactions within the 
Muslim society. 
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Starting from 1255 CE, the Mamluks established a new Abbasid caliphate 
in Egypt under their protection by installing a member of the Abbasid family, al-
Mustansir, as the caliph. Because of hosting the puppet caliphate, they gained 
recognition from various territories as the defender of the faith, including the 
Sharif of Hijaz. Now, the Mamluks not only hosted the Caliph but also protected 
the two holy cities. Egypt under the Mamluks also played important part in 
maintaining the connections between various Muslim locales. To further their 
influence, the Mamluks became enthusiastic patrons of knowledge, sponsoring the 
establishment of mosques, madrasas and other centres of learning, including 
lodges for Sufi orders (Levanoni, 2010, pp. 239–240). Sufi orders were essential 
in the development of a unified moral code in the Islamic world, thus providing 
another set of connections and an instrument by which the Islamic global 
consciousness travelled to and objectivated in Muslim territories, as will be 
described in Chapter Six. 
Economic activities also benefitted from the Mamluks’ rule. They 
controlled trade over the Red Sea and from there enabled larger trade routes to 
India, Southeast Asia and China. Spices, sugar and textiles were the most lucrative 
commodities during this period (Abu-Lughod, 1989, pp. 212–236). The 
accumulated wealth also made the inhabitants of major cities in the caliphate more 
willing to spend their money to attain exotic luxuries from various parts of the 
world, stimulating a world-wide trade which would play a significant part in the 
spreading of Islam to various lands previously unreachable (Donner, 1999, pp. 
32–34). It was because of the quest for exotic luxuries that Muslim merchants 
travelled to Southeast Asia, arrived in Indonesia and introduced Islam to the 
inhabitants of the archipelago, as was discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Integration under the Ottomans 
 
Map 2. Integration under the Ottomans (1512-1683 CE) 
Source: The Ottoman Empire, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t253/e12/images/0195334012.ottoman-empire-
the.2.jpg 
  
 
After the destruction of Baghdad and the re-establishment of the Abbasid 
caliphate in Egypt under the protection of the Mamluks, the caliphate was no more 
than a shadow of its former self. The new age of the caliphate began when 
Suleyman I took the title in 1540; it remained in the Ottomans’ hand until the 
abolition of the caliphate in 1924. During the Ottoman caliphate, the Caliph 
possessed great political power and made the caliphate a strong institution. 
Controlling the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, the Ottomans 
gained high prestige and were considered as the most powerful Muslim dynasty of 
their time. The Ottomans also managed to expel the Safavids from south-eastern 
and eastern Anatolia, controlling the western Mediterranean through Tunis and 
Algiers and conquering all territories of the Mamluks under the leadership of 
Selim I.  
By the end of his rule in 1520, Selim I had doubled the size of the 
Ottomans and provided a solid foundation for his son, Suleyman I, to rule. After 
he ascended the throne, Suleyman (r. 1520-1566) added Belgrade, parts of the 
Kingdom of Hungary and other territories in Central Europe to the empire. In 
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1535 , the Ottomans took Baghdad from the Savafids and gained access to the 
Persian Gulf, increasing their presence in the sea (Imber, 2002, pp. 44–66). 
Suleyman I adopted the title of Caliph in order to gain higher authority over the 
Muslim world and to counter Charles V’s election as Holy Roman Emperor in 
1519 (Imber, 2010, p. 350). 
The Ottomans, understanding that they had no blood ties or shared history 
with the Prophet unlike the Umayyads or the Abbasids, adopted a peculiar 
instrumentalisation of Islamic piety to enforce their legitimacy as the ruler of the 
Muslim world. They became patrons of Islamic learning and scholarship, and also 
adopted various Islamic symbols and rituals. Selim I adopted the title of “Servant 
of the Two Holy Cities” after his victory over the Mamluks in 1517, signifying his 
protection over Mecca and Medina and, consequently, affirming the allegiance of 
the two holy cities to his rule (Veinstein, 2010, p. 349). Selim II, who ascended to 
the caliphal throne in 1566, added a ritual to his inaugural ceremony by making 
pilgrimage to Eyüp, a suburb of Istanbul where allegedly lies the tomb of Abu 
Ayyub, a Companion of the Prophet who fell during the first Muslim siege of 
Constantinople. This pilgrimage became an essential part of the inauguration 
ceremony of Ottoman caliphs (Imber, 2002, pp. 116–117). 
To establish their reputation in the minds of the Muslim population, the 
Ottomans were keen in protecting and providing for Muslims doing their hajj. 
Ottoman sultans, and then caliphs, took great care in assuring the safety of the 
pilgrims by building forts and strengthening garrisons between Damascus and the 
Holy Cities. They also asserted physical presence in the Holy Cities using 
inscriptions of their names in the holy places, reminding the pilgrims of their role 
as the caliph and guardian of the two holy lands. They even tried to monopolise 
the provisioning for the local population in Mecca in order to gain their loyalty. 
This was important considering that the Ottomans were never able to directly 
conquer Arabia (Quataert, 2000, p. 95). Along with the adoption of Islamic 
symbols in their political rituals to enhance their legitimation in the eyes of the 
wider Muslim populations, the Ottomans also regulated taxes, established codes of 
law and a judicial system. These reinforced the subjects’ sense of belonging to the 
same universe (Quataert, 2000, p. 32).  
Developments in technology and infrastructure under the Ottoman rule 
further helped the integration of the umma. Under the sailing technologies 
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employed by Ottoman ships, the journey from Istanbul to Venice could take 
fifteen days. From Alexandria to Venice, the journey would be longer, between 
seventeen to eighty days, depending on the winds. This allowed faster and easier 
mobility between various places, helping Muslim traders, pilgrims and other 
travellers (Quataert, 2000, pp. 117–118). While they did not directly control the 
whole Muslim world, the Ottomans took their leadership over the Muslim world 
seriously. In their rivalry against European powers, the Ottomans expanded their 
diplomatic missions and trade envoys to all corners of the then-known Muslim 
lands. They also formed military alliances with various Muslim sultanates such as 
Gujarat in India and Aceh in Indonesia to halt the Portuguese expansion in these 
territories (Cizakca, 2010, pp. 243–244). Suleyman Pasha, the Ottoman governor 
of Egypt, was said to sign a military pact with Sultan Alaaddin of Aceh and 
Turkish soldiers were observed helping the Acehnese during their battle against 
the Portuguese in Malacca in 1547 (Reid, 1969, pp. 401–402).  
The Ottomans also established a military academy in the Sultanate of Aceh, 
to help the Acehnese in fighting future enemies. From this academy, a brave 
heroine emerged and became a celebrated figure in Indonesian history. Keumala 
Hayati, further recognised with her shortened name, Malahayati was a daughter of 
Acehnese Admiral Mahmud Syah. She graduated from the askari bayt al-
muqaddas that the Ottomans had built and served at first as the Sultanate’s Chief 
of Protocol but then became an admiral of the Sultanate of Aceh (Salam, 1995). 
She led the Sultanate’s navy and managed to stop the Portuguese fleet from 
invading Aceh. She also managed to confront the Dutch fleet under the brothers 
Houtman when their fleet harassed Acehnese merchants and ships in the Strait of 
Malacca in 1599. When Prince Maurits sent his envoy to Aceh, it was Malahayati 
who acted as the chief negotiator for the Sultanate. Malahayati also acted as the 
chief negotiator when the envoys of Elizabeth I arrived in Aceh to negotiate safe 
passage and trading access to the Sultanate’s ports (Sofyan et al., 1994). 
The Ottomans’ ambitious relations with various Muslim territories were 
doubtless pragmatic in nature. At the very least, these relationships were intended 
to protect the interests of the Ottoman empire from its rival empires which started 
to establish their foothold in Asia and Africa. At the same time, however, they 
also showed a certain degree of Islamic solidarity and could be perceived as 
providing valuable assistance. Malahayati was only one among various heroes and 
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heroines in the history of Aceh that had close relations with the Ottomans. In the 
process, a sense of linkage between the Acehnese and the Turks developed, thus 
helping the establishment of a translocal identity between the two territories. In 
the case of the Acehnese, Ottoman help saved the Sultanate and, even more, gave 
birth to many celebrated heroes who fought against imperialist forces, Malahayati 
being just one of them. This close relationship between the Ottomans and the 
Acehnese has become an integral part of Indonesia’s national memory today.  
The Caliphates as an instrument of the umma 
Khadduri (1955, p. 3) observes that Muslims embraced the societal nature 
of mankind unquestioningly. This philosophical position is based on Islamic 
teachings that state God is One and that men are created to live together. There 
were also the harsh conditions of the desert of Arabia which necessitated the 
presence of society to ensure the survival of individuals. The combination of 
Islamic teachings and the Arabian Desert environment provided the Muslims in 
Medina with religious, philosophical and practical justifications to embrace the 
umma, not only as an idealised concept but also as a fledging social practice. The 
figure of authority in the umma was Muhammad, both in his role as the Messenger 
of God and as the leader of the society. After his death, the umma lacked an 
authoritative figure and, if this was not addressed swiftly, it might cause the young 
society to crumble. 
The Constitution of Medina and the appointment of Abu Bakr as the 
successor of the Prophet were the first two steps to address the issue of authority 
in the umma. It was also the starting point in the development of the caliphate as 
the embodiment of authority in the umma. The establishment of the Constitution 
of Medina provided the umma with a legal framework regulating interactions 
between various members of the society. It acknowledged the inclusion of non-
Muslim groups as special sub-umma groups which retained their religious 
characteristics but were addressed equally by the law. The appointment of Abu 
Bakr developed the caliphate as a political institution that provided authority and 
order to the umma and, at the same time, helped to promote the idea of an 
integrated society beyond the Arabian Peninsula.  
 173 
The devil, however, resides in the details. While the Qur’an provides 
moral guidance and characteristics of a good governance, it does not contain 
instructions on how to establish a political institution prevailing over the umma. 
Muhammad’s practice and his principles of governance that led to the 
establishment of a polity were considered the best examples for a Muslim ruler. 
However, they often required further elaboration, especially when there were 
needs to address specific circumstances. Thus, the idea of the caliphate developed 
between the constant virtues guided by Islam and its religious teachings on the 
one hand, and the continuous evolution to fit with the conditions of a particular 
period in Muslim history, on the other.  
During the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the caliphate was a civil 
institution where the leader was elected by popular will, or at least after some 
consideration of popular opinion. The death of Uthman and the opposition against 
Ali brought the first schism into the society. Instead of one body of Muslims, there 
were at least three: the Khawarij, the Shi’a and the Sunni. All three, however, 
claimed the leadership over the whole umma. A power struggle ensued and 
resulted in the victory of Mu’awiyya, who then established a dynastic practice in 
the form of the Umayyad caliphate. In order to maintain their claim over the 
leadership of the umma, the Umayyads employed Islamic rhetoric, positioning 
themselves as the successors of Muhammad and the lines of prophets before him 
(Rubin, 2003). They were involved in battles against the “deviant” narratives of 
the Khawarij and the Shi’a and patronised various Islamic missions, such as the 
development of Islamic scholarship and the renovation of Islamic holy sites to 
further enhance their image as the guardian of the faith ('Isy, 2007). 
The Abbasids revolted against the Ummayads by claiming greater 
connection to the Prophet, thus enhancing their claim to leadership over the umma. 
In order to subdue the influence of orthodox Muslim scholars over their rule, some 
Abbasid caliphs sought to enforce their political legitimacy by cooperating with 
scholars considered as “deviant”, such as members of the Shi’a and the 
Mu’tazilites. The mihna, which tried to establish Mu’tazilism as the orthodox 
narrative in Islam and purge all other schools of thought (Nawas, 1994), bolstered 
the Caliph al-Ma’mun’s legitimacy, but in long term, it damaged the reputation of 
the Abbasids and contributed to its waning influence (Donner, 1999, p. 27). By 
the 940 CE, the Abbasid caliphs had lost most of their power and became nothing 
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more than figureheads. The real power and authority lay in the hands of various 
political groups which paid minimal tribute to the Caliph.  
As we have seen, al-Mawardi’s Ordinances (1996) was written during the 
late Abbasid period and tried to address the declining influence of the caliph. On 
the one hand, he emphasised the sanctity of the caliph and the caliphate and the 
importance for Muslims to respect and safeguard it. On the other hand, he 
acknowledged the need to recognise power of various officials and framed this 
necessity as if the Caliph had delegated the power under his own will. Thus, with 
the proliferation of al-Mawardi’s work during this period, the concept of the 
caliphate shifted from a powerful, centralised ruler to a much weaker one who had 
to share authority with other political actors. Yet, this decentralisation of power 
managed to prolong the reign of the Abbasid caliphate for several centuries. 
The invasion of the Mongols in 1258 CE dealt a finishing blow to the 
Abbasid caliphate. Baghdad as the centre of the caliphate was destroyed, together 
with the caliph and the caliphate’s ruling class. While the Mamluks managed to 
install al-Mustansir Billah (r. 1261 CE) as the next caliph in Egypt, he was no 
more than a figurehead used by the Mamluks to legitimate their rule. Gone were 
the rights and authority of the Caliph that al-Mawardi stipulated in his book. 
Instead, the Caliph was regarded only as a spiritual figure while the sultans and 
amirs claimed  temporal authority over the society. Some scholars, such as Ibn 
Khaldun (1967), justified this practice by reasoning that the Mamluks were the 
guardians of the Caliph. Moreover, as we saw in the last chapter, he disagreed 
with the condition that a caliph had to be a Quraysh, opening the possibility for a 
non-Quraysh or even non-Arab figure to ascend the caliphal throne. The concept 
of caliphate shifted yet again to accommodate the contemporary condition in the 
Muslim world. 
Despite the conceptual shifts and rise-and-fall in practical implementation, 
the caliphate gave considerable benefits to the development of an umma. As the 
caliphate expanded its territory and influence, various people ruled by this 
political institution increasingly considered themselves as part of an integrated 
umma. The development of various institutions of the caliphate such as the 
minting of coins, the presence of tax officers in many rural and urban areas, the 
promotion of the Arabic language as the lingua franca and the development of 
sharia courts as the universally accepted legal institution in Muslim territories 
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enforced the sense of unity among Muslims, providing a tangible embodiment of 
an umma idea to them.   
Since the integration was becoming more and more apparent during the 
caliphate era, this might invite the opinion that the umma was thus the result of the 
caliphate. However, as I have argued, even during political breakdown in the 
Muslim world, such as the presence of three contending caliphates or after the 
sacking of Baghdad, integration in society did not disappear. Thus, this thesis 
disagrees with the notion that the existence of the umma was the result of the 
existence of a political institution called the caliphate. Rather, as explained in 
previous chapters, this thesis argues that the umma came first as the concept of an 
Islamic symbolic universe inspired by the Qur’an which induced a global 
consciousness in Muslims. The caliphate as a political institution was only 
established after the death of the Prophet and formulated by scholars, centuries 
after his death.  
This thesis further argues that, while the presence of a caliphate is not a 
fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of the umma, it helped to 
concretise the idea. The caliphate acted as an agent of integration, imposing 
uniform rule, institutions and, to some extent, identity on the inhabitants of its 
territory, in the process advancing the integration of the various locales into a 
translocal society that was called the umma. The caliphate also provided a 
framework for the establishment of various networks, such as intellectual and 
trading networks in which the idea of the umma could develop and spread. As 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) have articulated, the idea of a symbolic universe 
requires social groups to define and embody it and also to defend it from the 
development of deviant concepts.  
Thus, the presence of a political institution sympathetic to the idea of the 
umma, whether it is called a caliphate or not, would benefit the idea of the umma 
and would help it to flourish. Whether these political instruments and political 
actors were sincere in adopting Islam was open to debate. It was very possible for 
them to have more than a singular motive, but one by-product was the effect they 
had on furthering the identity and encouraging the integration of the umma. Yet at 
the same time, without the presence of a political institution sympathetic to it, the 
idea of the umma would still have been present among Muslims. Social groups 
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supporting the umma do not necessarily have to take form in a political institution, 
as the next chapter will explain further. 
To summarise, based on the discussion in Chapters Four and Five, this 
thesis argues that the relations between the concept of the umma and the caliphate 
as a type of political instrument unfolded in two ways. First, the concept of the 
umma existed prior to the caliphate; it existed as the result of the teachings of 
Islam. It was the presence of such a concept in the teachings of Islam that 
instigated the development of a political structure, which at later time would be 
called the caliphate. Second, the presence of a solid political structure helped 
further concretisation of the concept of the umma into a practical and functional 
translocal society. The caliphate created a framework in which the intellectual 
conception of the umma could further develop, spread and express itself. 
Intellectual endeavours to develop the caliphate would also unwittingly serve as 
the objectivation of the concept of the umma. This, in turn, would further benefit 
the political structure by providing credibility and legitimation to political claims 
of unity.  
The development of political theories of the caliphate by medieval Muslim 
scholars could be considered as contributing to the development of the umma as a 
symbolic universe. Since Muslims considered the umma as the “natural course” of 
social practice, and a divinely sanctioned one, the institution of the caliphate as 
the embodiment of the authority of the umma was also considered the “natural 
order” of political practice. It became part of what Geertz calls the “common 
sense” of Muslim society. Their existence was taken for granted and, thus, 
Muslim scholars did not ask whether and why there had to be an umma and a 
caliphate. Their only concern was with the application of the concepts to fit 
prevailing conditions. This notable condition could explain why there were 
diverging theories on the political implementation of the concepts, especially 
during the periods of weak caliphs who had to share their temporal power with the 
sultans and amirs, and during the absence of the caliphate after the destruction of 
the Abbasid caliphate in 1258 CE to the establishment of the Ottomans in 1299 
CE. 
The development of the caliphate as the instrument of the umma reached 
its nadir with the implementation of the Tanzimat (1839-1876 CE). With the 
success of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman started its transformation, basing its 
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authority on secular principles, in contrast with its previous concept of authority 
which was based on the image of an Islamic empire (Voll, 2003, p. 244). While 
the reformers were not renouncing Islam, their source of inspiration was Western 
values. This in itself would invite suspiciousness from the ulama. In addition to 
that, the reforms put the Islamic institutions and imperial religious establishments 
in practice under greater bureaucratic control. For example, the office of shaykh-
al-Islam continued to be of importance but had lower influence compared to the 
previous era (Voll, 1994, pp. 88–89). Thus, looking from the perspective of the 
umma as a symbolic universe, the Tanzimat was a point where the umma lost its 
prominence to new ideas brought by the reformers. This defeat on the conceptual 
level would then be mirrored on the practical level, signified by the disbandment 
of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. 
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Chapter Six: 
Integration through the Sufi Orders 
 
As has been argued in the previous chapter, the caliphate played an 
important part as a social organisation supporting the idea of an integrated umma. 
The caliphate developed various institutions which, either intentionally or not, 
created a “shared universe” between Muslims. The presence of this tangible 
“shared universe” helped Muslims to perceive themselves as part of a greater 
society, which helped the imaginary of the umma to persist. The fall of Baghdad 
and the reduction of the Abbasid caliphate to a shadow of its former self 
afterwards somewhat disturbed the integration process. However, other 
instruments of integration existed and continued to connect Muslims in various 
territories into one translocal society.  
One of the instruments vital to the maintenance of translocal Muslim 
society was the Islamic intellectual network. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
Islamic intellectual network played an important part in maintaining networks 
between scholars, teachers and students in one academic environment 
transcending natural, political and cultural borders. Madrasas continued to serve 
as centres of learning for Muslims and attracted a constant flow of would-be 
students from various Muslim communities. Not only transferring knowledge, this 
network also transferred a worldview and code of ethics to the Muslims, further 
establishing a common identity and the foundation for Muslim community. 
Religious rituals, such as the hajj, also provided not only the impetus for 
translocal movements for Muslims but also the necessary means for Muslims to 
connect and define themselves and their role in relation to the greater world. 
These connections provided by Islamic rituals were then acknowledged and 
understood by Muslims as the “objective”, “normal” interpretation of the self and 
the world, providing further attachment for Muslims to each other and to their 
society. In periods of upheaval, Islamic doctrines and rituals functioned as the 
anchor for Muslims. 
Troubled by what they perceived as rampant materialism and petty 
conflicts in Muslim society, individuals began to distance themselves from what 
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they deemed as the source of these disturbances to the harmony of Islam: things 
that they broadly categorised as “worldly pleasures” or, in Islamic terminology, 
the dunya. These individuals sought solace amidst the turbulent world by 
renouncing the dunya and intensifying their study of Islam through cultivation of 
the inner life. They developed intricate rituals by which they hoped to cleanse 
their souls, strengthen their spiritualism and achieve the ultimate goal of tawhid. 
As a symbol of their renunciation of the material world, these individuals clothed 
themselves in a coarse garment of wool, known as suf. Wearing woollen clothes, 
as opposed to the majority of Muslims who wore linen clothes, symbolised their 
protest against the world. The cloth symbol then became the source of their name, 
and these individuals became known as Sufis and their movement, in European 
languages, as Sufism (Nicholson, 1906; Trimingham, 1971, p. 1). 
These ascetics eventually attracted like-minded students and then 
developed distinguished religious orders, known as Sufi orders or tariqas. The 
orders’ main function was to serve the members’ spiritual necessities through 
educating their members in the orders’ philosophical views and propagating their 
rituals. Eventually, however, the Sufi orders played an important part in the 
development of what they deemed as the “mundane” aspects of Muslim society. 
The Sufi orders’ contributions were especially invaluable in constructing a 
common identity among their members, promoting translocal movements and 
networks and, later in the eighteenth century, acting as centres of activism in the 
Muslim world.     
The development of Sufism  
Spiritualist movements had been prevalent in the Muslim world since the 
end of the second century of the Hijra (800-900 CE). The exact origin of this trend 
was unknown but several prominent figures were identified as the pioneers of this 
trend, such as Hasan al-Bashri (d. 110/728) and Rabi’a al-‘Adawiya (d.185/801), 
both from Basra, Shaqiq al-Bakhli (d. 194/810) of Khurasan, Abu Sulayman al-
Darani Muhasibi (d. 215/830) of Syria, Dhul Nun (d. 245/850) of Egypt and 
others. A Persian Sufi and poet, Abu Hamid ibn Abu Bakr Ibrahim (d. 617/1221), 
well-known by his pen-name Farid al-Din Attar, compiled the biographies of these 
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acclaimed figures in Tadhkira al-Awliya', which was translated as Muslim Saints 
and Mystics by Arberry (Attar, 1976). 
In the third Hijri century/ninth century CE, spiritualist movements began 
to thrive in Baghdad. The term “sufi” at first was specifically used to refer to a 
group of people of Baghdad who, distinct from other Muslims and other spiritual 
groups in Baghdad and outside it, wore the symbolic woollen shirt (Nicholson, 
1906). As suggested above, these ascetics of Baghdad at a later time adopted the 
name and began to use it to refer to themselves vis-à-vis other pious groups 
(Karamustafa, 2007, p. 7). One of the prominent figures of the Sufi movement in 
Baghdad was Abu al Qasim al-Junayd (d. 298/910). A merchant and student of 
law, Junayd started his spiritual journey by renouncing worldly wealth or zuhud. 
According to Junayd, “the best mankind are the poor who are happy with their 
poverty.” He, however, considered renunciation of the heart as a more advanced 
form of zuhud; thus those who possess wealth but are not attached to it are 
superior to those who are poor but covet wealth. He himself remained a merchant 
throughout his life but spent little for himself. Instead, he spent most of his wealth 
to help the poor (Ansari, 1983, p. 38). 
Junayd advocated that, in order to affirm God’s unity, individuals should 
discard any pretence of power or knowledge about God. He emphasised the 
concept of fana, the passing away of self-consciousness. Only after an individual 
abandoned his or her self and awareness, thus entering fana, only then he or she 
can truly discern and affirm the unity of God (Ansari, 1983, pp. 45–46). There is 
an archetype of human purity in the Qur’an, when God asked human souls prior 
their birth into the material world who their Lord is and the souls answered that 
only God is their Lord and affirmed obedience only to God (Qur’an 7:171). This 
event, considered as the Primordial Covenant, serves as the ideal to which 
individuals should strive (Schimmel, 1975, p. 24). Only after achieving this stage 
can a human be considered perfect, as he or she will have shied away from any 
false attachments and existed only by their connection to God. “At this stage,” 
said Junayd, “you die as well as live, and you live in reality, for you die to 
yourself and live by God” (Ansari, 1983, p. 45).  
However, since Junayd also stressed that fana is a condition that is granted 
by God, not something that can be achieved by human effort, Karamustafa (2007, 
p. 18) argues that Junayd’s path of ascendancy is somewhat elitist. It would be 
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difficult except for a select few to completely discard their self-awareness and 
negate any human agency in their spiritual journey. Individuals who are able to do 
so could be considered as the Chosen Ones; Junayd himself used phrases such as 
“the choice of believers” (safwa min ‘ibad) or “the pure one” (khulasa min khalq). 
Thus, Sufism in its early stage was not a populist movement; instead, it was an 
elitist one where a selected few embarked on their spiritual journey, forged a tight 
brotherhood and were privileged by God to ascend to a higher level of spiritual 
consciousness. 
Since the days of Junayd, the Sufis of Baghdad had become spiritual 
teachers to students from other cities. Given the nature of the Islamic intellectual 
world, these students established a strong link to their teachers and when they 
went back home, they spread the teachings and practices further in their cities. 
During the fourth Hijri century/tenth century CE, Baghdad-centred Sufism spread 
to other major cities and cultural centres in the Muslim world, especially in the 
regions of Hijaz, Fars and Khurasan (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 56). In Shiraz, there 
were Hanbali scholars who also practised Sufi mysticism. There were also several 
Sufi settlements, also known as ribat, in the region. Some of them were open for 
women. One of the prominent Sufis in Shiraz was Abu Abdallah Ibn Khafif al-
Shirazi (d. 371/982), who was also a scholar of hadith (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 57).  
In Isfahan, there were Sufi mystics who were also followers of the Shafi’i, 
Hanbali and Zahiri schools. These Sufis were in direct confrontation with the 
Mu’tazilites who, as we have seen, were the proponent of rationalism. In 
Khurasan, the teachings of Baghdad Sufis absorbed various local spiritualist 
movements. The first Baghdadi Sufi who resided in Khurasan was Abu Bakr al-
Wasiti (d. 320/932). He was of Iraqi origin but then migrated to Khurasan. His 
disciple, Abu’l Abbas al-Qasim ibn al-Qasim al-Sayyari (d. 342/953-4), succeeded 
in establishing a Sufi community in that region, which lasted for at least another 
century after his death (Karamustafa, 2007, pp. 58–61).  
This wide acceptance of Baghdad Sufism, however, did not mean that 
there was uniformity or homogeneity in the teachings of Baghdadi Sufis. Each 
teacher had their own views and attitudes toward certain aspects of Islam. For 
example, Junayd’s view on the ultimate goal of Sufism was different than al-
Hallaj’s. According to Junayd, the ultimate experience of a Sufi after negating 
oneself is an experience of One Actor (wahdat al-fa’il). In this view, while there 
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might be multiple beings in this world, there is only one Entity who becomes the 
One Actor in the Universe. The Sufi will feel the nearness to God, that God Acts 
through the Sufi and that only His will and actions are what matter (Ansari, 1983, 
pp. 51–52). Al-Hallaj (d. 309/922), on the other hand, asserted that the ultimate 
experience of a Sufi is the union with God into One Being (wahdat al-wujud), but 
this was considered blasphemy by Muslim scholars (Mason, 1995). The contrast 
between al-Hallaj’s and Junayd’s opinions can be found in pictures drawn from 
the tenth century CE, showing al-Hallaj as a drunken Sufi while Junayd is 
depicted as a sober one (Chittick, 2007, p. 35). 
Despite their differences, there were some aspects on which Sufi teachers 
tended to agree. The spiritual journey that Sufis embarked upon was normally 
envisioned as a path (tariq or tariqa) marked by stopping places (manzil), stations 
(maqam) and states (hal) that a wayfarer passes through in his or her journey to 
attain perfect tawhid. When a Sufi has attained a certain maqam, it is expected for 
him or her to fulfil the obligations of that station (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 98–100). 
The centres of Sufi learning were usually called ribat or khanaqa. A Sufi teacher 
was called murshid while the student was a murid (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 3–5). 
These teachers, however, did not establish a systematic process to embark on this 
path. Instead, as can be understood in Junayd’s teachings, they undertook the 
journey privately. On occasions when there were other Sufis who strove in the 
same spiritual process, individuals might meet and learn together. Yet, these 
collective journeys were only for a certain duration of time. At the end of the day, 
each Sufi had to travel his or her own private journey.  
Three Stages of Development of Sufi Orders 
First Stage 
The early form of Sufism emerged as a spiritual quest which each and 
every individuals had to perform and experience privately. Individuals might join 
together as a group and forge a close relationship with one another. They might 
travel together on pilgrimage or on journey to visit a famous mystic. During 
physical journeys or periods of seclusion, groups might stay at a ribat together but 
some would continue their journey immediately while others would stay for 
longer period. At times, there were individuals whom others considered as having 
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more experience and possessing a wealth of spiritual knowledge. These 
individuals would be considered as teachers or masters and others might seek 
guidance from them. However, none of these was permanent and institutionalised. 
In this early stage of Sufism, the connections between Sufis were apparent but 
informal.  
Trimingham (1971) describes this first stage in the development of Sufi 
orders as the Golden Age of Sufism. At the beginning of this stage, Sufism began 
to develop in Baghdad, as we saw above. Through chains of relations between 
Sufi masters and their students, Sufism spread to other cities in the Muslim world. 
The early Sufi masters put emphasis on experiencing the spiritual rather than 
theorising the movement. They guided the students through meditations so that the 
students directly acquired insights into the spiritual truth. Unlike a madhhab 
which provided a systematic and methodological approach to Islamic law, a tariqa 
was simply a method of contemplation. Al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) writes that, “this 
spiritual revelation can not be learned but only attained by direct experience, 
ecstasy and inward transformation” (Trimingham, 1971, p. 3). 
By the eleventh century CE, the numbers of Sufis had increased but they 
still maintained this personalised characteristic. A ribat might serve as a learning 
centre but, mostly, it provided a safe place for travelling Sufis to stay for a certain 
period. Only minimum rules on day-to-day activities were institutionalised in a 
ribat. If a renowned master decided to stay in a place, students might come to visit 
and learn from him during his stay. But upon his death or leaving, this gathering 
of students would disperse. After the Seljuks gained control over Baghdad, as part 
of their strategy to win the hearts of the Muslims, they supported the development 
of madrasas and ribats, providing funds generously and thus allowing both the 
fiqh madhhab and Sufi tariqa to flourish (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 7–8).  
It was during this time that al-Ghazali discarded his wealth and reputation 
to live as a poor Sufi. Al-Ghazali stated in his autobiography, Deliverance from 
Error, that he turned to study Sufism after he had found no satisfaction in his 
study of theology, philosophy and batinism13. His interests in Sufism found the 
opportunity to flourish because his teacher, al-Juwayni, from whom al-Ghazali 
had learned theology, was also sympathetic to Sufism (Watt, 1963, pp. 133–134). 
                                               
13Al-Batiniyya is what al-Ghazali called the teaching of Ismaili Shi’ism; it literally means 
“esotericism”. For a detailed explanation of this, refer to Mitha  (2002, p. 19). 
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Al-Ghazali left Baghdad in 1095 CE and for a time travelled the Muslim world in 
his journey to find the ultimate truth. He spent almost two years in Damascus, 
staying in retirement and devoting his time to spiritual exercises. He went on to 
Jerusalem and Medina and then went on a pilgrimage to Mecca (Watt, 1963, p. 
144). It was after this spiritual journey that al-Ghazali wrote his masterpiece in 
religious studies: Ihya ‘ulum al-din or Revival of the Religious Sciences 
(Schimmel, 1975, p. 94). 
Ihya consists of forty chapters in four books. Forty is a number which the 
Sufis believe to symbolise patience, trial and almost infinity. By dividing Ihya into 
forty chapters, al-Ghazali likely meant to give Ihya a strong mystical connotation 
as the book that teaches patience against worldly trials (Schimmel, 1975, p. 94). In 
the first book, al-Ghazali criticises the established religious sciences. He felt that 
religious sciences gave too much attention to differences between the main legal 
traditions and elaboration of laws which had little relevance in practice and would 
not help the life of common people (Trimingham, 1971, p. 138). In the subsequent 
books, al-Ghazali explains the basic principles of Islam, the basic rituals from 
ablutions before worship to performing hajj and extracanonical devotions. The 
second quarter of Ihya deals with customs in Muslims’ daily life such as eating 
and drinking, marriage, relations with family and friends and so on. The last two 
quarters deal with the cultivation of inner life, such as details on vices and virtues, 
repentance, patience and gratitude to God (Watt, 1963, pp. 151–154).  
Reading Ihya, Watt (1963, p. 154) concludes that for al-Ghazali, rather 
than being a means to achieve an ecstatic state, Sufism is a way to improve one’s 
character and gain reward in the hereafter. Schimmel (1975, p. 95) asserts that the 
whole of Ihya may be called the book which prepares the readers for death. All 
that al-Ghazali wrote in the preceding thirty-nine chapters culminates in the last 
one which expounds upon death with its terrible and yet lovable aspects. Ormsby 
(2008, pp. 116–119) agrees with this assertion and describes the architecture of 
Ihya as steps in a slow ascent that culminate in the highest pinnacles of insight. 
Ihya ‘ulum al-din was not only al-Ghazali’s magnum opus but also the greatest of 
Sufi literature guiding aspirants in their spiritual journey to the ultimate truth.  
Ihya is also a book that talks to its reader in a personal, intimate way 
(Ormsby, 2008, p. 119). Instead of writing the work as a scholar lecturing the 
reader, al-Ghazali wrote it as an intimate guide for aspirants in their personal quest, 
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thus fitting in with the characteristics of the first stage of Sufism. Throughout the 
parts of the work, al-Ghazali speaks in the first person form, sharing, for example, 
stories of his own journey. Another outstanding characteristic of Ihya is how al-
Ghazali manages to integrate the narration of a spiritual journey with theological 
arguments and careful observance of Islamic law. Reading the book is akin to 
conversing with al-Ghazali, fitting the pattern of a conversation between a Sufi 
guide and his disciples. Because of this, Ihya received acclaim not only from Sufis 
but also from average Muslims and even orthodox theologians (Schimmel, 1975, 
p. 96). This would help Sufism to integrate into the general Muslim populace, 
gradually losing its elitist view and seeding the development of a new Islamic 
culture (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 106). 
Second Stage 
The works of al-Ghazali and other Sufi mystics opened the pious 
movement to a wider audience. From the beginning of the thirteenth century CE, 
more and more students started to gather around Sufi masters in regular fashion 
and these masters then became the centres for Sufi learning. This marked the 
beginning of the second stage in the development of Sufi orders. In this stage, the 
tariqa had started to develop distinctive patterns, centred on the teachings, rules 
and mystical exercises of a certain master, or shaikh. Each tariqa established their 
own spiritual chain, or silsila, just as the madhhab and Muslim centres of learning 
in general also established their own intellectual chains, or isnad, as described in 
Chapter Three. The tariqa’s mystic knowledge was handed down only through 
this silsila, and would-be students were required to perform certain initiation 
rituals, including swearing an oath of allegiance to the founder of the tariqa and 
his deputy (Trimingham, 1971, p. 10).  
The establishment of silsilas can be considered a step forward in 
institutionalising the Sufi movement. Sufism was no longer a personal spiritual 
journey that each aspirant had to undertake by his or her own. Instead, Sufism was 
transformed into a collective spiritual journey whereby the master would lead the 
students in their endeavour to achieve a higher understanding. The power structure 
in Sufism also shifted. In the first stage, it was somewhat egalitarian but, in the 
second stage, it became a hierarchical order between the master and the students. 
Even the students were separated into levels depending on their maqam. But, still, 
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the tariqa allowed some form of creativity; students could modify the teachings of 
the shaikh in accordance with their own mystical experiences. Thus, while the 
structure of the silsila introduced a certain degree of institutionalisation in the Sufi 
movement, the actual rituals and practices were still varied from one group to 
another (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 11–12). 
The more central role of shaikh in the students’ life occurred in parallel 
with the upheavals in the Muslim world. During the early stage of Sufi, the shaikh 
had been essential in the students’ life when there was turbulence on a personal 
level. Thus, by the time the Mongols destroyed Baghdad and the caliphate in 1258 
CE and order in the Muslim world apparently collapsed, the shaikh had become a 
steady anchor in many Muslim lives (Trimingham, 1971, p. 14). Following the 
destruction of Baghdad and its many learning centres and libraries, scholars fled 
from the Mongol threat to various remote corners of the world. Cities that were 
spared from Mongol invasion became safe havens where intellectual and mystical 
activities flourished. These centres became the centres where Sufism thrived. 
Some refugees fled to the outskirts of the Muslim world, such as to Anatolia in the 
north-west and Hindustan in the south-east, inevitably spreading the message of 
Islam and the rituals of Sufism with them (Trimingham, 1971, p. 22).  
During these turbulent times, various powerful actors also established 
closer ties with various Sufi tariqas, for both spiritual and political reasons or a 
combination of them, as the support of a charismatic shaikh might bolster a Sultan 
or Amir’s legitimacy in front of his people. One such relationship was formed in 
Anatolia, between the Seljuk sultanate and Persian Sufis who sought refuge in the 
region (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 23–24). The Seljuks had been exposed to Sufism 
since the days of the Caliph al-Nasir (r. 1158-1225) because his adviser, Umar al-
Suhrawardi, was a prominent Baghdadi Sufi and had visited the region in 1221 CE 
(Cahen, 1968, p. 256). The arrival of these Persian Sufis were welcomed by the 
ruling elite of the sultanate. Thus began the flourishing of the Sufi tradition in 
Anatolia to the point of becoming the majority tradition of Islam there (Ocak, 
2009, p. 391). 
From this period, rose a great Sufi in the Muslim world: Jalal al-Din Rumi 
(d. 672/1273). Rumi’s father, Baha al-Din Walad, was a preacher and mystic 
himself. Rumi and his parents migrated from Khawarizm to various regions before 
they finally settled in the capital of the Seljuk sultanate, Konya in 1228 CE 
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(Cahen, 2001, pp. 162–163). Educated in religion and mysticism since his youth 
by teachers in Damascus and Aleppo, Rumi became an expert in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Rumi was well-known to various groups, among both Muslims and 
non-Muslims, and attracted students from high-class circles. When he was thirty-
eight, Rumi left his position and wealth and embarked on a spiritual journey to 
find his real self. During this journey, Rumi allegedly met a Sufi master named 
Shams of Tabriz and, through their dialogue, Rumi found the spiritual insight that 
he was looking for (Arasteh, 1972, pp. 36–41). His poetry, the Masnavi, gained 
widespread respect for its  spiritual status and became the pinnacle of mystical 
poetry in his time (Schimmel, 1975, p. 316). 
In Rumi’s time, Konya developed into a centre of religion, learning and 
culture in the Muslim world, thanks to various scholars, mystics and artists that 
resided there (Schimmel, 1975, p. 312). After Rumi’s death, his teaching and 
mystical exercises were instituted as a tariqa by his son, Sultan Walad. This 
tariqa, Mevleviye, gained popular support, especially in the urban area of the 
region. By the mid-fifteenth century CE, Mevleviye had gained considerable 
influence in the Ottoman Empire and continued to grow until the following 
centuries (Ocak, 2009, pp. 393–394). 
Third Stage 
The third stage in the development of Sufism brought the tariqa into being 
a formal and strict institution. This stage began formally in the fifteenth century 
CE, under the Ottoman’s’ rule, but had been going on gradually from the earlier 
century. There were essential changes within the movement, especially with 
regard to the position of the shaikh. While the shaikh was a teacher in the first 
stage and a guide in the second, in this third stage, he became the wali of God. 
The shaikh ascended into the status of a saint and possessed the spiritual power 
known as baraka (Trimingham, 1971, p. 26). Baraka itself can be understood as 
holy power inherently possessed by saints, distinguishing him or her from 
ordinary humans. It is conceived as a force that emanates from the saint, 
permeating the persons and objects around him or her. By exercising this baraka, 
saints are able to perform miracles, or karama (Karamustafa, 2007, p. 130). 
The ascendancy of Sufi shaikhs into the status of wali brought another 
change to the rituals of Sufis. Believing that the baraka possessed by the shaikhs 
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stayed even after their death, people began to flock to their tombs and venerated 
the tombs. For Sufis, travelling to the tombs of walis, or ziyara, were part of their 
spiritual journey. They hoped for a communion of spirits with the wali and to find 
a sacred place in which to meditate. For the laymen, however, this ziyara was 
intended to seek help from the deceased wali to act as an intercessor on the behalf 
of the pilgrims (Trimingham, 1971, p. 26). The presence of a living saint and the 
promises of his baraka made the Sufi orders increasingly popular with the general 
populace. While they did not partake in the initiation process, thus never 
becoming students, many Muslims attended the shaikh’s lectures, visited his 
places and even performed pilgrimages to his tomb in order to attain his baraka. 
Instead of embarking on a personal journey or following the rules of a spiritual 
group, Sufism in the third stage of its development was characterised by 
veneration of the wali and dedication to  acquiring his baraka (Trimingham, 1971, 
p. 72). 
The cult of saints and veneration of tombs encouraged more complex 
translocal travel routes for Muslims. If centuries before pilgrimages were focused 
on Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, by the end of seventh Hijri century/thirteenth 
century CE, there were many cities, holy places and saints’ tombs for pilgrims to 
visit. The three holy cities still retained their supremacy against these new 
spiritual sites but the presence of these new destinations intensified translocal 
travel with new travel hubs and routes. An example of this intensification could be 
seen in the widespread publication of guide books for ziyara. Karamustafa (2007, 
pp. 132–133) listed five prominent guide books from various scholars which 
describe the pilgrim routes to various holy sites and tombs in Egypt, Central Asia 
and the Maghrib, showing the popularity of ziyara as a form of religious practice 
among the Muslims at that time.  
Tapper (1990) describes a more complex picture of ziyara, beyond its 
spiritual or religious connotation. While the spiritual or religious aspect of ziyara 
is undeniable, there is also a social or cultural context of the activity. First, ziyara 
embodied the respect that the pilgrim had towards the saint whose tomb became 
the destination of ziyara. Second, the practice (or, disallowance) of ziyara also 
revealed the tensions between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in Islam, as sanctioned 
by the political and religious establishments. Therefore, ziyara was not a mere 
personal journey but one laden with social, political and theological meanings. 
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Chamberlain (1994, pp. 119–120) also highlights the social aspect of ziyara by 
asserting it as a method to acquire important social ties necessary to advance in 
Muslim intellectual and mystical networks. While many laymen visited holy 
tombs to gain baraka, learned shaikhs used the visitation to strengthen bonds 
between themselves. While it was an honour for younger scholars to be able to 
visit and learn from a senior shaikh, receiving visits was also a sign of distinction 
for the more senior shaikh.  
The institutionalisation process of Sufism intensified to the point that 
Trimingham (1971, pp. 71–103) describes it as hierarchical and rigid, with an 
attendant loss of mystical creativity. In contrast with the first stage, where many 
Sufi scholars developed their own, original, mystical exercises, in this third stage, 
the tariqa focused solely on the veneration of the persona of the shaikh and 
followed his instructions without reserve. Because of his baraka, only the shaikh 
could discern the ultimate truth. Even the Sufi writers of this age did not produce 
original ideas in their books, instead only compiling, repeating and simplifying the 
ideas of previous masters. At the same time, in the third stage Sufism lost its elitist 
status completely and allowed the general populace to partake in some of the 
rituals without having to be initiated in the order. This openness combined with 
the centralised teachings allowed Sufi tariqas to bridge various Muslim local 
societies into a greater, translocal society, as seen in the example in the following 
section. 
Revivalism of the Sufi Orders 
The next wave of development in Sufi orders occurred in late eighteenth 
century-early nineteenth century CE. During this period, Sufi orders underwent a 
change of perspective. Unlike Sufism in previous stages, whose concern was 
mainly the improvement of self, this new Sufism focused attention on the socio-
moral reconstruction of Muslim society (Rahman, 1979, p. 25). Theologically, this 
shift of paradigm was inspired by the work of Ibn Taymiyya who suggested that 
the obligation to implement sharia falls on to the shoulders of the whole Muslim 
society. Thus, Muslims must set up certain institutions in their society to help 
them implement God’s will. The state is a vital instrument for the manifestation of 
God’s will in the material world; in so arguing, the social virtue and justice of 
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Muslim movements was emphasised instead of personal virtue (Rahman, 1970, p. 
637). 
This shift in paradigm towards socio-moral reconstruction was also 
triggered by the socio-political conditions of Muslim society. The sultanates had 
become weakened with military defeats by the European powers and were 
burdened by ineffective administration. While the common people faced 
economic difficulties, the ruling elite often presented a wealthy image, causing 
discontent among the general populace (Voll, 1994, p. 29). These kinds of 
problems also plagued the Ottomans and some wazirs tried to revitalise the 
caliphate by adopting Western ideas, which culminated in the Tanzimat 
movement in 1876 (Voll, 1994, pp. 30–31). With each of the reform efforts 
introduced, the reform became more closely associated with European ideas and 
was influenced by the secularist trend. This marginalised the ulama and, in 
reaction, they became the strongest anti-reform faction in the empire (Voll, 1994, 
pp. 33–35). 
It was against this background that revivalism within the Sufi orders 
commenced. This revivalism was not a concerted, deliberate effort to revive 
Sufism as a whole. It instead was initiated by three figures, each leading his own 
tariqa: Muhammad al-Arabi al-Darqawi (d. 1823), the leader of the Shadhiliyya 
tariqa; Ahmad al-Tijani (d. 1815), the leader of the Tijaniyya tariqa; and Ahmad 
ibn Idris (d. 1837), the leader of the Idrisiyya tariqa. Muhammad al-Arabi al-
Darqawi focused his revivalist movement on moving Sufism towards spiritualism 
and eschewing the material world (dunya). His efforts managed to enliven 
spiritual fervour among his followers and stimulated the flourishing of 
Shadhiliyya branches in North Africa. Ahmad al-Tijani started his order in Fez, 
Morocco and it spread to Sudan and, in the next century, to the Senegambia region. 
His teaching focused on unity of the order. Ahmad ibn Idris started his order in 
Mecca. He sought to preserve the inner aspect of Islam and directly responded to 
the anti-Sufi sentiment unleashed by the Wahhabis. While their works were 
focused within their own tariqa, their efforts inevitably affected other tariqas and 
initiated a wave of revivalism in Sufism generally (Trimingham, 1971, p. 106).  
Scholars such as Rahman (1979) and Voll (1994) define this revivalist 
movement as “Neo-Sufism” to signify the different characteristics of this wave of 
movements compared to the older Sufi movements. One of the prominent 
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characteristics of this new wave of movements was its concern towards social and 
political issues. It sought to restore Muslim society from degeneration. This wave 
of movements also instigated the transformation of Sufi orders into a more 
centralised and coherent organisation, larger in scale than the previous form of 
Sufi orders (Levtzion, 2002, p. 114). This new wave of movements also possessed 
a consciousness of a greater umma while operating in their local context (Voll, 
1994, p. 294). Ahmad ibn Idrisi in particular harboured the spirit of pan-Islamism 
and advocated the unity of all Muslim lands (Trimingham, 1971, p. 106). While 
O'Fahey and Radtke (1993) disagree with the notion that this wave introduced 
something “new” to the Sufi orders, Voll (2008) argues on the contrary, asserting 
the aforementioned characteristics as unseen in the previous generation of Sufi 
orders. 
The Activism of Sufi Orders 
According to Trimingham (1971, pp. 2–3), early Sufism emerged naturally 
as the extension and intensification of religious expressions among Muslims. It 
sought to connect directly to God by putting emphasis on recollection of religious 
chants (dhikr) and ascetic rituals, instead of conforming to the increasing 
legalisation of Islamic laws. Sufis were not members of a particular madhhab nor 
were the disputes between the schools their interest. They diligently sought to 
internalise the values of Islam rather than conform with formalised rituals. As the 
saying of the famous Baghdadi Sufi, Junayd, put it, “Sufism is not [achieved] by 
much praying and fasting, but it is the security of the heart and the generosity of 
the soul” (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 12–14).  
Though there were other ascetic, non-Islamic, traditions preceding Sufism 
such as Eastern Christian monasticism, and while those traditions were likely to 
have had some contact with the Sufis, Sufism was something unique and 
distinctively Islamic in nature. Schimmel (1975, pp. 24–27) explains that the 
development of Sufism centred on the Qur’an and the figure of Muhammad. The 
teachings of the Qur’an formed the foundation of Sufism’s doctrines and its words 
were the cornerstones of their mystical recitations, helping the devout to achieve a 
higher level of understanding. The figure of Muhammad was vital as Sufis sought 
to connect their traditions to the Prophet’s. In order to support their claims, Sufi 
 192 
tariqas established a spiritual chain from teachers to students, with Muhammad as 
the first link. His spiritual journey was also considered as the path to which Sufis 
strove to adhere. 
Because these characteristics of Sufism were simple yet heartfelt, they 
were able to attract sympathy from common people. These characteristics perhaps 
were felt to be natural and practical, thus appealing to the common sense of 
Muslims then. Geertz (1975, p. 18) describes “naturalness” and “practicalness” as 
two characteristics which appeal to human common sense as a cultural system. 
Unlike the scholars of law whose main interest was maintaining the proper form 
of religious rituals, Sufis put emphasis on the essence of the rituals, yet without 
neglecting Islamic law. The nature of Sufism which encourages the initiates to 
undertake a long journey and to establish hostels for other travellers enabled the 
Sufis to reach far-flung territories and to introduce Islam there.  
In the time of turbulence after the destruction of the Abbasid, the presence 
of Sufi orders was invaluable. With their da’wa, the Sufi orders were capable of 
rousing an affective response, regardless of cultural background or social standing. 
Sufi orders, with their secluded lodges, also managed to penetrate and link various 
geographical locales which had been relatively untouched by various political 
actors in the era of the caliphate (Levtzion, 2002, p. 116). In later centuries, Sufi 
orders were also engaged in various social and political activism. This activism 
strengthened the role of the Sufi orders as social actors that supported the idea of 
an umma, as can be seen in examples detailed in the following sections.  
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The Activism of Naqshbandiyya Sufi Order 
 
 
Map 3. The Spread of Sufi Orders 
Source: The Rise and Spread of Sufism, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t253/e15/images/0195334012.rise-and-spread-of-
sufism-the.1.jpg  
 
The Naqshbandiyya is one of the prominent orders which managed to 
penetrate and expand to Central Asia and Indo-Pakistan, bringing Islam to the 
inhabitants and connecting them to the larger Muslim society. The Naqshbandiyya 
order gained its namesake from Baha al-Din al-Naqshbandi (d. 1389) but the order 
itself regards the founder of the order to be Abu Ya’qub Yusuf al-Hamadani (d. 
1140) (Trimingham, 1971, p. 62). The Naqshbandiyya is an orthodox Sufi 
movement in the sense that its doctrine maintains a balance between sharia, tariqa 
and haqiqa. Sharia is the Islamic law formulated by scholars. Tariqa is the path 
designated by the Sufi master. Haqiqa is the ultimate inner knowledge that each 
Sufi possesses (Weismann, 2007, p. 3). At the core of its doctrine lie the eleven 
principles attributed to its founder and a distinct form of silent dhikr. They also 
claimed that their tradition is linked to the Prophet in an unbroken chain through 
the Prophet’s Companion and first caliph, Abu Bakr. This makes the 
Naqshbandiyya distinct from other tariqas which link their tradition to the Prophet 
through Ali (Weismann, 2007, pp. 10–11). 
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Centred on Bukhara, the tariqa started to spread to neighbouring cities by 
the efforts of Baha al-Din’s disciples. In the fifteenth century CE, cities such as 
Balkh, Herat and Samarkand had considerable influence over northern territories 
of the Muslim world. By spreading the order there, the Naqshbandiyya gained 
access to important figures in the Timurid dynasty which held the territories. One 
such important figure, who finally joined the order, was Ali Shir Nava’i (d. 1501), 
a Timurid minister who was a patron of literature and arts. With Nava’i's 
assistance, the tariqa managed to gain both financial and political support, 
including access to the ruler of the dynasty (Weismann, 2007, pp. 30–33). Since 
the early day of the tariqa, individual members travelled to the west, connecting 
the order to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. It was said that the founder of 
the tariqa, Baha al-Din himself, had made two pilgrimages to the holy cities. 
Some members went further and finally reached the land of Anatolia. It was said 
that a member of the Naqshbandiyya, Rukn al-Din Bukhari, settled in Amasya, 
where a lodge (zawiya in Arabic or tekke in Turkish) was built for him in 1405-6 
CE (Le Gall, 2005, p. 18).  
The next generation of Naqshbandis continued the institutionalisation and 
consolidation of the order. Under the leadership of Nasir al-Din ‘Ubaydillah Ahrar 
(d. 1490), the order managed to establish an inter-regional network of Naqshbandi 
groups in Central Asia. Ahrar sent his spiritual successors, know as his khalifas, to 
various cities in the region. Abdullah Ilahi and Ahmad Bukhari settled in Simav, 
in western Anatolia before moving to Istanbul after the death of Mehmed II in 
1481 CE. Another khalifa of Ahrar, Baba Ni’matullah ibn Mahmud, settled in 
Aksehir in central Anatolia. Abdullah Ilahi and his disciples were sent to 
disseminate the tariqa in parts of the Balkans. Ilahi himself spent the end of his 
life in Yenice-I Vardar, which is in contemporary Greece. Ilahi’s khalifa, 
Bedreddin Baba, settled and became a shaikh in Edirne (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 18–19). 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century CE, the  Naqshbandiyya’s position as the 
most prominent Sufi order in the region was uncontested (Weismann, 2007, p. 34). 
The heads of all independent states succeeding the Timurid dynasty favoured the 
order, honouring the leaders during their lifetime and after their death by building 
mausoleums over their graves and hostels for housing the pilgrims going there 
(Trimingham, 1971, p. 94). 
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The rise of the Safavids as a Shi’i empire provided great challenges to the 
dissemination of the Naqshbandi order. Arjomand (2009, pp. 109–121) asserts 
that the order was suppressed under the Safavids. By the end of Shah Ismail’s rule 
(1501-1524), the order had been totally eradicated from Western and Central Iran. 
While she casts doubt on the total eradication of the order by the end of Shah 
Ismail’s rule, Le Gall (2005, pp. 28–30) describes how the Safavids’ rise provided 
significant challenges to the Naqshbandis, especially by obstructing 
communication and travel between Central Asia and the Ottoman lands, thus 
endangering or even stopping the travel of pilgrims, students and immigrants from 
Anatolia, Arabia and the Balkans. Yet, the hostilities shown by the Safavids over 
the order eventually stimulated it to make a stronger commitment to Sunni 
orthodoxy (Le Gall, 2005, p. 33).  
In their activism, the Naqshbandis were keen on travelling. Foremost was 
travelling to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina to perform hajj. Other forms of 
travelling were to visit various learning centres or attending famous shaikhs in 
their lodges. After the Ottomans had managed to secure the loyalties of Mecca and 
Medina, gained the title of “Protectors of the Holy Cities”, and established a 
pilgrimage route from Istanbul to the holy cities in the early sixteenth century CE, 
the Naqshbandis were observed following this route, detouring to Istanbul first 
before travelling to Mecca and Medina. In so doing, they enjoyed the security of 
the route and infrastructures laid down by the Ottomans (Le Gall, 2005, p. 171). 
Yet, the Naqshbandis not only benefited from the existing infrastructures. They 
also established their own infrastructures such as lodges for pilgrims and other 
travellers, attended by shaikhs from Bukhara. Such lodges were observed in Bursa, 
Istanbul, Erdine, Jerusalem and so on. These lodges became the resting places for 
travellers, and thus helped the integration process between these various places 
into one well travelled network (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 171–172). 
The Naqshbandi shaikhs also contributed to the integration of the Muslim 
population through another method: by working across linguistic and cultural 
barriers. The Naqshbandi shaikhs themselves had various cultural backgrounds. 
Some of Ahrar khalifas were foreign students from faraway lands. By accepting 
these foreign students, Ahrar had cultivated a multicultural environment for the 
Naqshbandiyya (Le Gall, 2005, p. 20). Their rigorous training also made these 
shaikhs well versed in Perso-Islamic literary culture. Yet, at the same time, since 
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their audience were of Turkish and Arabic origins, the shaikhs were also trained to 
be able to produce Sufi literature in Turkish and Arabic, both as the translation 
form of Persian scholarly works, such as the Masnavi, or original works of their 
own (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 172–173). This ability to work in a multilingual and 
multicultural environment made the Naqshbandi shaikhs valued scholars, since, at 
that time, many Islamic learning institutions used scholarly works from Perso-
Islamic culture. This ability also allowed them to build a bridge between the older 
Perso-Islamic heritage and the younger Turkish scholarship (Robinson, 1997).  
The Activism of Tijaniyya Sufi Order 
 
 
Map 4. The Spread of Sufi Orders in Africa 
Source: Islam and the Spread of the Sufi Orders 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t253/e7/images/0195334012.islam-and-the-
spread-of-the-sufi-orders.2.jpg 
 
 
While the Naqshbandiyya order was centred on Transoxania and spread 
towards Central Asia and then to Arabia and South and Southeast Asia, the Sufi 
order of Tijaniyya was founded in Fez, Morocco, through the teaching of Ahmad 
al-Tijani (d. 1815). Ahmad al-Tijani was one of the proponents of revivalism in 
Sufi movements. He claimed that the tariqa was revealed to him by the Prophet 
through a vision; thus the silsila went directly from Muhammad to him (Vikor, 
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2000, p. 450). During his da’wa, Ahmad easily appointed local organisers 
(muqoddam) from anyone who professed allegiance to his order. Thus, at his 
death, the Tijaniyya was quite widespread and possessed a large number of 
followers (Trimingham, 1971, p. 108). After the death of Ahmad, the activism of 
Tijaniyya spread south to west Sudan, the Nilotic and then central Sudan. It then 
spread among the people of Tokolor of Senegambia (Trimingham, 1971, p. 110).  
The spreading of the Tijaniyya order in rural areas of West Africa was 
coterminous with the spreading of other Sufi tariqas such as the Qadariyya to the 
region. With this development, a new class of religious scholars arose. These 
scholars, unlike the urban scholars often associated with traders or ruling 
aristocrats, were part of the peasantry. They articulated the voices of farmers, 
criticised the rulers and, eventually, led the jihad movement in the region 
(Levtzion, 2002, pp. 114–115). The transformation of the Tijaniyya into a more 
political and militaristic orientated movement happened under the leadership of al-
Hajj Umar ibn Sa’id Tall of Tokolor (d. 1864). Umar himself was initiated into the 
order during his stay in Mecca in 1828-1831. He was then appointed as the khalifa 
of the order for West Africa. Invigorated by this appointment, Umar established 
various Tijaniyya lodges during his return journey from Mecca. He established 
Tijaniyya branches in Sokoto, Masina and Futa Toro regions (Vikor, 2000, p. 451).  
In 1852, Umar declared a jihad against the rulers neighbouring his region 
of Futa Toro (present day Senegal) and declared the establishment of a Tijaniyya 
caliphate. The main supporters of his campaign were his students. These warriors 
were recruited into the order in 1846 and after. Umar’s authority toward them was 
based on his title as the khalifa of the order, thus making the campaign not only 
military or political in nature but also spiritual. Umar developed his tariqa in two 
related ways: as a way to infuse identity into his military campaign and also as a 
way to establish and legitimate his authority over the campaign (Vikor, 2000, p. 
452). Between 1855 and his death in 1864, Umar managed to capture various 
cities and integrated them into his growing empire. In 1855, he captured Nioro, a 
strategic town which then became a centre of Islamic learning and a leading 
market in the region. In 1860-1861, he occupied the seat of Bamana kingdom of 
Segu. In 1862, he occupied the capital of Hamidullahi (Lydon, 2009, pp. 116–
117).  
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The campaign of Umar integrated a wide area in West Africa under the 
banner of his Tijaniyya caliphate. He controlled the area of present-day Guinea, 
Senegal and Mali. During his rule, Umar provided the people of his caliphate 
religious scholars to guide their spiritual life. It was during this time that the 
Tijaniyya order established a stronger presence in the area. He also tried to 
increase the welfare of the people by providing them with skilled craftsmen. One 
trade account noted that a trade caravan sent by Umar had recruited ten 
blacksmiths and farmers to teach their arts to the Tijani people (Lydon, 2009, p. 
118). He endeavoured to open the trade route from his territory to the northern 
trade route towards Morocco, in so doing maintaining the connectedness of 
Africans across the Sahara (Lydon, 2009, p. 119).  
Other than the legacy of Umar in establishing the Tijaniyya caliphate, 
which lasted for a half century, the Tijaniyya order also had significant 
achievements in the development of literary culture in West Africa. The history of 
the literary in the order connected the Maghreb, the origin of this order, with the 
entire Sahelian Belt of Africa. But not only that, the literary culture of the order 
also connected the locations with wider territories where members of the order 
resided, such as in Egypt, Hijaz, Turkey and Indonesia. The literary culture of the 
Tijaniyya started with the collections of al-Tijani’s sayings and sermons by his 
students. The book of Jawahir al-ma’ani (Pearls of Meaning), collected by Ali 
Harazim (d. 1797), was the first of such collections and was acknowledged as the 
authoritative account of life and teachings of al-Tijani (Seesemann, 2009, p. 306). 
Other than the Jawahir, the important books of the order are Rimah hizb al-rahim 
‘ala nuhur hizb al-rajim (The Spears of the Party of the Merciful thrown at the 
Necks of the Party of the Accursed), written by al-Hajj Umar ibn Sa’id Tall (d. 
1864), the leader of the Tijaniyya caliphate, and Bughyat al-mustafid fi sharh 
Munyat al-murid (The Object of Desire for One who Benefits from the Book ‘The 
Aspiration of the Disciple’) by Muhammad al-Arabi ibn al-Sa’ih (d. 1892). The 
latter two are considered as essential handbooks by the Tijanis and the usage of 
these books was an essential part of the literary culture of the order (Seesemann, 
2009, p. 308). 
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The relevance of Sufi orders’ activism toward the idea of an umma 
 
The decline of the caliphate had left Muslim society in a somewhat 
disorganised state. In the eyes of many, not only had the caliphate failed to impose 
order over the society in their role as the post-Muhammad instrument of authority, 
it had also failed to become the spiritual symbol of the umma. The disappointment 
towards the caliphate had permeated scholarly works in which Muslim 
intellectuals discussed and debated the issue of authority, as described previously. 
From the perspective, which many held, that the caliphate had failed to fulfil its 
function in maintaining the Muslim symbolic universe, it was reasonable that they 
tried to fill the void by creating a new social movement. 
Since the caliphate had become weak and corrupted with rampant 
materialism, some Muslims sought to revitalise the Muslim society by developing 
ascetic movements. The leaders of these movements were normally possessing 
‘ilm and having deep commitment to the mystic path (Weismann, 2001, pp. 1–2). 
Among these movements, the most popular one was the Sufi movement of 
Baghdad. This movement spread to many major cities in the Muslim world, 
bringing with it a new sense of spiritualism which tries to capture the essence of 
Islam instead of spending time and energy to debate the proper form of the 
religion. While Islamic orthodoxy emphasises the distance between God and man, 
Sufism approaches the relation between God and man as a journey: a spiritual one 
which will require great effort if Sufis want to complete it.  
This new movement offered no particular organisation at first. Sufism was 
emergent as a somewhat elitist movement, only for the Chosen ones. Al-Ghazali’s 
Ihya made Sufism not only appealing to the jurists but also to the common people. 
Yet, by the eleventh century CE, Sufism still maintained a personal characteristic 
in its movements. Only in later centuries did Sufism start to provide a more 
definitive structure. There were established learning centres, with each focused on 
a shaikh. Each shaikh would teach his method of spiritualism to the adherents and, 
after a certain period of learning, the adherents would receive the silsila from the 
shaikh, signifying their initiation into a certain stage in the shaikh’s method. This 
provided an alternative structure in the Muslim society, not only mirroring the 
madhhab with their isnads but more. The shaikh also played a prominent role in 
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their students’ life as a spiritual guide, a role which was usually assigned to the 
Prophet, his Companions or the caliph. 
When Baghdad fell in 1258 CE, Muslim society lost its most precious 
symbol: the caliphate. Yet for the adherents of a Sufi shaikh, the trauma was 
lessened by the presence of the shaikh as their personal spiritual guide. Thus, 
people were attracted to Sufism and sought solace from their turbulent life in the 
Sufis’ life of piety and rigorous rituals. Sufism became a movement that provided 
distressed Muslims a route to escape from their plight. Rather than establishing 
the umma in the physical realm, Sufism was translating the concept of umma into 
a metaphysical realm, connected through dhikr and mystical rituals. Sufism taught 
that the ultimate unity that humans could achieve would not be actualised in the 
material world, as in the establishment of the Muslim caliphate, but in the spiritual 
realm, as in the return of Muslims’ souls to the Creator. This enforced a new 
“interpretation” of Muslim identity, which oriented purely in the spiritual realm, 
unlike the previous sense of identity established by the legalistic view of the 
madhhab or by the political view of caliphal movements. The latter views, while 
also claiming spiritual authority, were, ineluctably, attached to the temporal world. 
This adoption of Sufism can be understood in terms of the 
conceptualisation that Geertz (1973, p. 90) asserts. People sought to translate and 
find meaning for their life experience in the metaphysical experience of religious 
symbols and rituals -- in this case, Sufism. The rituals of Sufism were no longer 
an alternative way of interpreting Islam, but of interpreting the physical world in a 
metaphysical sense. In the frame of Berger and Luckmann (1966), adopting 
Sufism could be seen as the efforts of Muslims to perform a therapy for 
themselves so that they could still bear the vision of an umma despite the 
shattering of its embodiment. Sufism provided them with tools to analyse and 
justify the destruction of the caliphate (rampant materialism and corruption) and 
also a solution to the problem (embracing the spirit of Islam). Since their vision of 
an umma embodied in the caliphate had been destroyed, these Muslims were 
seeking to find a new embodiment of the umma within a Sufi order, in a more 
intimate relationship between a shaikh and his students. 
While the destruction of Baghdad had been traumatic, at the same time, the 
loss of the established political and intellectual structures allowed the Sufis to 
come forward as a new structure in Muslims’ life, which combined mystical and 
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religious legitimation as the source of their authority. The existing political actors 
sought cooperation with the Sufi tariqas, for a variety of reasons -- genuine 
admiration, religious piety and practical considerations – in order to bolster their 
authority. With the failure of the Mu’tazilites to impose their doctrine through the 
mihna, the majority of the scholars were either sympathetic to the Sufis or could 
not mount an adequate attack against the rising influence of Sufism. The 
publication of works such as the Ihya, which combines the mysticism of Sufism 
and the adherence to the law of the fiqh schools, further strengthened the Sufis’ 
position as a “proper” movement in Islam, increasing its popularity among general 
Muslims and scholars alike. Sufism became what Schlegell describes as “the one 
cultural and intellectual constant that bound together elite and common Muslims 
throughout the Muslim world” (Schlegell, 2002, p. 578). 
In the eighteenth century CE, when the social and political conditions in 
Muslim society floundered and degenerated, Sufi orders underwent a 
transformation. Leaders of several tariqas, in their independent efforts to address 
the social and political turmoil within the umma, revived the Sufi orders, changing 
their nature to become more active in addressing societal and political problems. 
The Sufi orders became not only a spiritual haven in the midst of a turbulent 
world but also a transformative agent that sought to address the problems and to 
create a better world in accordance with God’s will and the sunna of the Prophet. 
This effort affirmed the neo-Sufi orders as carriers of the idea of the umma. As 
Voll (1994, p. 294) observes, the neo-Sufi movements had developed a strong 
popular basis for a universalist Islamic message while working in their local 
context.  
Understandably, there were tensions that threatened the message of unity 
brought by Sufi orders. These tensions might have arisen in a particular order or 
appeared in the dynamics between two or more orders. Ay (2012) describes 
conditions which put Sufi shaikhs into different social groups in thirteenth to 
fifteenth century CE Anatolia. Other than difference in their Sufi orders, these 
shaikhs were differentiated between rural shaikhs and city shaikhs. Rural shaikhs 
lived in rural areas and usually evinced a more practical approach to mysticism. 
They lived with their families and often became the head of the village or tribe. 
The city shaikhs, on the other hand, pursued a more ascetic approach to mysticism. 
These city shaikhs were often also educated in the science of Islam, combining a 
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degree of familiarity in fiqh with their mystic tariqa (Ay, 2012, p. 6). In larger 
cities, there were also charismatic shaikhs whose influence transcended sectarian 
affiliations.  These shaikhs gathered a large number of disciples and followers and 
often acted outside of their tariqa (Ay, 2012, p. 7). 
A Sufi shaikh was often perceived as a holy man by the society. This 
image was more or less fostered by the Sufi tradition, which portrayed the ‘path’ 
as divided into various stations (maqam) and the Shaikh as the perfect human who 
had completed the spiritual journey. His status was then elevated to that of wali, or 
friend of God (Ay, 2012, p. 8). He, thus, had spiritual authority over the populace 
and, in return, the general populace would expect him to behave as a spiritually 
superior man, including being able to perform miraculous feats or to bless the 
populace with his baraka. This made the shaikhs important actors in their society 
(Ay, 2012, pp. 9–10).  
This prestige occasionally would cause rivalry not only between the 
shaikhs but also between their families and students (Ay, 2012, pp. 13–14). This 
rivalry could take the form of criticism towards the other party’s religious 
standing, accusations over their rituals or even physical fighting. One notable Sufi 
shaikh, Otman Baba (d. 1478), often entered into a dispute with other shaikhs he 
met during his travels (Ay, 2012, pp. 15–17). The objective of such dispute was to 
undermine the rival shaikh’s legitimacy and to deprive him of the source of his 
influence (Ay, 2012, p. 17). When the rival shaikh was deprived of religious 
prestige and social status, the winning shaikh could expand his teachings and 
influence, becoming more powerful both in religious and in social standing (Ay, 
2012, p. 19). 
Another form of rivalry can be seen in the document that records the law 
suit over the leadership of the Zayniyya Sufi community in seventeenth century 
Allepo. This document is preserved in Ottoman court records. The Zayniyya 
tariqa was a local tariqa in Aleppo, relatively unknown to historians. The order 
possessed a lodge in the city and  agricultural land in support of the lodge (Salati, 
2013, p. 207). The dispute over the lodge was between Shaikh Abd al-Rahman ibn 
As’ad against Shaikh Ali ibn Hajj Aslan. Shaikh Abd al-Rahman claimed to have 
the right over the lodge because he was a descendant of the founder of the lodge. 
Shaikh Ali the defendant, however, prevented him from exerciinge his right as 
descendant. After hearing witnesses who could identify Shaikh Abd al-Rahman as 
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the rightful descendant of the founder, the judge restored him his rights as the 
leader of the tariqa and over the lodge, and forbade Shaikh Ali from interfering 
with Shaikh Abd al-Rahman’s affairs (Salati, 2013, pp. 209–210).  
While it is easy to highlight the rivalries among various Sufi shaikhs to 
negate the message of unity brought by the tariqas, it is more beneficial to look at 
the bigger picture of the dynamics surrounding the Sufi orders. The rivalries 
between Sufi shaikhs were inevitable, just like rivalries between scholars of 
different madhhabs or rivalries between various political actors inside or outside 
the caliphate. Yet, despite the rivalries, the madhhabs were beneficial in the 
integration of the umma by providing Muslim society with intellectual structures 
connecting various lands and allowing the transmission of ideas from one centre 
of learning to another. The Sufi orders, despite local rivalries, also provided 
benefits to the umma, prominently with their role as the social actors which 
revitalised the concept of the umma and facilitated internalisation of it among the 
younger generation of Muslims, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. 
One fundamental characteristic that allowed the Sufi orders to embody the 
idea of an umma was the non-exclusive nature of the orders. The rivalry between 
shaikhs was usually local in nature and stemmed from either personal 
dissatisfaction over the rival’s teaching or rivalry over social achievements. In the 
more general tradition of Sufism, there was no problem with different 
interpretations of the mystic way exhibited by the various tariqas. It was even 
common for a shaikh to have been initiated in several different tariqas, mastering 
the dhikr and rituals of those tariqas before eventually chosing one in particular to 
serve (Levtzion, 2002, p. 114).  
The practice of being initiated into multiple tariqas was quite common in 
the Naqshbandiyya order around the thirteenth to fifteenth century CE. One 
particular shaikh, Ahmad al-Nakhli of Mecca (d. 1717/1718), was initiated in 
three distinct tariqas: the Naqshbandiyya, Shattariyya and Khalwatiyya. For a 
while he practised all three and performed initiation in all three. Yet, one night he 
dreamt of a meeting with the Prophet. In that dream, the Prophet instructed him to 
sit on a prayer rug belonging to Shaikh Taj al-Din al-Uthmani, a shaikh of the 
Naqshbandiyya who had died some decades ago. Shaikh Ahmad considered this 
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dream as a vision and thus chose to affiliate solely to the Naqshbandiyya 
afterwards (Le Gall, 2005, pp. 168–169).  
Sufism and the orders of mystics following the ‘way’ or ‘path’ were thus 
an invaluable social actor in the construction of the Muslim umma. The 
flourishing of Sufism had multiple beneficial effects in the maintenance of a 
global consciousness, of being part of a greater umma. Sufism was also important 
in maintaining the idea of the umma as a social reality through its unique 
attributes.. First, Sufism provided a powerful method to heal the trauma post-
destruction of Baghdad. Sufism attached a new metaphysical dimension on to the 
concept of the umma, making it more bearable for Muslims to live and witness the 
destruction of the caliphate, which had been a powerful symbol of the umma for 
hundreds of years. Second, the Sufi practitioners and their orders also became the 
social groups supporting the umma, perhaps unwittingly at first but then more 
assertively as the neo-Sufism transformation gave them a more active role in 
propagating and defending the idea of a larger umma. The organisational structure 
of the Sufi orders became new networks that not only assisted Muslims in their 
travels but also provided new centres for disseminating the narratives of Islam, 
further strengthening the image of an integrated umma. 
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Chapter Seven: 
The Umma as a Symbolic Universe 
 
The Prophetic umma  
The concept of the umma is a central concept in the social life of Muslims. 
The umma was a fundamental concept with both transcendental and social 
characteristics. In Qur’anic terminology, the umma refers to a body of people who 
are objects of the divine plan of salvation (Denny, 1975). The Qur’an uses this 
term to refer to various people of faith, not only Muslims, such as implied in the 
term ummatun wahida (Qur’an 21:9214), ummatun muslimah (Qur’an 2:12815) and 
ummatun wasatan (Qur’an 2:1416), as described in Chapter Four of this thesis. Yet, 
in one of the Qur’anic verses, sura 3:110, kuntum khaira ummatin ukhrijat 
linnaasi, the Qur’an specifically addresses the Muslim umma and puts it in a 
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 The full verse of the Qur’an, sura 21:92, is: Inna haadhihi ummatukum ummatan wahidatan wa 
ana rabbukum fa’ buduun  
[Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me]. 
15
 This verse of the Qur’an should be put into the larger context:  it refers to a prayer from 
Abraham to God, which is described in the Qur’an, sura 2:127-129, as follows: 
Wa idh yarfa'u ibrahimu al-qawa’ida min al-baiti wa isma'ilu rabbana taqabbal minna. Innaka 
anta as-sami'ul-‘alimu. [127] 
[And (mention) when Abraham was raising the foundations of the House and (with him) Ishmael, 
(saying), “Our Lord, accept (this) from us. Indeed You are the Hearing, the Knowing.] 
Rabbanaa waj’alna muslimain laka wa min dhurriyyatina ummatan muslimatan laka wa ‘arinaa 
manaasikanaa wa tub ‘alainaa. Innaka anta at-tawwabu ar-rahimu. [128] 
[Our Lord, and make us Muslims (in submission) to You and from our descendants a Muslim 
nation (in submission) to You. And show us our rites and accept our repentance. Indeed, You are 
the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful.] 
Rabbanaa wa-b’ath fiihim rasuulan minhum yatluu ‘alaihim aayaatika wa yu'allimuhumu al-
kitaba wa al-hikmata wa yuzakkiihim. Innaka anta al-‘azizu a1-hakim. [129] 
[Our Lord, and send among them a messenger from themselves who will recite to them Your 
verses and teach them the Book and wisdom and purify them. Indeed, You are the Exalted in 
Might, the Wise.”] 
16
 Sura 2, verse 143 should be put into the context of moving the qibla, or direction of prayer, from 
Jerusalem to Mecca; thus it addressed the Muslims specifically.  
Sayaquulu as-sufahaau min an-naasi maa wallahum ‘an qiblatihimu al-latii kaanuu ‘alaihaa. Qul 
lillahi al-masyriqu wa al-maghribu. Yahdii man yashaau ilaa syiraati mustaqiim. [142] 
[The foolish among the people will say, "What has turned them away from their qibla, which they 
used to face?" Say, "To Allah belongs the east and the west. He guides whom He wills to a straight 
path."] 
 Wa kadzaalika ja’alnaakum ummatan wasatan litakuunuu shuhadaa-a ‘alaa an-naasi wa 
yatakuuna ar-rasuulu ‘alaikum shahiida. … [143…] 
[And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the 
Messenger will be a witness over you….] 
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global context. The Muslim umma is one of the many communities in the world 
and it can be the best through its faith and good deeds (Denny, 1977a, pp. 36–38). 
Despite being originally framed in the religious terminology of the Islamic 
faith, the concept of the umma was eventually transformed into a social term and 
applicable practices. Not only did it permeate the daily life of the believers, it gave 
meaning to their existence; it also gave them a place in the broader context of the 
universe. The umma was becoming an overarching term that connected various 
institutions and social practices in the society and, to some extent, was taken for 
granted by the Muslims as the natural condition of a society. In the conceptual 
framework based on Berger and Luckmann (1966), discussed in Chapters One and 
Two, the umma had become a symbolic universe living in the Muslims’ minds.  
The transformation of the umma from a religious terminology into a 
symbolic universe occurred through the possibility of religious activities in 
inducing motivation and moods to the believers. As detailed by Geertz (1973, pp. 
96–98), religious activities motivate the believers by providing the believers with 
the underlying cause they strive for. In the case of the Muslim umma, it is possible 
that the social activities done by Muslims are within the framework of the Islamic 
umma when the Muslims perceived their actions as required steps to achieve the 
Qur’anic virtue of khaira umma described in the verse above. For example, when 
a certain Muslim goes to faraway places in order to spread Islam to the people of 
other cultures and to integrate them in the greater Muslim society, this action of 
travelling and spreading Islam could be considered as motivated by the concept of 
the umma. 
Other than providing a motivational goal, Geertz (1973, pp. 96–98) also 
explains that religious activities can influence the moods of the believers by 
conditioning the believers to do or avoid certain actions. This behavioural-shaping 
ability is mainly achieved through the practice of religious rituals. By attending 
religious rituals, believers shape their worldview in accordance with the religion’s. 
They then conform their actions to the values embedded in this particular 
worldview. Geertz’s assertion that religion influences the societal activities of the 
believers is important in understanding the transformation of the umma from a 
religious idea to a societal phenomenon. Through Muhammad, Islam introduced 
the notion that human society is characterised by faith, instead of by blood. In the 
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time and location where tribalism was the prevalent societal system, it was a 
radical new idea.  
At first, Muhammad seemingly had tried to establish a Muslim society 
within the existing context of Arab tribalism in Mecca. Yet, it was soon apparent 
that the established societal structure in Mecca resisted these attempts (al-Tabari, 
1988a; Donner, 1999, p. 8). Frustrated by the constant rejection, Muhammad then 
aspired to build a new society outside the existing establishment of Mecca. He 
sent the believers to other tribes and to far countries such as Abyssinia (Abu-
Shahlieh, 1996, p. 37). When the people of Yathrib received his envoy warmly 
and pledged to support him, Muhammad was determined to build the new Islamic 
society in Yathrib. He then inspired the believers to take the religious journey of 
hijra, emigrating from Mecca to Yathrib, before finally doing so himself (Donner, 
1999, p. 9). As soon as Muhammad had arrived in Yathrib, which was then 
renamed Medina, he established a society of the believers, which then became 
known as the initial form of the Islamic umma (Robinson, 2009, p. 187). 
Hijra means to abandon or to separate oneself from their roots (Masud, 
1990, p. 30; Abu-Shahlieh, 1996, p. 37). Hijra was considered as a sacred 
religious duty of the believers. Yet, it was also more than religious terminology. It 
surely had immediate non-religious implications. One such implication of hijra 
was the establishment of a new society in Medina, which, unlike other societies in 
Arabia at that time, was not based on blood or kinship but on Islamic values. To 
perform the hijra was not simply changing one’s location from Mecca to Medina 
but it required the person to completely discard his/her allegiance, attachment and 
deference from the tribe and changed it to the umma (Watt, 1956, p. 242). It was a 
total societal change and it allowed the umma to mobilise its members, even 
against their former tribes and kin. Hijra and the establishment of the Muslim 
umma in Medina had been the beginning of what Donner (1999, p. 9) calls  
“Islam’s long life as a political force”.  
Watt observes an interesting characteristic of the umma. While it was 
natural for tribes to have their own territorial basis, the members of the umma did 
not recognise such a basis for the umma. It is true that the umma was based on 
Medina and its core members were Muslims living in the city, but the umma was 
also thought of as vaguely translocal. This lack of territorial basis became more 
pronounced with the inclusion of various tribes outside of Medina after their 
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conversion to Islam (Watt, 1956, pp. 241–242). This observation is interesting 
because it recalls how the Qur’anic verses characterised the umma: that it is a 
society of mankind and is not limited to a certain territorial area. For example, a 
verse of the Qur’an that orders the believers to embark on hijra states:  
And whoever emigrates for the cause of Allah will find on the earth 
many [alternative] locations and abundance. And whoever leaves 
his home as an emigrant to Allah and His Messenger and then 
death overtakes him - his reward has already become incumbent 
upon Allah. And Allah is ever Forgiving and Merciful. 
Sura 4 al- Nisa’ (The Women) verse 100. 
 
Ibn Kathir (2000a, p. 430) describes in his tafsir that there were several 
historical accounts considered as the cause (asbab al-nuzul) of this verse. While 
these historical accounts vary in detail, they speak about the same event: that a 
person embarked on a journey, leaving Mecca for another city or country to 
perform the hijra, passed away before reaching his destination. Upon hearing the 
news, the Prophet then passed on the revelation, praising the person and 
commending his action. Ibn Kathir then concludes that this verse, among others, 
motivates the believers to do hijra and assures them that Allah will provide safety 
and sustenance wherever they go, despite the foreignness of the land of their 
destination.  
This verse, and others like it, combine the order to do hijra with the 
vastness of the Earth that they can travel to (Qur’an 4:97), that Allah’s Mercy is 
with the Emigrants (Qur’an 2:218), that Allah will provide and sustain them 
throughout their ordeals, both in this world and the hereafter (Qur’an 3:195, 
16:41). These verses build a religious narrative breaking a common consciousness 
at that time which relied on kinship and was restrained by locality. Thus, coming 
back to Watt’s observation on the lack of locality exhibited by the members of the 
early umma, it is possible that the early Muslims had decided to avoid claiming 
fixed territorial basis so as to align themselves with the spirit of the Qur’an. This 
thought process might had been done as part of their rational choice or, 
subconsciously in line with Geertz (1973), it might have been affected by the 
divine words of a religion to which they were devoted. In later stages of the 
development of the umma, this lack of attachment to a certain locale encouraged 
the Muslims to travel and to establish translocal connections, and provide an 
enduring basis for a global umma, as this thesis has argued in previous chapters. 
 209 
The establishment of the umma in Medina put Muslims on an equal 
standing vis-à-vis the Quraysh of Mecca. Muhammad then used his position to 
forge unity among the Arab tribes. According to Watt (1960, pp. 142–143), the 
notion of unity among the Arabs before Islam was rudimentary. It was Islam that 
strengthened this sense of unity by implicitly alluding to the Arabs as an 
independent cultural unit. Muhammad then took this into practice by building 
what Hodgson (1974a, p. 187) calls an “Arab commonwealth”. Soon, Muhammad 
contested the influence of the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires over the region. 
Hamidullah (1945) describes in great detail how Muhammad conducted activities 
such as correspondence and sending and receiving envoys to various regional 
powers -- practices which can be perceived, in our modern language, as 
international relations activities. The scholar al-Mubarakpuri (1996) also dedicates 
parts of his book to discuss these translocal interactions and networks that 
Muhammad tried to establish.  
If the Qur’an had instilled a sense of global consciousness to the believers 
through its religious narrative, Muhammad then became the first one to embrace 
the idea. It was through him and his teachings that the global consciousness 
embedded in the Qur’anic verses was introduced to the believers and then, 
considering how eager the believers were to emulate the Prophet, became 
proliferated among the Muslims. The proliferation of this global consciousness 
not only occurred during high level meetings, such as when Muslims observed the 
sending and receiving of envoys. Muhammad also instilled this sense of 
consciousness through daily activities recorded by Muslim scholars. Ibn Ishaq 
(1967, p. 452) narrated an account from Salman al-Farsi, a Companion of Persian 
descent, that during the War of the Trench, Salman and other Companions were 
busy digging the trench but they found a rock which gave them trouble. Hearing 
this, Muhammad came to them and struck the rock. Sparks flared three times and 
Muhammad reportedly said, “Did you really see that, Salman? The first means 
that God has opened up to me the Yemen. The second Syria and the West. And 
the third the east.”  
Looking through the perspective of the theoretical framework of this thesis, 
this kind of interaction between Muhammad and his Companions could be 
considered as an act of externalisation, how a person communicates his/her 
consciousness and ideas to others around him/her and then constructs a socially 
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accepted intersubjectivity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 34). Language, the 
choice of words, may become the sign bearing a certain meaning in the 
objectivation process (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 50–51);  in the previously 
mentioned case, the words of the Prophet were accompanied by explicit reference 
to  ‘sparks’ and eventual shattering of the offending rock, giving the process a 
much stronger impression in the believers’ minds. When the attending 
Companions shared this occurrence with others, the idea that God had sanctified 
the victory of Medina over Yemen, Syria and both empires on the West and East 
was embraced by the Companions and became the socially accepted truth, or 
prophecy in this case. The Muslims kept spreading this to other believers and to 
the next generation, thus beginning the internalisation process of that idea in 
Muslim society.  
The incident above not only motivated the believers against the upcoming 
war but, more profoundly, enlightened their conscious minds that the Muslims of 
Medina were on the same playing field with the Yemenis, Syrians and people of 
other nations. They were no longer isolated in their secluded, middle-of-nowhere 
corner. This kind of message, that the Muslims are part of the wider world, is 
consistently present in both the Qur’an and hadith. The Qur’an provides the 
fundamental idea of a global society and then Muhammad refined the idea and put 
it in application. The two have become the source of a new kind of awareness, a 
consciousness to see and think of Muslims as part of a wider world, and to provide 
the moods and motivations to Muslims to actualise the globality of this message. 
In the perspective of “norm life cycle” theory proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998, pp. 895–896), when the Qur’an started to build its narrative of the idea of a 
global society and encouraged the believers to perform hijra, the Islamic global 
consciousness was entering its stage of norm emergence. Muhammad was the first 
and foremost norm entrepreneur who mounted campaigns and disseminated this 
global view as much as he could to the point of the establishment of Muslim 
society in Medina. His negotiation with the Arab tribes could be seen as his effort 
to negotiate the tribes’ acceptance of the Qur’anic norm. 
The conquest of Mecca and the emergence of the umma as a prominent 
regional actor could be seen as the point where the Islamic global consciousness 
reached its tipping point and entered its second stage, norm cascade. Islam had 
won against paganism, the Muslims were victorious against their archenemy, the 
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Quraysh. The people of Arabia acknowledged the superior force of the believers 
and they started to embrace Islam. The Qur’an illustrated the growing acceptance 
and the eagerness of the people of Arabia towards Islam in one of its suras, Al-
Nashr (110):1-3. Ibn Kathir (2000b) in his tafsir of this sura describes a narration 
from al-Bukhari, that a Companion of the Prophet said after the Conquest of 
Mecca that the people rushed to the Prophet and professed their acceptance of 
Islam. Afterwards, in two years’ time, the peninsula of Arabia was described as 
“laden with faith”. Whether the later converts were sincere in their profession of 
faith or not, and whether their intention was mainly to adopt the message or to 
adapt to the new and decisive political reality, is irrelevant to this discussion. As 
stated by Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16), while the adopters of 
certain norms might maintain their pragmatic interests, unwittingly they become 
deeply involved in the moral discourse brought by the norm enterpreneurs, in this 
case, by Muhammad. 
Yet, as Muhammad passed away, the seemingly perfect society of 
Muslims was shaken. It is fair to assume that the shock was multi-dimensional. It 
was a spiritual and religious shock, because Islam had lost its prophet, and also a 
social and political shock because the Muslims had lost their leader. It is important 
to note that the first generation of Muslim society had not developed a 
sophisticated explanation of how to bring the concept of the umma into realisation. 
During the first generation of Muslims, the umma was perceived as the divinely 
sanctioned form of social practice. Yet, the Qur’an does not provide a clear 
instruction on handling various societal and political issues (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 
183). There had to be someone or some officials who had the authority to lead the 
Muslims and maintain the unity of the umma, and that position of leadership was 
shouldered by Muhammad, which intertwined and coexisted with his position as 
the Prophet. The social and political functions of the umma were inseparable with 
its nature as a religious community (Khadduri, 1955). Thus, the death of 
Muhammad posed a question: should the umma continue to exist after the death of 
the Prophet?  
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Institutionalisation in the historical umma  
The death of Muhammad had taken away the authoritative figure from the 
emerging umma and posited the question on whether the fledging state should 
survive after him (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 197). The death of Muhammad forced the 
Muslims to question the umma. Thus, the Muslim society felt the need to appoint 
a leader and then to develop political theory both to define the leader’s authority 
over the society and to support his political actions. Through political consensus, 
the umma had elected Abu Bakr as the first successor of Muhammad (Hodgson, 
1974a, p. 198). Abu Bakr legitimated his authority not only on the basis of 
political consensus, though. Since the umma was founded based on religious 
values, he continued to use Islam as the foundation of his rule. Yet, because he 
was not a prophet and did not receive divine revelation, his authority depended on 
his closeness to Muhammad and how his behaviour mirrored the Prophet’s way 
(Hodgson, 1974a, p. 207) 
This arrangement did not, however, appease some groups of Muslims. Part 
of them then decided to follow new prophets and prophetesses as the replacement 
of Muhammad, which is anathema to Islamic teaching stipulating that Muhammad 
is the last Prophet. Another group of Muslims decided to reject the political 
authority of Medina and refused to pay zakat. Thus, the first Caliph was faced 
with secessionist groups challenging both the political authority of Medina over 
various other Arab tribes and the religious legitimacy of Islam. These secessionist 
movements culminated in the Wars of Ridda or wars against apostasy in Muslim 
historical accounts. The name confirmed the religious nature of the wars from the 
Muslims’ side. While Donner (1981, pp. 85–86) argues that some of the groups 
were purely political and did not defy Islamic teachings, Muslim scholars such as 
Ibn Kathir (2006, pp. 76–78), for example, argue that the “political” groups were 
defying the obligation to pay zakat, which is part of the basic obligations for a 
Muslim. Thus, their seccesionist movements were religious in nature and the 
actors were considered as both political enemies and religious apostles. 
As we saw in Chapter Five, during this period, the umma underwent a 
subtle change. While maintaining the complex nature as an amalgamation of 
political and religious society, the appointment of Abu Bakr transformed the 
umma from a society led by a leader-prophet to a society led by an elected leader. 
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In some ways, the umma had evolved in place of the social contract of the state 
(Khadduri, 1955, pp. 9–11). Abu Bakr’s successor, Umar, managed to strengthen 
the fledging society by appointing persons known as close companions of 
Muhammad, both from the muhajirin and the ansar, in various governmental 
posts (Lapidus, 2002, pp. 45–46). The umma emerged as a strong political entity 
to the point that it managed to defeat the aging Sassanid Empire. Within only a  
few years, the umma controlled a wide swath of territory from Egypt to Persia, 
including the holy city of Jerusalem (al-Suyuti, 1881, pp. 135–137). 
The young umma was not without problems, however. Umar’s policy to 
distribute favour based on a person’s closeness to Muhammad and their perceived 
devotion to Islam drew the ire of the aristocrats. The Quraysh tried to re-establish 
their power in Mecca and Medina. Other old aristocratic families in outer 
provinces also did the same. Even the tribal chiefs were seeking to expand their 
influence and gain their share of power (Lapidus, 2002, p. 46). The rule of Umar, 
while recorded as an idealised period in Muslim tradition, was rife with 
conflicting interests. These conflicts are also recorded in Islamic history, such as 
Umar’s decision to dismiss Khalid al-Walid from his position as the general of the 
Muslim army because Khalid was too famous (al-Tabari, 1989a, pp. 106–108). 
While the Muslim historical accounts assert that Umar dismissed Khalid to 
maintain the purity of intention among the Muslims, for them to serve under God 
instead of under Khalid, this event can be interpreted differently -- as part of the 
constant struggle of power and for popular support in the Muslim umma. 
Further challenge awaited Umar’s successors. During the rule of Uthman, 
the struggle for power between various political actors within the society 
sharpened, culminating with the assassination of Uthman (Lapidus, 2002, p. 46). 
Despite Ali’s efforts to mend the rift, the different political aspirations within the 
umma hardened into a series of civil wars and took on the dimension of religious 
schism between the Sunnis and the Shi’a, and to lesser extent, the Kharijis, with 
each side claiming their authority over the whole umma. To support their claim, 
each developed their own system of leadership over the umma and provided 
different interpretations of historical events to support their claim. While the 
Sunnis considered the Qur’an and the traditions of Muhammad narrated through 
unbroken chains of scholars as their main sources of belief, the Shi’a put emphasis 
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on the loyalty to Ali and his descendants as their main source of belief (Lapidus, 
2002, pp. 94–95).  
After an idea is adopted as a social reality through the objectivation 
process, the idea goes through the habituation process, making it a habit of the 
members of the society; it thus further proliferates through the institutionalisation 
process. Through institutionalisation, the society controls its members and makes 
them conform to the agreed idea (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 70–77). In the 
case of the early Muslim society, the idea of Islam was externalised by 
Muhammad and had been accepted as the social reality in Medina by the time of 
the hijra and on the Arabian peninsula a few years after the conquest of Mecca. 
The Muslim society expanded from only Medina to most territory on the 
peninsula. Islam had become the social reality. Yet, suddenly Muhammad passed 
away and the cornerstone of this social reality vanished, disrupting the 
habitualisation process before the institutionalisation process had even begun. The 
period of the al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun, the Rightly Guided Caliphs, was a period 
of turbulence. After a brief moment of victorious surge, the death of Muhammad 
made the Islamic movement lose their adopters to the secessionist movements. 
The global consciousness introduced by Islam reverted back to the parochial 
consciousness of tribalism. The sign of this reversion of consciousness can be 
seen during the Wars of Ridda, from the way some of the tribes tried to separate 
themselves from Medina and go back to their tribal ways (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 
197). 
The early Muslims tried to adapt their society to address this development. 
Their first effort was to determine who should step up as the successor of 
Muhammad. This was a step in institutionalising the leadership upon the Muslims, 
from a charismatic person to an institutional office. There were contending views 
during this process. The Helpers were concerned that the conquest of Mecca 
reunified the Emigrants with their estranged families, the Quraysh, thus resulting 
in the subjugation of the Medinans. Yet, the Helpers had their old rivalry between 
the Aus and the Khazraj, making a unified front of Helpers difficult to achieve 
(Kennedy, 2004, p. 51). The succession was finally solved when Abu Bakr, Umar 
and Abu Ubaida ibn al-Jarrah, as the leaders of the Emigrants, went to meet the 
Helpers and they managed to reach an agreement, to choose Abu Bakr as the 
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successor of the Prophet based on his closeness to Muhammad (Kennedy, 2004, p. 
52).  
The appointment of Abu Bakr as the Caliph was an attempt to 
institutionalise Islam after Muhammad’s death. With the appointment of Abu 
Bakr, the early Muslims tried to institutionalise the authority of Muhammad into 
an office, the caliphate, and they chose the holder of this office according to 
degrees of closeness toward Muhammad. According to Donner (2010, pp. 146–
147), the Rightly Guided Caliphs were chosen by the Muslims because they had 
been close to Muhammad and were considered to embody the central values that 
the Believers believed in. At the same time, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were of 
different clans, with none of them from Muhammad’s Bani Hashim. This, argues 
Donner, suggests that the Muslims did not value the genealogical or lineage factor 
as the main criterion for choosing a leader.   
Deviation and Heresy 
The secessionists, whatever their reasons were, disregarded the 
institutionalisation process. They expressed their disagreement towards the 
established Islamic society and this was not well-received by Caliph Abu Bakr, 
who then conducted a campaign against the secessionists. Berger and Luckmann 
(1966, pp. 130–134) argue that when a society is threatened by “deviants” who 
advocate ideas challenging the accepted social reality, the society has at the very 
least two options to deal with these “deviants”. First, to perform therapy toward 
the deviants. To perform therapy, society needs to develop a body of knowledge 
or “therapeutic theory”, which consists of theorising the source of the pathology, 
developing diagnostic methods and performing curative efforts to allow the 
deviants to embrace the societal truth and return to the society (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, pp. 130–132). Second, nihilation, by which society assigns a 
negative status to the deviants, giving them negative legitimation; in some 
circumstances, this might proceed to physical liquidation of the deviants (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 132–133). 
The Wars of Ridda could be seen as attempts to discipline members of the 
society who had deviated and challenged the agreed idea. The wars seemed to be 
nihilistic in nature, as seen from the negative labelling of the secessionists as 
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“apostates” and labelling their actions as “apostasy”. Donner (1981, pp. 85–86) 
argues that while some of the secessionists were not apostates, unlike some who 
claimed to be new prophets and prophetesses, the status of apostasy was used 
indiscriminately. Yet, Baladhuri and Hitti (1916) provide a detailed account of the 
wars which show that some of the apostates were forgiven and received once 
again as members of the Islamic umma after repudiating their secessionist efforts. 
These were both the rank-and-file members of the secessionist movements and 
their leaders, such as Tulaihah ibn Khuwailid, who had claimed to be a new 
prophet in Buzakhah (Baladhuri and Hitti, 1916, p. 146) and Sajah, who had 
claimed to be a prophetess and the wife of another false prophet, Musailamah. 
Citing the Muslim historian Hisham ibn al-Kalbi (d. 819 CE), Baladhuri reports 
that, after the defeat of her husband’s army, Sajah accepted Islam, emigrated to 
Basrah and remained a good Muslim until her death (Baladhuri and Hitti, 1916, p. 
151). These accounts show the theraupetic side of the Wars of Ridda. 
During the Wars of Ridda, there were two sides of the society with 
different strengths of legitimacy to their claims. The side of Abu Bakr and the 
Companions enjoyed higher legitimacy over their claim to the office of caliphate 
thanks to their history with the Prophet. The question of legitimacy was more 
problematic on the secessionist side. First, there was no one, overarching 
secessionist movement. Second, the movements did not have a strong ideological 
narrative able to compete with the Islamic narrative. Some of the movements were 
based on tribal affinity, a movement to step back to the pre-Islamic tribal way and 
its parochial consciousness. The false prophets and prophetesses did claim trans-
tribal leadership but there were too many of them, limiting their support to that of 
their own tribes and kin. The victory of Abu Bakr over the seccesionists 
strengthened the unity of the umma, at least until the next conflict arose. 
Another kind of conflict occurred a few years later. Unlike the Wars of 
Ridda, the internal civil wars during the rule of Ali and in later centuries 
represented more fierce and systematic challenges to the leadership of the whole 
umma. These conflicts were not sporadic or tribal in nature but continuous 
throughout the Muslim lands. These conflicts consisted of conceptual and 
practical dimensions. On the conceptual level, there was the development of 
bodies of knowledge that provided different and contending interpretations on 
how the umma should be organised. On a practical level, there were conflicts and 
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contestations between various actors, each trying to promote and impose their 
interpretation on to the whole umma. Referring to the theoretical framework 
articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 124), these conflicts over the 
interpretation of a symbolic universe could be considered as “heresy”. 
The presence of “heresy” in the narrative of Islamic society started during 
Ali’s rule. The death of Uthman was still unfinished business and Uthman’s 
family demanded that Ali punish the wrongdoers before he could rule. Uthman’s 
family was essentially ruling Mecca and Syria, blocking these provinces from 
giving allegiance to Ali (Donner, 2010, pp. 157–158) Meanwhile, Ali’s major 
supporters, the Helpers of Medina, were rather unsympathetic to Uthman’s family 
because they felt that Uthman’s policy in appointing his cousin to oversee the 
market in Medina had undermined the Helpers’ control even in their own city 
(Kennedy, 2004, p. 75). While the senior Companions were bickering and found 
themselves in different, conflicted camps, the general mood of the populace 
turned to the worse. Since the leadership was embroiled in disputes over wealth, 
land and status, the general populace assumedly thought that the leadership had 
strayed away from the principles of piety (Donner, 2010, p. 151).  
As we have seen, divisions inside the umma did not end with the Battle of 
the Camel. During the first civil war, Ali and his supporters had to face Mu’awiya 
and supporters. Both parties had senior Companions with them. Both parties used 
the Qur’an and the teaching of Islam to support their claims. When a group 
splintered from Ali’s camp and became what is known as the Kharijis, the division 
turned into a three-camps conflict, each claiming authority over the whole umma. 
Each of these factions then developed a sophisticated body of knowledge to 
support their claim. All of these movements intertwined the sacred and the 
profane. They were both political movement and religious doctrines. 
Universe-maintenance: theological developments  
The development of theology to support their particular idea of the umma 
is consistent with the mechanism of universe-maintenance. As argued by Berger 
and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–129), there are four levels of knowledge which can 
be used to support an idea by providing rational explanation and normative 
justification to it: mythology, theology, philosophy and science. Mythology 
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provides the most basic legitimation to a conception of reality, explaining the 
penetration of the sacred into day-to-day social reality. Theology has a greater 
degree of systematisation than mythology. It also requires the development of 
disciplined bodies of knowledge to support it, such as was exhibited in Islamic 
history by the development of the fields of hadith and fiqh to support the 
theological positions of the Sunnis and Shi’a. Philosophy and science are, by way 
of contrast, a secular form of legitimation to the extent that science removes the 
sacred from day-to-day social reality. 
This development was apparent especially in the case of the Shi’a. At first, 
the conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi’a was political in nature but then each 
side developed theological arguments both as the consequences of their political 
views or to provide higher moral and religious ground on their political view. 
According to Lapidus (2002, pp. 95–96) there were two concerns in Shi’i religious 
circles during the middle of the eighth century: to develop their own tradition of 
hadith and to defend the legitimacy of the Shi’i Imamate. These were imperative 
in order to support their political claim over the succession. These efforts were 
parallel with the efforts to codify the hadith and to develop theories of the 
caliphate from the Sunni side. Scholars like al-Mawardi to some extent might 
have developed their theories partly to defend the legitimacy of the Sunni 
caliphate against attack from Shi’i scholars (Hanne, 2004).  
Not only Sunni and Shi’a developed their own bodies of knowledge. The 
Khariji movement to some extent also developed their own interpretation of the 
umma and its leadership, adamantly characterising a leader based on their rigid 
view of piety. It was very active as a political movement, despite its number being 
relatively low (Lapidus, 2002, p. 47; Donner, 2010, pp. 163, 167-168). The 
Mu’tazilite movement in later centuries also developed their own interpretation of 
the umma and tried to establish it as the correct interpretation through the mihna, 
in which the Abbasid caliph, al-Ma’mun (r. 813-833 CE), decreed that any 
religious judge, or qadi, had to embrace Mu’tazilism or be dismissed or jailed 
(Fakhry, 1999, pp. 278–281).  
The presence of contending theological movements, such as Sunnism, 
Shi’ism, Kharijism and Mu’tazilism, is prevalent in the history of the umma. 
These theological movements were then supported by various groups within the 
society, each claiming the legitimacy of their cause by citing the theological 
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framework developed and labelling the others as heretics. There was interplay 
between religion, politics and social movements in each case of heretical dispute. 
In the case of the Kharijis, for example, this group was formed by the pious 
believers of Kufa. They were against Ali’s decision to end the civil war using 
arbitration. Their opinion was, by putting the matter to arbitration, Ali had 
supplanted God’s will with human will (Donner, 2010, p. 162). The Kharijis then 
developed their own interpretation of the umma and its leadership. They put heavy 
emphasis on piety, using it as the sole characteristic for their imam (Hawting, 
2000, p. 3). While this at a glance could be considered as an egalitarian movement, 
the extreme Kharijite branch advocated indiscriminate killings, including rejecting 
other Muslims not adhering to their principles, considering them sinful and liable 
to be killed unless they accepted the Kharijites’ imam and their doctrine (Hawting, 
2000, p. 4; Black, 2011, pp. 16–17). 
The Shi’a assumed a different position. The Shi’a considered lineage was 
the ultimate prerequisite for an imam. According to the Shi’a, since Ali was the 
legitimate caliph, it would be imperative to maintain the succession through his 
bloodline. This view then evolved and Shi’i scholars developed a theological 
argument to support their claim over the leadership of the umma, arguing that the 
Prophet had designated Ali as his successor at the event of Ghadir Khumm 
(Berkey, 2003, p. 131). By the end of the ninth century, this concept had evolved 
into the infallibility and sinless nature, or ma’sum, of the Imams (Lapidus, 2002, p. 
95). The Shi’a had been mainly supported by the close followers of Ali in Kufa 
but by focusing on under-privileged Muslims and consistently asserting their place 
as the opposition to the worldly Umayyad government, Ali’s descendants gained 
the respect and support of many Muslims throughout Islamic lands (Kennedy, 
2004, p. 77).  
The group within the Muslim society now known as the Sunnis was not 
readily defined during the early century of the umma, unlike the Kharijis or the 
Shi’a. Schacht (1964; 1979) argues that Sunni legal thinking started to develop in 
the second century of the hijra, basing his argument on the development of usul 
al-fiqh in the Shafi’i school. Melchert (1997, pp. xxi–xxii) and Motzki (2002, pp. 
287–291) argue that the development of Sunni legal schools had started by the end 
of the first century of the hijra, as can be seen in the development of the Hanafi 
school in Kufa and the Maliki school in Hijaz. With regard to the political 
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dimension, the Sunnis acknowledged the legitimacy of all four Rightly Guided 
Caliphs and primarily focused on supporting the unity of the umma (Hodgson, 
1974a, p. 278). This group slowly built on their political conceptualisation of the 
umma and its leadership under the caliphate, as described in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five. 
Politically, the Mu’tazilites had been neutral in political contestation 
between these three factions. They were the rationalist scholars, putting reason 
above passionate piety. Yet, when the Mu’tazilites supported al-Ma’mun (r. 813-
833 CE) and together enforced the violent mihna in 833 CE, it had become 
another political/religious faction within the umma (Black, 2011, pp. 26–27). 
Mu’tazilite scholar, al Jahiz, supported al-Ma’mun and the Abbasids in general. 
He argues that there are differences between the enlightened elite and the mass. 
Thus, it is impossible to leave the election of a leader to the masses, who do not 
even understand what the leadership is for and, instead, he relies on the elite to 
choose the leader. According to al-Jahiz, the important characteristics for a leader 
are intelligence, erudition and having good habits, and these qualities should be 
observable in a particular candidate, in contrast to the Shi’ite idea of a hidden 
leader (Black, 2011, p. 29). The violent mihna continued after the death of al-
Ma’mun and lasted for fifteen years (833-848 CE). At the end of the day, the 
mihna failed and damaged the reputation of the Abbasids in general (Donner, 
1999, p. 27).   
Objectivation and Legitimation processes 
The Islamisation process and the caliphate 
The contestation between these various movements was one of the major 
themes in Muslim history. This contestation mainly affected the political unity of 
the umma. The institution of the caliphate, which was once anticipated to be a 
unifying force over the body of the umma, had failed to do so. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, the combination between constant conceptual contestation and 
constant territorial expansion had made it hard to maintain one, unified, caliphate 
throughout Muslim history. Yet, despite its shortcomings, the caliphate and the 
Caliph himself had become important symbols of, and to, the umma (Donner, 
1999, p. 18). There were also various achievements done or ordered by various 
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Caliphs which inevitably helped the integration process between various Muslim 
locales. The Umayyads, for example, were considered the pioneers of the 
Islamisation process throughout the Muslim lands (Donner, 2010, pp. 203–217), 
which unwittingly provided the society with a common platform to interact.  
The Islamisation process done by the Umayyads likely stemmed from their 
need to provide stronger legitimacy over their rule. Because of civil strife, it was 
considered prudent to adopt policies which would strengthen their rule. At the 
same time, unwittingly perhaps, these policies helped in the integration of the 
umma. Donner (2010, pp. 203–217) describes several policies of the Umayyads 
which were in line with the theoretical frameworks advocated by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) and Geertz (1973), such as the minting of new coinages with 
the shahada inscription. Possibly in order to strengthen his image as a pious 
Muslim, Abdul al-Malik (r. 685-705) minted coins only with the shahada and 
Qur’anic verses inscribed on them. This design was considered a radical departure 
from the designs of common coins of Byzantine origin.  
While this monetary policy might have financial intent and effect, it also 
served the objectivation process of a unified umma. The presence and utilisation 
of these coins helped the people inside the Umayyads’ territory to build a 
consciousness that they were part of an integrated society. If people from Syria 
and Hijaz traded using the same coins as people from Kufa, surely they were part 
of the same society? And if these coins bore the holy inscriptions, surely this 
society was also blessed by God? The same policy of minting coins to empower 
political legitimacy was also adopted by Abdurrahman III, the Umayyad Caliph in 
al-Andalus. In order to stop the distribution of Fatimid coins, which could be seen 
as a tool of Shi’i propaganda, Abdurrahman III ordered the minting of Andalusian 
Umayyad coins with an engraving claiming him as “the servant of God 
Abdurrahman, Commander of the Faithful, who brings victory to the religion” 
(Fierro, 2005, p. 59).  
Donner (2010, pp. 217–218) also states that the Umayyad rulers were 
involved in the elaboration of a story of Islam’s origins. While the efforts to 
construct a unified narrative on Islam and early Muslim history were done by 
many people in the umma, the Umayyads invited and provided patronage to 
knowledgeable scholars. Through this story of Islamic origins, the society built a 
common history --of the Prophet, of the early society of Believers that he had 
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established, of how this society continued to exist over the decades after 
Muhammad’s death. The goal of this narrative, Donner (2010, p. 218) argues, was 
to legitimate the contemporary umma in general and to educate the next 
generation on the legitimacy of the umma. This is precisely a form of 
institutionalisation of history in order to introduce the socially accepted idea as the 
“objective truth” to the younger generation (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 70–
77). It also provided legitimation to the institutions in the umma by ascribing 
meaning and cognitive validity through the presence of unified historical narrative 
of the Prophet, or sira, which further enforced the developing Sunni theology.  
The Abbasid Revolution (746-750) resulted in the destruction of the 
Umayyads’ political institution and supplanted it with the Abbasids’ own. Yet, the 
Abbasids kept the Islamic narrative just like the Umayyads had done, which at 
that time had become the “objective truth” in the society. El-Hibri (1999, p. 3) 
describes the Abbasid revolution as part of a greater movement, which was 
believed to be messianic in nature and would usher in a new age of Islamic revival. 
According to Kennedy (2004, p. 123), in the ninety years of Umayyad rule, there 
was a growing general assumption among discontented Muslims that the problem 
of the umma could only be solved by a leader from what he calls the ‘Holy 
Family’ of Muhammad,. While in the later period of Muslim history the Holy 
Family was taken as the descendants of Ali and Fatima and their Shi’a followers, 
the ahl al-Bayt, during the end of the first century of hijra, the Shi’a were not 
consolidated enough to claim this exceptionalism. There were several branches of 
the Prophet’s family who claimed the right to rule, one of whom were the 
Abbasids. Riding on this sentiment, the Abbasids then cultivated the narrative that 
the Holy Family consisted of descendants of Hashim, thus including the Alids and 
the Abbasids but excluding the Umayyads (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 123–124). 
The Abbasids’ claim of authority was not uncontested. The Shi’a were 
developing their political and theological concepts and continued to threaten the 
authority of the Abbasid Caliphs. For example, as early as 762 CE, the Shi’a 
orchestrated a massive revolt over the Abbasids’ authority and undermined their 
legitimacy by accusing them of betraying their oath of allegiance to the Shi’i 
leader, Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (El-Hibri, 1999, pp. 4–5). Later, a branch 
of Shi’ism, the Ismaili Shi’a, founded the Fatimid Caliphate in 909 CE which 
made Cairo the centre of learning for Ismaili Shi’a and challenged the Sunni part 
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of the umma, in both the East and the West for four generations (Halm, 1991, pp. 
170–177). Starting in 945 CE, the Abbasid Caliphate itself was controlled by the 
Buyids, a military family who professed the Ithna’Ashari branch of Shi’ism 
(Kennedy, 2004, p. 227).   
The constant attack on their legitimacy prompted the Abbasid Caliphs to 
develop more elaborate legitimation for their claim to authority. This drove the 
development of Islamic political theory to support the political practice of the 
caliphate. Although large territory was absorbed into the Muslim political entity, 
the wide variance of local cultures and social groups also necessitated the 
development of more sophisticated tools to maintain the unity of the umma. The 
Qur’an had provided Muslims with motivation to establish and maintain the umma. 
It, however, did not provide them with details on the operational part. Muslim 
intellectuals endeavoured to answer this challenge by developing derivative social 
and political concepts in relation to the umma. Usually, political entities drew their 
authority from historical milestones, be that the history of a nation or history of a 
certain personage. However, Islam cut ties to the past. Historical accounts of both 
Arab and non-Arab nations or personal lineage to some extent did not hold sway 
in Muslim society. It was imperative for Muslim intellectuals to pool their efforts 
and fill this theoretical void by developing a concept of authority in line with 
Islamic teachings, all to serve the umma (Kennedy, 2000, pp. 18–19).  
One of the treatises that provides discussion of the political institution of 
the umma is the work of al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya or the Ordinances of 
Government. It is the perfect example of the levels of legitimation process 
articulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 127–129). Before al-Mawardi’s 
Ordinances, the umma and the caliphate were more of a myth, remnants from the 
time of the Prophet. The scholars of sira and hadith then developed it further, 
under the Umayyad’s patronage, into a structured theological knowledge based on 
reliable narrators. Al-Mawardi took the legitimation step further by describing the 
umma and the caliphate in the language of political philosophy and political 
instrumentality. This effort increased the level of legitimacy supporting the 
institution of the caliphate and the Sunni interpretation of the umma.   
The institution of caliphate was rejuvenated when Sulayman I of the 
Ottoman took the title in 1540 CE. Sulayman I adopted the title in order to gain 
equal footing with Charles V who had been inaugurated as the Holy Roman 
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Emperor in 1519 CE (Imber, 2010, p. 350). After taking the mantle of the 
caliphate, the Ottomans paid close attention to the affairs of the Muslim world, 
near and far. They expanded their diplomatic missions and trade envoys to various 
Muslim locales, for example.  
While their initial motive in adopting the title of the caliphate was 
certainly not entirely altruistic, the Ottomans inadvertently adopted the framework 
of Islamic virtue and solidarity embedded in the Qur’an. They tried to be the 
“proper” caliph, as can be seen through both symbolic and practical efforts of the 
Ottoman caliphs. To further strengthen their authority over the umma, the 
Ottomans developed political legitimation based on Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya, thus 
lending them credence leading the umma by virtue of having a strong solidarity. 
The Ottomans also became patron of various Sufi orders, including the 
Naqshbandiyya. With this, they sought to become the legitimate ruler of the 
Muslim world and to integrate the umma under their banner. However, in late 
eighteenth century, the Ottomans, facing external challenges and internal 
inefficiencies, decided to adopt Western values and started the Tanzimat reform. 
This marked the defeat of Islam as a central political concept and the umma with it.  
Intellectual networks and translocality 
The flourishing of knowledge, especially during the Abbasid era, was 
driven by the believers’ perspective that seeking knowledge is a sacred duty for 
Muslims. As detailed in Chapter Three, Muslim intellectuals were both motivated 
and conditioned by their Islamic environment; they established an intellectual 
culture distinctively Islamic by combining religious rituals with intellectual rituals. 
The result was the development of bodies of knowledge based on holy texts and 
Islamic worldviews (Grunebaum, 1955, p. 111). They were open to knowledge 
developed by other intellectual traditions but would made adjustments before 
adopting the foreign knowledge.   
While they could work in a solitary environment, Collins (1998, p. 21) 
argues that scholars would gain benefits by being members of an intellectual 
network or chain. Through this intellectual network, scholars could participate in 
intellectual ritual and gain bursts of enthusiasm, which Collins calls “emotional 
energy”. Scholars can also collect symbols acknowledged by the intellectual 
world -- what is termed “cultural capital” -- and increasing one’s standing in the 
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intellectual world. The description of this intellectual ritual and its effects on the 
participating scholars are seemingly parallel to Geertz’s (1973) definition of 
religious ritual and its effects on the believers. In the case of Muslim scholars, 
since they believed that pursuing knowledge was a duty according to the hadith, 
they did not make a distinction between intellectual and religious, thus 
intensifying the practice of intellectual/religious rituals and networks throughout 
the Muslim lands. Through intellectual networks, Muslim scholars gained 
knowledge and symbols important to their social standing, such as a certificate 
(ijaza) from prestigious schools in Mecca or Medina or being part of a student-
chain (isnad) to a renowned scholar. 
The presence of intellectual/religious networks throughout the Muslim 
lands connected various Muslim locales into a translocal network of intellectuals. 
This helped in bridging geographically distant areas into one, integrated, society 
and cultivating the development of a consciousness in the minds of Muslims that 
transcended their parochial consciousness. This integration could be seen in the 
culture of rihla among Muslim scholars. Gellens (1990) describes how rihla as a 
social phenomenon connected various parts of Muslim society in one 
interconnected web of interactions. Various learning centres such as Mecca, 
Medina, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Cairo had become the destination of Muslims 
throughout the world. When young scholars from Indonesia or Andalusia 
journeyed to the learning centres, they underwent a translocal journey which 
broadened their perspective. Even after they returned home, the experience would 
be embedded deep within their consciousness and it changed them. 
Yet, not only Muslim scholars gained benefit from this extensive 
intellectual network. Kings and the general populace also reaped considerable 
benefit by connecting their realm with the greater umma. Thanks to the 
intertwined nature of intellectual and religious rituals, by joining the Muslim 
intellectual network, a local population gained not only religious knowledge but 
often access to better medicine or sanitation or other kinds of developments. With 
the network also came political influence and power. There is an account which 
describes how kings from Bornu and Songhay sought the attention of the West 
African scholar Jamal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505), hoping that by gaining his 
service in their courts, the scholar could help the kings in obtaining formal 
recognition as vice-regents of the Abbasid caliph (Reichmuth, 2000, p. 427).  
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The established Muslim intellectual networks also helped the integration 
of the umma by promoting social mobility for Muslims, irrespective of their 
origins. Being a member of the network opened the chance for anyone to prosper 
and gain achievements. Islam came to Indonesia at least from the eleventh century 
and had been established as the majority religion in the area by the sixteenth 
century (Attas, 1969, pp. 29–30). Its location and limited influence on the 
supposed centre of the Muslim world might have attested to Indonesia’s 
peripheral status. Yet, the presence of translocal intellectual networks allowed 
Indonesian Muslims to take a great role in the Muslim world. One such example, 
as we have seen in Chapter Three, is Syaikh Yusuf al-Maqassari (d. 1699). A 
scholar from Makassar, eastern Indonesia, he went to hajj and afterward stayed in 
Medina and studied under Sayyid Shibghat Allah ibn Ruh Allah Jamal al-Barjawi 
(d. 1606), a scholar from Bharuch, India. He is considered an influential figure in 
the spreading of Islam in the Cape peninsula where he had been subsequently 
exiled (Blij, 1969, pp. 246–247).  
The Islamic intellectual networks became an instrument of the global 
umma by providing an intellectual narrative supporting the idea of the global 
umma, thus supporting the legitimation process, and transmitting this intellectual 
narrative to various locales within the Muslim world. It also became evidence of 
the global umma, thus helping with the objectivation process. The abstract global 
consciousness was realised in a tangible way and was an easy to understand 
phenomenon by allowing Muslims from one locale to move and gain cultural 
capital in another, for example by visiting Mecca and studying there. While not all 
Muslims were part of these intellectual networks, many others would be in 
connection and interaction with those who were. In this sense, the Muslim 
scholars had become the carrier of the global consciousness and interaction with 
them would trigger a transference process, maybe unwittingly “infecting” the 
other party with at least a partial consciousness that their territory was connected 
to a greater, larger Islamic world. This is in accordance with the transference 
process, which Friedman (2007) describes as one of the defining characteristics of 
contemporary globalisation. 
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Another Form of Transference: Sufi networks 
The declining power of the Abbasids and the emergence of rival caliphates 
in Cairo and Cordoba did not disturb the intellectual networks. If anything, these 
political developments stimulated intellectual activities. After the establishment of 
the Umayyad Caliphate in al-Andalus, the flow of scholars from the Umayyad 
cities did not decline. Fierro (2005, pp. 134–135) describes that the Caliph 
Abdurrahman III encouraged the Andalusian scholars to adopt the Maliki school 
of law and foster strong cooperation with the Maliki scholars of Medina. Through 
this intellectual link with the legacy of Muhammad, Abdurrahman III managed to 
strengthen his claim as the Caliph and to counter both the Fatimids’ and the 
Abbasids’ propaganda against him.  
The destruction of Baghdad in 1258 CE, however, was different. It 
shocked Muslim society. It halted many scientific and intellectual endeavours. It 
sacked one of the most beautiful cities in the Islamic world. The caliphate had 
been accepted as a natural course of the Islamic governance over the umma, yet 
suddenly it was destroyed. Muslim scholars considered this destruction as a divine 
portent and al-Suyuti (1881, pp. 500–503) quotes elegies lamenting the 
destruction. The Mamluks established the caliphate in Egypt several years later 
but it was without power or glory. It was no more than a shadow of its former self. 
The shock had been profound and felt widely, and this pushed the development of 
alternative forms of religiosity. The movement to capture the spirit of Islam 
through mysticism had been growing since the tenth century CE but Sufism 
gained true prominence in the Muslim society after the destruction of Baghdad 
(Trimingham, 1971, p. 22). 
Sufi brotherhoods established networks through chains of silsila between 
teacher to student, not unlike the intellectual networks established by various 
schools of thought earlier. Sufism, however, strengthened these chains using a 
specialised form of chants (dhikr) and appropriating Sufi shaikhs as walis. This 
eventually developed Sufi orders into more cohesive and strongly bonded groups, 
comparable to the madhhabs. Their lodges could be found in rural areas, thus 
allowing the Sufis to penetrate geographical areas previously untouched by 
instruments of Muslim society. The scattered lodges also resulted in an intensified 
culture of travelling in Sufism. Sufis often travelled to visit shaikhs residing in 
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particular lodges or, after the shaikhs’ death, travelled to visit their tombs. This 
activity, known as ziyara, stimulated travelling in various Muslim locales and 
providing other destinations for pilgrims other than the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. Trimingham (1971) describes in detail the evolution of Sufi orders. Early 
Sufism could be considered as intensification of Islamic piety. Sufis sought to 
connect directly to God, finding no interest in the contestation and conflicts 
among the madhhabs (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 12–14). Later, Sufi orders started to 
put more emphasis on the role of the shaikh and developed their chains of 
studentship, just as the madhhab and Muslim centres of learning in general had 
also established their own intellectual chains, isnad (Trimingham, 1971, p. 10). 
Eventually, the shaikh ascended to the status of saint and only he could discern the 
ultimate truth. The orders lost their mystical creativity by institutionalising rituals 
according to the shaikh’s instruction but, at the same time, this allowed the 
general populace to take part in the Sufi rituals without having to initiate 
themselves in deeper mysteries (Trimingham, 1971, pp. 71–103). 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the flourishing of Sufism brought Sufi orders 
to various part of the Islamic world. The examples in Chapter Six, the 
Naqshbandiyya and the Tijaniyya, were capable of connecting disparate Muslim 
lands. The Naqshbandiyya was founded in Bukhara yet then spread to Central 
Asia and became a popular order in the area. In addition to connecting various 
territories, the Naqshbandi shaikhs also played an important role in cultural 
integration by translating important works from Persian into Turkish or Arabic 
(Le Gall, 2005, pp. 172–173). The Tijaniyya, on the other hand, was founded in 
Fez. Under the leadership of Umar ibn Sa’id Tall, the Tijaniyya established a 
caliphate that encompassed contemporary Guinea, Senegal and Mali, integrating 
the region to a wider trans-Saharan trade network (Lydon, 2009, pp. 116–118). 
The umma as a global society?  
Society has been an important part of our life. While traditionally the 
concept of society was in practice bound by state or tribal boundaries, it is no 
longer so (Elias, 2001a, pp. 162–163). Scholars have contested the claim of the 
nation-state to be the natural unit of organisation and affiliation, such as argued by 
Held (2005, p. 10). Indeed, with the intensification of translocal interactions and 
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networks due to the development of transportation and communication technology, 
the world is slowly integrated into “a single, integrated and interdependent world” 
(Jaffe, 2006). Yet, is this integration unique to our contemporary world? Scholars 
such as Abu-Lughod (1989) and Frank and Gills (1996) disagree. Although they 
differ as to the number of historic world systems, according to them, our world 
has been interconnected and integrated in a world system from long ago. 
Robertson (2011) does not give details on the form of  world-wide connectivity as 
they do; instead, he usefully highlights the presence of a global consciousness that 
presupposes the global connection.  
This thesis takes on this debate and further proposes that one candidate for 
historical world systems articulated by Abu-Lughod is the Islamic umma, and 
specifically seeks to answer two particular questions: “how did the early Islamic 
society develop global consciousness?” and “how was the concept of the umma 
developed in relation both to the concept of global consciousness and to the 
concept and historical formation of a global society?” To answer these questions, I 
build a theoretical framework based on social constructionism articulated by 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) to illustrate the development of a social reality 
called  “the umma”. Geertz’s (1973) explanation as to how religion and religious 
rituals are capable of providing mood and motivation to the believers is 
indispensable to understand how Islamic teaching could inspire and motivate the 
believers to create such a transformative social movement by forming and 
maintaining the umma. Conceptual developments in the field of international 
relations, especially those of the English school such as Burton (1972), Wight 
(1977), Bull (2002) and Buzan (2004) are crucial to the development of a 
definition of “global society” as an instrument to reflect on the development of the 
umma. 
To answer the first question, “how did the early Islamic society develop 
global consciousness”, I argue that the early Islamic society developed global 
consciousness through reflecting the spiritual teaching of Islam and through 
several networks -- namely, intellectual, political and legal-institutional and 
mystical networks. That the teaching of Islam had changed the societal practice in 
the Arabian Peninsula is supported by various accounts, from both classical 
Muslim tradition and contemporary scholars. The ease of the first generation 
Muslims in embracing the societal nature of the umma was based on their 
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understanding of the Islamic teaching that God is One and that men are created to 
live together (Khadduri, 1955, p. 3). This emphasis on unity is caused by the 
foremost doctrine in Islam, which is tawhid or the Oneness of  God. There are also 
verses in the Qur’an which emphasise the unity of mankind according to Islam, 
such as Qur’an 49:13, which, according to al-Suyuti, was delivered to admonish 
the racial behaviour of early Muslims (Suyuti, 2008, p. 530). The teaching of the 
Qur’an sets the moods for Muslims to maintain unity in their society. Furthermore, 
the Prophet had also established a unified society in Medina, which then 
developed into what Arjomand (2009, p. 271) describes as the Pax Islamica 
movement. This is in line with what Robertson and Inglish (2006, p. 30) define as 
a global consciousness: a consciousness of the world as a whole, interconnected 
and interdependent. 
Observing the efforts of Muhammad to build the umma through the 
perspective of the norm diffusion process, this thesis assumes that after the Qur’an 
had provided the Muslims with a type of global consciousness, Muhammad 
adopted it as a new norm and, as its first and foremost norm enterpreneur, set out 
to actualise this norm in the Quraysh society of Mecca. Finding resistance from 
the Quraysh, however, Muhammad embarked upon a social process, the hijra, 
which then triggered the establishment of the umma in Medina. The consciousness 
of the umma went through the norm life cycle discussed by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998, pp. 895–902). It emerged during the hijra, it reached the tipping 
point after the conquest of Mecca and entered the second stage, norm cascade, in 
the years afterwards. The death of Muhammad had been a blow to the 
development of this norm, as seen by the various secessionist movements 
challenging the unity of the umma, but Abu Bakr as the successor of Muhammad 
managed to reaffirm the dominance of the umma.  
The later caliphs might have adopted the concept of umma in order to 
provide legitimation for their claim of authority over the vast territories of the 
Muslim world, but their continuous usage of Islamic rituals, symbols and rhetoric 
to strengthen their political position in turn helped to enforce the imagery of the 
umma in the mind of the general populace. Expressed in Berger's and Luckmann’s 
(1966) terminology, they helped to foster the objectivation and institutionalisation 
processes of the idea of the umma, turning it into a coherent social reality. There is 
a possibility, of course, that this adoption of idea of the umma might have been 
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driven by non-religious motives, but, even so, it would not alter the fact that they 
had facilitated the actualisation of the idea. That norm adopters often adopt norms 
in accordance with their pragmatic interests is common, yet, doing so, they 
invariably engage with the moral discourse brought by the norm, as argued by 
Risse-Kappen and Sikkink (1999, pp. 15–16).  
The institution of the caliphate was important in the maintenance of the 
umma because it also provided structural support for the idea. As Berger and 
Luckmann (1966, pp. 134–146) have described, an idea requires a social structure 
to support and maintain it. An idea is considered pragmatically superior against 
other contending ideas not by its intrinsic qualities but by its applicability to the 
social interest of the supporting group. Thus, the flourishing of the caliphate and 
its pragmatic achievements were considered as evidence of the superiority of the 
idea of the umma. It is understandable if the fall of the Abbasid caliphate was then 
considered as the fall of the umma itself. The same could be understood from the 
fall of the Ottoman caliphate. Yet, this thesis has demonstrated that despite the fall 
of the Abbasids, the umma was, to some extent, sustained. The networks of 
intellectuals and Sufi orders were among the evidence of the presence of the 
translocal connections and integration present in the Muslim world. 
The development of bodies of knowledge to support the umma as the 
natural social order, such as the works of al-Mawardi, Nizam al-Mulk, al-Ghazali 
and many others, helped to establish the legitimacy of the umma. These books 
attempted to justify the presence of the umma and the figure of authority over it, 
be that the caliph or the sultan, in accordance with the political situation at their 
times. By engaging the concept of the  umma with the reality of their time and 
trying to systematise their arguments on authority over the umma, these scholars 
raised the legitimacy level of the umma from that of mythology to philosophy 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 127–129). The networks of intellectuals then 
helped the proliferation of these philosophical debates and facilitated the 
transference of the embedded global consciousness to the corners of the Muslim 
world. More than being the medium of transference, this thesis argues that the 
presence of intellectual networks in the Muslim world connected various 
geographically distant locales and provided an avenue for social mobilisation 
among Muslim scholars. Thus, the networks also served as an indicator of the 
actualisation of the global consciousness into a translocal society.    
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The second question follows: “how was the concept of the umma 
developed in relation both to the concept of global consciousness and to the 
concept and historical formation of a global society?” I argue that the global 
consciousness embedded in the Islamic teaching solidified into a translocal, but 
not encompassing global, society, which in the Islamic vocabulary is referred to as 
the umma. The presence of the caliphate, and networks of intellectuals and Sufi 
orders extensively described in the previous chapters, are the indicators that the 
umma was a social reality and had the characteristics of translocal society. Yet, 
was this translocal society truly global in the sense that it, quoting Shaw (2000, p. 
10), had “the quality involved in the worldwide stretching of social relations”?    
Reflecting on the discussion in the previous chapters, I conclude that the 
presence of a truly global umma that connected and encompassed the whole world 
in networks of social relations was, and is, questionable. The Umayyad caliphate 
never ruled the entire world. Even during their peak, the Abbasids and the 
Ottomans had to share their authority with contending caliphates or other political 
actors. The networks of scholars in the Muslim intellectual world or the Sufi 
brotherhoods were expansive and extended well beyond the caliphate’s political 
influence, especially in the later years, but there were still parts of the world which 
were not included in the network because of various reasons. The exclusion of 
non-Muslim societies from these networks is obvious but more subtle questions 
such as “should the non-Muslim intellectuals in the Muslim world be considered 
as part of the Muslim intellectual network” or “should the presence of an 
independent Sufi order be considered as part of a global Sufi movement” posit 
challenges to the idea that the umma was a truly global society. 
This thesis then arrives at its conclusion that the “global umma” resided at 
the conceptual level of belief, calling Muslims to venture towards it. The Qur’an 
taught it. Islamic rituals provided the mood and motivations to actualise it. It 
perpetuated and permeated Islam and Islamic teaching and Muslims inevitably 
internalised the concept with their religious experience. As an example, a Muslim 
might have considered performing the ritual of hajj as his or her religious duty. In 
so doing, interacting in the charged multicultural environment of Mecca, pilgrims 
from various geographical areas were likely to envision the Muslim umma in 
global terms. Once home, the perceived global society would have formed an 
integrated part of their religious narrative – in this sense, an integral part of their 
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religious experience. Yet the global society as an established fact –a concrete, 
regularised and institutionalised existence– was and remains an aspiration. In a 
word, therefore:  global consciousness has inspired the idea of a global society but 
the reality is of a translocal, rather than truly global, society.     
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